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CHICANA/CHICANO LAND TENURE
IN THE AGRARIAN DOMAIN:
ON THE EDGE OF A "NAKED KNIFE"t
Guadalupe T. Luna*
Neither sovereignty nor property rights could forestall American geopo-
litical expansion in the first half of the nineteenth century. The conflicts
that resulted from this clash of doctrine with desire are perhaps most evi-
dent in the history of the Chicanas/Chicanos of Texas, California, and the
Southwest, who sought to maintain their land and property, as guaran-
teed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in the aftermath of the U.S.-
Mexico War. Integrating an exploration of case law with political and so-
cial histories of the period, the Author explores the sociolegal significance
of Chicana/Chicano land dispossession; exposes the racial, economic, and
political motivations of the legislators, judges, and attorney's involved;
and demonstrates the internal incoherence of land grant doctrine. Fo-
cusing on the material relationship of the past to the present, the author
seeks to establish linkages between the past roles of law and legal struc-
tures in dispossessing Chicanas/Chicanos of their land and their present
roles in structuring Chicana/Chicano political and economic subordina-
tion in the agricultural sector. The author concludes that the study of
Mexican land dispossession suggests both the need to expand the tradi-
tional approach to teaching property law as well as the importance of
deploying the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and international law in the
struggle for racial equity.
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INTRODUCTION
Law is not a water-tight compartment sealed or shut off from
contact with the drama of life which unfolds before our eyes. It
is in no sense a cloistered realm but a busy state in which
events are held up to our vision and touch at our elbows.1
As early as 1885, the federal courts evinced clear awareness of
their dubious record in deciding disputes between Mexican land-
owners and American settlers in the Southwest. In United States v.
San Jacinto Tin Company,2 the court poignantly addressed the subject
as follows:
Those familiar with the notorious public history of land
titles in this state need not be told that our people com-
ing from the states east of the Rocky Mountains very
generally denied the validity of Spanish grants... and,
determining the rights of the holders for themselves,
selected tracts of land wherever it suited their purpose,
without regard to the claims and actual occupation of
holders under Mexican grants .... Many of the older,
best-authenticated, and most-desirable grants in the
state were thus, more or less, covered by trespassing
settlers. When the claims of Mexican grantees came to
be presented for confirmation, these settlers aided the
United States; the most formidable opposition usually
1. Wortham v. Walker, 128 S.W.2d 1138, 1150 (Tex. 1939).
2. 23 F. 279 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885).
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coming from them, first, to the confirmation of the
grants, on every imaginable ground, of which the most
frequent was fraud in some form at some stage of the
proceedings. When confirmed, and the officers of the
government came to the location, the contest became
still more vigorous and acrimonious; the trespassing set-
tlers, or adverse claimants... would seek to move the
location ... in opposition to confirmation .... Charges of
fraud are easily made, and they were by no means spar-
ingly made by incensed defeated parties, and these
reckless charges by disappointed trespassing and op-
posing claimants, in many instances, as in this case,
involved the officers of the government, as well as the
claimants under the grant.
3
This Article investigates the dispossession of Chicanas/
Chicanos4 from their property interests following the war between
the United States and the Republic of Mexico ("U.S.-Mexico War").5
3. 23 F. at 295-96.
4. "Mexican" nationals include citizens of Mexico. The term "Chicanas/
Chicanos" refers to individuals of Mexican descent in the United States after the
Conquest of the former Mexican Territories. The terms are used interchangeably
with emphasis on "self-designations." See generally GENARO M. PADILLA, MY
HISTORY, NOT YOURS (1993) (describing the importance of allowing people to name
their own identity). For an alternative designation, see ANA CASTILLO, MASSACRE OF
THE DREAMERS 12 (1994), which employs the term "Xicanisma." Castillo encourages
Xicanistas to "not only reclaim [their] indigenismo but also reinsert the forsaken
feminine into [their] consciousness." Id. For information concerning the indigenous
heritage of people of Mexican ancestry, see RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO &
ARNOLDO DE LEON, NORTH TO AZTLAN, A HISTORY OF MEXICAN AMERICANS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1996). Griswold del Castillo and De Le6n assert that the indigenous
background of Mexicans derives from "the tribes and groups that populated Amer-
ica before Christopher Columbus's voyage. Along with most Mexicans, Chicanos are
also Mestizos-a biological as well as cultural mixture of Indian and Spanish with
some traces of African and Asian peoples." Id. at 7.
The Mexican period is distinguished from the Spanish governance of the
provinces. See generally Ely's Adm'r v. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 228 (1898) (noting
Mexico's declaration of independence from Spain on February 24, 1821).
5. The war between the two Republics began on May 13, 1846. Lisbeth Haas
reports that "its immediate causes... stemmed from the United States' annexation of
Texas." Lisbeth Haas, War in California, 1846-1848, in CONTESTED EDEN, CALIFORNIA
BEFORE THE GOLD RUSH 331, 333 (Ram6n A. Guti6rrez & Richard J. Orsi eds., 1998).
Imperialism and the doctrine of Manifest Destiny encouraged westward expansion
in the 19th century, see FREDERICK MERK, MANIFEST DESTINY AND MISSION IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1963), and it is well established that the United States long had
coveted Mexico's northern provinces. See A. BROOKE CARUSO, THE MEXICAN SPY
COMPANY, UNITED STATES COVERT OPERATIONS IN MEXICO, 1845-1848, at 5 (1991)
(reporting that President Adams "made no less than three [unsuccessful] attempts to
induce Mexico to sell [Texas] to the United States") After Mexico's refusals, President
Andrew Jackson attempted to purchase key regions of Mexican territory; he also
became the first American president to direct American continental acquisition
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The admission, by at least one federal court,6 of the widespread
abuses that occurred during the nineteenth century suggests that
one might reasonably expect to find some mention of them within
traditional legal education in the contemporary period. Not only
were these actions the type of "abuses" that often attract at least
academic discussion, they -also constituted the means by which pri-
vate citizens gained title to vast amounts of rural property.
Nevertheless, legal scholarship and classroom discussions are virtu-
ally silent on the matter.
This gap in legal history does not result from a lack of present
relevance.7 A fundamental issue in both property and agricultural
law8 involves the reconciliation of conflicts between the ownership
rights of fee holders and certain governmental actions.9 Academic
efforts toward the Mexican ports of Monterrey and San Francisco. See id. Because he
sought to expand the United States to all Mexican territories, Andrew Jackson,
whether in or out of office, proved a continuous threat to Mexico's security for the
next 20 years. See id.
For an account of westward expansion into territory formerly belonging to
Mexican landholders, see generally Southern Pacific Railroad v. Brown, 68 F. 333
(C.C.S.D. Cal. 1895), in which the court discussed land granted by the Mexican
goverrunent and later awarded by the U.S. government to railroad companies. For
another detailed discussion, see generally WILLIAM H. GOETZMANN, WHEN THE
EAGLE SCREAMED: THE ROMANTIC HORIZON IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1800-1860
(1966).
6. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
7. For example, property law exposes students to chain of title issues. Broome v.
Lantz, 294 P. 709 (Cal. 1930), presents a chain-of-title fact pattern of property once
held under Mexican ownership. That case describes Isabel Yorba and her ranch,
Guadalasca, dating back to 1836. During her tenure as property owner, Yorba con-
veyed various parts of the ranch. Whether she conveyed her property under duress
is a further point of interest. Finally, the gap in legal history obscures the extent to
which property titles throughout the Southwest derive from the land grant periods.
As the Supreme Court noted at the time, "[w]hen the sovereignty of Spain was dis-
placed by the revolutionary action of Mexico, the new government established
regulations [for granting public lands to individuals]. These two sovereignties are
the spring heads of all land titles in California ...." United States v. Moreno, 68 U.S.
400, 403 (1863).
8. Agricultural law encompasses the realm of federal and state regulatory
structures that expedite food production in the United States and entry into foreign
markets. See KEITH MEYER ET AL., AGRICULTURAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (1985).
9. Students of property law conceptualize property rights as a "bundle of
sticks." Board of County Comm'rs v. Conder, 927 P.2d 1339, 1352 (Colo. 1996)
(Kourlis, J., dissenting); see also JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW, RULES, POLICIES AND
PRACTICES 3 (1994) ("Property rights concern relations among people regarding
control of valued resources."). Anglo-American jurisprudence has a longstanding
tradition, expressed in Constitutional and legislative provisions as well as court
rulings, of protecting these bundles of sticks from overly intrusive governmental
actions. For example, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in part:
"Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V., cl. 4. The Federal Takings Clause applies not only to the federal
government but also to state governments by incorporation through the Due Process
[VOL. 4:39
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inquiry also examines how those conflicts impact the country's natu-
ral resources. Notwithstanding the breadth of these fields of study,
the literature generally excludes reference to Chicana/Chicano land
dispossession.'" This Article seeks to provide a partial remedy for
that exclusion."
Prior to the U.S.-Mexico War, the Mexican government
awarded and recognized private and communally held 2 grants of
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
10. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY (3d ed. 1993) (ex-
tensively discussing property acquisition by discovery, capture, creation, find,
adverse possession, and gift, but omitting the enormous history of property owner-
ship and governmental actions as they affected Chicana/Chicano land disposition).
Land use texts also fail to examine the historical underpinnings of land distribution
law, which arose from land grant adjudication law. See, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR &
MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING, A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE AND
RE-USE OF URBAN LAND (4th ed. 1989). These omissions result in an imprecise legal
history and deprive students of the opportunity to address complex analytic exer-
cises that stem from the difficult task of reconciling land grant adjudication with
prior American legal principles.
Regarding the invisibility of Latinas/Latinos in law generally, see Berta E.
Hemandez-Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities,
Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 369 (1994); Kevin Johnson, Los
Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law
and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REv. 1139 (1993); Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts On
The Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 101 (1997); Juan F.
Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Indivisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 965 (1995).
11. Although Chicana/Chicano dispossession touches on numerous compelling
issues that require further scholarly investigations, space constraints permit the
enumeration of only a few. For example, the jurisprudence from the annexation
period encompasses federalism considerations. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez,
184 U.S. 441, 444 (1902) (questioning whether, after the private land claims court
confirms a land grant, a court can without explanation "entertain a supplemental
petition for the value of certain parcels disposed of and patented by the United States
to third parties before the filing of the original petition"); Gunn v. Bates, 6 Cal. 263,
266 (1855) ("California is an independent sovereignty, and the Federal Courts have
no right or power to interfere with the decisions of this Court.").
This review also omits discussion of water rights litigation. However, infor-
mation on that litigation as it involved the former Mexican territories can generally
be found in Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land & Irrigation Co., 188 U.S. 545 (1903); Mann v.
Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273 (1894); Miller v. Letzerich, 49 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1932).
These conflicts extend into the present. See Richard D. Garcia & Todd Howland,
Determining the Legitimacy of Spanish Land Grants in Colorado: Conflicting Values, Legal
Pluralism, and Demystification of the Sangre de Cristo/Rael Case, 16 CHICANO-LATINO L.
REV. 39 (1995).
12. Empresario grants entitled groups to live on large tracts of land. See Vernon B.
Hill, Spanish and Mexican Land Grants Between the Nueces and Rio Grande, 5 S. TEX. L.
REv. 47, 47 (1960). Communal living was valued because it permitted people living
on semi-arid tracts to access scarce water resources. American courts, however,
disallowed communal rights. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 298
(1897). In rejecting these rights, United States courts failed to consider colonial
American laws that permitted colonists to hold communal property. For a discussion
FALL 19981
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property throughout its territories." After the Conquest," the United
States annexed the former Mexican territories through the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo ("Treaty"). 5 In establishing new national geo-
graphic borders, the Treaty also obligated the United States to
provide grantees in the annexed areas citizenship status and to pro-
tect their fee interests.7 Notwithstanding the promises contained in
the Treaty, grantees of Mexican descent and their successors in title
experienced the loss of the very property interests the Treaty
pledged to protect. 8
of such laws and practices, see EDWARD T. PRICE, DIVIDING THE LAND, EARLY
AMERICAN BEGINNINGS OF OUR PRIVATE PROPERTY MOSAIC 29-48 (1995).
13. Rural Mexican estates of varying sizes included, for example, Rancho San
Antonio, Canon de San Diego, and Rancho San Francisquito. See, e.g., Chaves v.
United States, 168 U.S. 177 (1897) (San Antonio and San Diego); United States v.
Rodriguez, 25 F. Cas. 821 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 14,950) (San Francisquito).
14. For an account of the provocation between the countries as a factor leading
to alienation, see RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE
HIDALGO, A LEGACY OF CONFLICT 83-86 (1990), which discussed hostilities in Texas
and subsequent alienation. Other scholars assert that the alienation followed from
the actions of the Mexican ruling elite who, by arguing for privatizing communal
grants prior to annexation, set the stage for post-annexation partition actions under
Anglo-American law. See Robert D. Shadow & Maria Rodriguez-Shadow, From
Repartici6n to Partition: A History of the Mora Land Grant, 1835-1916, 70 N.M. HIST.
REV. 257, 270 (1995).
15. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the United States of
America and the Republic of Mexico, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848,
U.S.-Mex., art. IX, 9 Stat. 922, 930 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].
16. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, arts. V-VII, supra note 15, at 926-29. Carto-
graphic errors in a map relied on in negotiating the Treaty engendered a "prolonged
dispute that resulted in the Gadsden Treaty in 1854." GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra
note 14, at 56; The Disturnell map was a "reprint of 1828 plagiarism of an 1826 re-
production of an 1822 publication titled Mapa de Los Estados Unidos de M6jico,
published by H.S. Tanner, of Phildelphia." Id. see also HUNTER MILLER, Treaty of Gua-
dalupe Hidalgo, Documents 122-150: 1846-1852, 5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 207, 414-21 (1937). For an analysis of the
geographical dispute in case law, see Ainsa v. United States, 161 U.S. 208 (1895)
(adjudicating a land claim under the Gadsden Purchase). See also Camou v. United
States, 171 U.S. 277, 287 (1898) (addressing a land dispute deriving from the Gadsden
Treaty); State v. Gallardo, 135 S.W. 664, 670-71 (1911) (leaving boundary question for
future determination between Texas and Mexico).
17. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15, at 929-30.
18. For example, by the 1920s, the majority of grantees and their heirs in Texas
had long ago been dispossessed of their property holdings. See Rodolfo 0. de la
Garza & Karl Schmitt, Texas Land Grants & Chicano-Mexican Relations: A Case Study,
21 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 123, 125 (1986). Grantees of Spanish descent also lost their
property following the Conquest by the United States, but this Article focuses on
governance of the Southwest in the Mexican period. Specifically, the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo identifies those remaining after the Conquest as Mexicans.
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, art. VIII, supra note 15, at 929 ("Mexicans are now
established in territories previously belonging to Mexico .... ).
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Scholars outside of legal academia have long investigated the
issue of Chicana/Chicano property dispossession. 9 Three theories
regarding the origins of Chicana/Chicano alienation from their
property interests emerge from these scholars' work. Two of these
theories attribute alienation to differences between Anglo-American
and Mexican property law, while the third relies on cultural differ-
ences.
The first theory places responsibility for property dispossession
on the substantive differences between United States common law
and Mexican civil law.20 Adherents of this theory contend "[niot so
much that Americans ran roughshod over the legal rights of Mexi-
can landowners [but rather] that different traditions of property
rights came into conflict.",21 Such an argument is difficult to reconcile
with the Treaty, international law, constitutional provisions, and
subsequent congressional legislation obligating the United States to
protect the property rights of those remaining in the annexed territo-
ries.2 Thus, by relying on conflict between the different property
traditions, the first theory does not completely explain Chicana/
Chicano land alienation. 23
19. See, e.g., HUBERT O. BRAYER, WILLIAM BLACKMORE, THE NEW MEXICO LAND
GRANTS OF NEW MEXICO AND COLORADO (1949); MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS
AND LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO (1994); WILLIAM GREY, A PICTURE OF
PIONEER TIMES IN CALIFORNIA (1881); William W. Morrow, Spanish and Mexican
Private Land Grants, in SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANTS 1, 15 (Carlos E. Cortes et
al. eds., 1974); Paul Gates, The California Land Act of 1851, 50 CAL. HIST. SOC'Y Q. 395
(1971).
20. "Civil law uses law codes as the main source of its rules, while Anglo-
American common law ... looks primarily to the decisions of judges for precedents
to govern its jurisprudence." EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 69. Contrary
to the English common law origins of U.S. law, Mexican law originated from the civil
law of Spain. See Manry v. Robison, 56 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Tex. 1932) (contrasting
American common law riparian rights with Roman civil law governing Spain and
Mexico); Miller v. Letzerich, 49 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. 1932) ("After the revolution by
which Mexico gained her independence, the Spanish civil law prevailed in connec-
tion with the decrees and statutes of the supreme government of Mexico.").
21. DAVID GUTIERREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN AMERICANS, MEXICAN
IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 23 (1995); see also Gordon Morris
Bakken, Mexican and American Land Policy: A Conflict of Cultures, 75 S. CAL. Q. 237
(1993) (describing the civil litigation process in Mexican California and its concilia-
tion system). In some instances, the differences are difficult to discern. See, e.g., Suhfol
v. Hepburn, 1 Cal. 254 (1850) (similarly interpreting possession under common and
civil law).
22. See discussion infra Part II. For a discussion of the role of a former sover-
eign's law in proving validity of a grant and American courts' disregard of
testimony regarding official jurisdiction as a source of construction of that law by the
antecedent government despite the lack of a practically available alternative, see
Hans W. Baade, The Historical Background of Texas Water Law, A Tribute to Jack Pope, 18
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 21-23 (1986).
23. Indeed, in the southwestern United States, several Mexican and Spanish legal
principles extend to the present. For example, the law of community property
FALL 19981
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A second theory argues that the procedural differences between
the systems led to the loss of property. Characterizing Anglo-Saxon
law approvingly as "exact, clear, and precise,, 24 while criticizing
Mexican legal institutions as employing "loose and careless meth-
ods,"' 5 proponents of this theory assert that "the defects in the
Spanish and Mexican records and titles," rather than the unfair
treatment of Mexican grantees, resulted in alienation.26 American
courts, however, did not always share this view. In Davis v. California
Powder Works,27 for example, the court declared that "[t]he Mexicans
of the Spanish race, like their progenitors, were a formal people, and
their officials were usually formal and careful in the administration
of their public affairs., 28 Thus, the second theory does not adequately
link Chicana/Chicano land dispossession to differences in proce-
dural administration of the laws.
The last theory asserts that the cultural differences between the
United States and Mexico produced dispossession of Mexican grant-
ees' property interests. 29 This theory posits that "the original holders
being Mexicans were improvident and really squandered [their
land] for riotous living."' As one author has noted, while early
remains in use. See SINGER, supra note 9, at 1078. For an account of the Spanish influ-
ence on Texan marital property law, see generally Hans W. Baade, The Form of
Marriage in Spanish and North America, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1975).
24. Gates, The California Land Act of 1851, supra note 19, at 405 (1971); see Paul
Gates, Pre-Henry George Land Warfare in California, in LAND AND LAW IN CALIFORNIA:
ESSAYS ON LAND POLICY 186 (Richard S. Kirkendall ed., 1991) (discussing the
"rigidity" of Anglo-Saxon law).
25. Morrow, supra note 19, at 15; see also Sena v. United States, 189 U.S. 233, 239
(1903) (favoring the U.S. government's interpretation of property boundaries due to
the "loose manner" in which Spanish land grants were made).
26. Morrow, supra note 19, at 15; cf WILLIAM W. ROBINSON, LAND IN CALIFORNIA
109 (1948) (discussing the typical lawyer's attitude that "condemnation of the whole
procedure comes only from those not familiar with the situation").
Other scholars, providing only limited references to legal causes, assert that
Mexican lands were lost because they were the spoils of war. See Harold Weiss, The
Texas Rangers Revisited: Old Themes and New Viewpoints, 97 S.W. HIST. Q. 621 (1994).
These discussions, however, fail to consider the extent to which the United States
breached its contractual and fiduciary-like obligations to grantees of Mexican de-
scent.
27. 24 P. 387, 388 (Cal. 1890).
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting White v. United States, 68
U.S. 660, 680-81 (1863)).
29. See DOUGLAS MONROY, THROWN AMONG STRANGERS: THE MAKING OF A
MEXICAN CULTURE IN FRONTIER CALIFORNIA 199 (1990) (discussing the "conflict of
legal cultures").
30. U.S. INDUST. COMM'N, REPORT ON AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL LABOR,
H.R. Doc. No. 57-1, at 952 (1901) (testimony of A.H. Naftzger, President and General
Manager of Southern California Fruit Exchange). Those who adhered to this theory
essentially viewed the land as wasted until American settlers arrived. Cf, e.g., Luco
v. United States, 64 U.S. 515, 524 (1859) ("The influx of American settlers had, from
the year 1849, given great value to these lands ... ").
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Anglo-Americans pejoratively characterized the Mexican population
as "indolent, ignorant, and backward, Americans of the late nine-
teenth century re-imagined the Californios as unhurried [and]
untroubled."3 This theory is grounded in part on the same de-
meaning ethnic stereotypes that shaped court decisions in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, evidence from
historical texts demonstrates the industry of Mexican grantees' landS 33
use practices. Cultural biases alone cannot justify any theory. The
lack of evidentiary support further demonstrates that this theory
fails as a sufficient explanation for Chicana/Chicano alienation.
Proponents of the above theories apparently ignore compel-
ling legal evidence demonstrating that, in dealing with Mexican
grantees' land, the United States failed to honor the Treaty of Gua-
dalupe Hidalgo and violated American constitutional norms
protecting against governmental instrusions on private property
rights. By subjecting them to shifting legal norms, American courts
subordinated Mexican grantees and their heirs as outsiders to the
American legal system, thereby diminishing their status as citizens,34
31. DAVID J. WEBER, THE SPANISH FRONTIER IN NORTH AMERICA 341 (1992)
("Anglo Americans controlled Texas and the writing of its history. They adopted the
story line of their propagandists and added an additional twist-they portrayed
themselves as heroic, a superior race of men .... "). Several scholars discuss this
revisionism. See, e.g., GREY, supra note 19, at 20-21 (noting that much of the history of
the war is rewritten by Anglo-Americans, constituting an account "full of exaggera-
tion, and so extravagant and absurd that it is not even amusing"); Rufus B. Sage,
Degenerate Inhabitants of New Mexico, in FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND, HIS-
TORICAL ROOTS OF THE MEXICAN AMERICANS 71, 71-75 (David Weber ed., 1973). For
examples of these characterizations at the time, compare United States v. Galbraith, 63
U.S. (22 How.) 89, 92 (1859), in which the court said "The Californians are a simple,
ignorant people," with THOMAS JEFFERSON FARNHAM, TRAVELS IN THE CALIFORNIAS
AND SCENES IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN 139 (1844), quoted in ROSAURA SANCHEZ, TELLING
IDENTITIES, THE CALIFORNIO TESTIMONIOS 30 (1995), who states "[in a word, the
Californians are an imbecile, pusillanimous, race of men, and unfit to control the
destinies of that beautiful country."
32. See, e.g., Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434, 439 (1865); Luco v.
United States, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 515 (1859).
33. See Paul Horgan, Life in New Mexico, in CHICANO: THE EVOLUTION OF A
PEOPLE 67, 67-68 (Renato Rosaldo et al. eds., 1973); Carey McWilliams, The Heritage
of the Southwest, in CHICANO, supra, at 11-14; see also infra notes 108-113 and accom-
panying text.
34. See Guadalupe T. Luna, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Dred Scott v.
Sandford and the Complexities of Race, U. MIAMI L. REv./TEX. HISPANIC L. REV.
(forthcoming 1999); see also Guadalupe T. Luna, Agricultural Underdogs and Interna-
tional Agreements: The Legal Context of Agricultural Workers Within the Rural Economy,
26 N.M. L. REV. 9, 9 (1996) ("As soon as cheap labor from Europe was stopped, ...
American industry... turned to the Mexican supply.... The Mexican 'peon' (Indian
or mixed-breed) is a poverty-stricken, ignorant, primitive creature, with strong
muscles and with just enough brains to obey orders and produce profits under
competent direction....") (quoting LOTHROP STODDARD, RE-FORGING AMERICA: THE
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sacrificing basic principles of law, and ultimately privileging the
dominant population.5
A principal goal of this Article is to provide a counter-
hegemonic story to the exclusion of the history of the post-U.S.-
Mexican War period from legal analysis and education. This
omission facilitates a legal culture that subordinates Chicana/
Chicano communities through restrictive laws.36 Its exclusion also
denies a more sophisticated understanding of race.37 Not unlike the
work of LatCrit theorists, this Article elaborates several linkages
among our history, our communities, and legal norms, long denied
by mainstream legal culture and scholarship.3 By providing a
counter-story, this Article presents an opportunity to examine the
continuing subordination of Chicana/Chicano communities and its
harmful effects, both of which derive from the period of land grant
adjudication.
This Article also aims to introduce the case law of Chicana/
Chicano land dispossession into legal education. Chicanas/Chicanos'
status as outsiders and the extent of their land alienation encompass a
wide range of issues, including ejectment, trespass law, adverse
possession, quieting of title, and the takings doctrine.39 Consideration
STORY OF OUR NATIONHOOD 214 (1927)); George A. Martinez, The Legal Construction
of Race: Mexican and Whiteness, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 321 (1997).
35. The terms "dominant population," "Euro-American," and "European-
American" refer to individuals of European descent. For a discussion of the legal
identification of the dominant population, see In re Camille, 6 F. 256, 257 (C.C.D. Or.
1880), which defined the dominant population as "Europeans or white race."
36. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-220, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(1996); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997) (vacating en
banc judgment that struck down as overbroad and unconstitutional an article of
Arizona's constitution that required state employees to speak only English); Hop-
wood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the University of Texas Law
School's affirmative action policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment by discrimi-
nating against those of European descent).
37. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Latinalo Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-
Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA
L.J. 1 (1996).
38. Environmental racism in contemporary communities of color constitutes an
example of these denied linkages. See Gerald Torres, Race, Class, Environmental Regu-
lation, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 839, 841
(1992).
39. In addition, other authors specifically describe the use of violence in remov-
ing Chicanas/Chicanos from their land and property. See, e.g., RODOLFO AcUf1A,
OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS 115 (3d ed. 1988) (arguing that through
"nonfeasance law officers condoned the legal and physical abuse" of Mexican grant-
ees and noting that grantees were killed after they acquired title to their property)
(citing LEONARD PITT, THE DECLINE OF THE CALIFORNIOS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
SPANISH-SPEAKING CALIFORNIANS, 1846-1890 119 (1971)); see also ALFREDO MIRANDt,
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of the diverse legal methods that expedited dispossession provides
an invaluable opportunity for analytical study of the tension be-
tween private ownership rights and governmental actions.
As a means of establishing the legal framework necessary to
develop a more precise understanding of the events of land dispos-
session, Part I provides a discussion of the historical procedures
Mexico used to regulate land grants throughout its provinces.40 Part
II analyzes case law41 to examine whether the United States met its
obligations under the Treaty, which terminated the U.S.-Mexico
War. This examination demonstrates that legal and governmental
actors extended favorable legal "interpretations" to the dominant
population, denied analogous interpretations to Mexican fee hold-
ers, and ultimately that favoritism expedited dispossession.
42
Finally, Part III joins the past with the present and examines the
link between lack of land tenure and poverty in the contemporary
period. It demonstrates that rural Chicanas/Chicanos cannot acquire
land 43 and that without property, they are unable to access the
GRINGO JUSTICE 3 (1987) (enumerating examples of violence against Mexicans after
the Conquest).
40. For other legal perspectives on the dispossession of Chicanas/Chicanos, see
Frederico M. Cheever, Comment, A New Approach to Spanish and Mexican Land Grants
and the Public Trust Doctrine: Defining the Property Interest Protected by the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1364 (1986); Placido Gomez, The History and
Adjudication of the Common Lands of Spanish and Mexican Land Grants, 25 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1039 (1985); Peter L. Reich, The "Hispanic" Roots of Prior Appropriation in
Arizona, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 649 (1995).
41. Further evidence of the treatment of Chicana/Chicano property interests can
be found by examining land grant and deed records, census and church records,
deposition papers, Board of Land Commissioners hearings, and federal legislation
promulgated during the period. In addition, voluminous examples of these docu-
ments, legal briefs, motions, court opinions, surveys, and maps of land formerly held
by grantees of Mexican descent are located in the Bancroft Library at the University
of California at Berkeley.
42. The application of vague standards by American courts ultimately accom-
plished what political forces could not-an expedited dispossession of land from
Chicanas/Chicanos. See George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion
and the Mexican-American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 555,
566-68 (1994) (referring to Mexican land grants); cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 132 (1961) ("[1In every legal system a large and important field is left open for
the exercise of discretion by courts and other officials in rendering initially vague
standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties of statutes, or in developing
and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by authoritative precedents.").
43. See generally Arnoldo De Le6n & Kenneth L. Stewart, Lost Dreams and Found
Fortunes: Mexican and Anglo Immigrants in South Texas, 1850-1900, 14 W. HIST. Q. 291
(1983); Richard Griswold del Castillo, Myth and Reality: Chicano Economic Mobility in
Los Angeles, 1850-1880, 6 AzTL&N 151 (1975) (examining the validity of economic
upward mobility myths for Chicanas/Chicanos from 1850 to 1880). For data on the
present condition of rural areas, see generally U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE
HISPANIC POPULATION OF THE U.S. SOUTHWEST BORDERLAND, C3.196: P-23/17 (1992)
[hereinafter HISPANIC POPULATION OF U.S. SOUTHWEST]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
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privileges extended to property owners through government Xro-
grams. Thus, they are guaranteed impoverished conditions. To
counter their marginalized existence, Part III suggests opening the
public domain for distribution to Chicanas/Chicanos. Rather than
calling for the wholesale distribution of the country's natural re-
sources, Part III indicates that land transfers should be conditioned
on sustainable, alternative forms of land use and agriculture. In
addition to righting prior wrongs, this proposal therefore also pro-
vides a means of ameliorating the current ad hoc spoliation of the
public domain.
I. "THE GREAT AMERICAN LAND BUBBLE" 4
It is a serious thing, for a branch of history, to lack a general
treatment. It means there is no tradition, no received learning,
no conventional wisdom. But tradition is needed: to define
what is important and what is not, to guide students, re-
searchers, other historians-and the general public.4
Omitting land alienation from legal history and education pro-
motes Chicanas/Chicanos' status as outsiders and renders their
history invisible. This omission fails to "break down simplistic na-
tionalistic readings of the American past [in ways that might] enable
us to acknowledge and learn to respect the substantial differences in
historical experience of the ethnically diverse groups that make up
contemporary American society. '47 Exclusion of this history contrib-
OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-40FS, RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROFILE OF RURAL AREAS (1993)
[hereinafter DEVELOPMENT PROFILE OF RURAL AREAS].
The marginal economic status of present rural Chicanas/Chicanos promotes a
culture in which individuals of Mexican descent are viewed as newcomers to the
United States and "encouraged" to return to Mexico. See Elizabeth Martinez, Go Back
To Mexico?, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Dec. 27, 1996, at 11B (responding to Bob Doman
supporters who, after Loretta Sdnchez defeated the nine-term congressman, argued
that Chicanas/Chicanos supporting SAnchez should return to Mexico).
44. See infra notes 482-89 and accompanying text.
45. AARON M. SAKOLSKI, THE GREAT AMERICAN LAND BUBBLE (1932) (describing
the loss of public domain in the United States to land speculators, from pre-
revolutionary times through the early twentieth century).
46. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 9 (1973) ("Without
tradition, there is no framework, no skeleton, nothing to hang one's ideas on, nothing
to attack and revise ... ").
47. EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 69. In employing a racial critique of
the cases in which courts dispossessed Chicanas/Chicanos, this Article examines the
relations among the various individuals and groups who sought control of the valu-
able resources belonging to Mexican grantees. See SINGER, supra note 9, at 20 ("Social
relations approaches analyze property rights as relations among persons regarding
control of valued resources."). Not unlike the work of LatCrit Scholars, this Article
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utes, moreover, to a legal culture that facilitates legislation ad-
versely impacting subordinated communities. In addressing
Chicana/Chicano property dispossession, therefore, this Article
rejects simplistic norms while emphasizing the "substantial differ-
ences" comprising the country's legal history.
A. Property and the Common Law
Students of property law examine fee-holder rights that pur-
portedly function as "limits" on governmental actions.4 Additionally,
recent judicial rulings emphasize the tension between protecting
private land ownership rights and protecting the country's natural
resources.5 0 These rulings suggest that the Supreme Court is return-
ing to stronger support of private property rights deriving from the
common law, as against state and local government.5 1 Courts in the
contemporary period, moreover, reason that the common law has
long and consistently protected the nation's citizens from overly
intrusive governmental actions. Yet this reasoning elides Chi-
cana/Chicano history by failing to account for both the role of
seeks to link law to the subordination of Chicana/Chicano communities. See supra
notes 37-38.
48. See, e.g., supra note 36.
49. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRE-
SENTATIONS 162 (1991); see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 1141.
50. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) (holding that the
city's public land dedication requirements were not sufficiently related to plaintiff's
proposed development). But see Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
(upholding Hawaii's Land Reform Act of 1967 as not violating the Fifth Amend-
ment's "public use" requirement).
51. See, e.g., Lucas v. Southern Cal. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 & n.7
(1992) (relying on the "rich tradition of protection at common law" for land to hold
that an owner sacrificing "all economically beneficial use" of his property suffers a
taking under the Fifth Amendment). For a discussion of the issue from the perspec-
tive of a state court, see Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
455 (Mich. 1981), in which the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the City of Detroit's
use of eminent domain to acquire property.
The conflict between private property rights and governmental actions con-
tinues to generate extensive debate; space constraints, however, limit references to
but a few investigations. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, A Poor Relation? Regulatory Takings
After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 199 (1996); Mark V. Hanrahan, Dolan v.
City of Tigard: Rough Proportionality as the Supreme Court's Next Step in Takings Juris-
prudence, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 553 (1996); Sarah Long, Tipping the Scales for the Private
Property Owner, 25 STETSON L. REV. 213 (1995).
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common law actions by American settlers52 and the role of the
United States government in the process that led to land alienation. 3
Although a conquered people, 4 Mexicans received the negoti-
ated promises of the United States to protect their feeholder
interests.55 Nevertheless, the United States' need for greater public
domain acreage competed with the promises made to those of Mexi-
can descent. Land was the Republic's greatest resource and its sole
source of revenue, especially in the West where land was abundant
and fertile.7 The former Mexican territories, containing rich natural
resources such as gold, silver, zinc, copper, oil, and uranium, offered
52. American settlers of the former Mexican territories ceded under the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15, used actions of trespass and adverse possession
to gain control of lands owned by Chicanas/Chicanos. See infra notes 404-12 and
accompanying text.
53. Despite its promises in the Treaty, the United States undermined its obliga-
tion to protect Mexican grantees' property by enacting several pieces of legislation
and pursuing an aggressive program of challenging the validity of grants. See infra
Part II.
54. See, e.g., Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 480 (1865).
55. See Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15, at 217-18. In addition to
these contractual guarantees, the Constitution protected grantees as citizens. The
United States also assumed a trustee status that further required it to protect the
legal interests of the Mexican population. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U.S. 456,
460-61 (1888) ("[Iun a loose and general sense the United States, pending issuance of
a patent under other land grant acts, has been referred to as a trustee of lands to be
patented."); see also Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367 (1921) (holding that a claim-
ant to public land who met all requirements for perfecting his claim acquires rights
against the government because he holds equitable title in the land); Orchard v.
Alexander, 157 U.S. 372 (1895) (declaring that the government must provide justice
for all claimants in land grants); Rodrigues v. United States, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 582, 588
(1863), cited in Shelley v. Hurwitz, 92 P.2d 660 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934) (declaring
that the Treaty and international law obligated the United States to protect all private
rights previously acquired).
56. "Public domain" means public lands subject to sale and disposition under the
general land laws. See Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875). For general discus-
sions of the public domain in both the United States and Mexico, see United States v.
McLaughlin, 127 U.S. 428 (1888), and Hornsby v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 224
(1869).
57. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 46, at 202. The country also needed land to connect
its eastern boundaries with the West. See id. In keeping with this goal, approximately
32,000,000 acres in Texas alone accrued to railroads. See THOMAS LLOYD MILLER, THE
PUBLIC LANDS OF TExAS, 1519-1970 139 (1972). The displacement of Chicana/
Chicano property for railroads and adjacent canals falls outside the scope of this
Article. For further information about the role of railroads and its connection to land
losses, see, for example, Gonzales v. Ross, 120 U.S. 605 (1887), which involved a tres-
pass action by a Mexican grantee's heirs against a railroad company in connection
with 11 leagues of Texas land.
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tremendous wealth.58 Timber and access to rivers and springs 9 also
added value to the territories.6°
To the detriment of Mexican grantees, the public land question
"touched every other national issue-fiscal policy, veterans' bene-
fits, and the spread or containment of slavery, population diffusion,
and the political strength of factions and regions."" Demands for
compensation by those who were volunteers in the Conquest of
Mexico62 and pressure from squatters and settlers seeking land ne-
cessitated the availability of large amounts of the public domain.63
Land fever and its legal results conflicted with the property and
other rights of grantees. Thus, grantees of Mexican descent wit-
nessed their newly so-called adopted country itself challenging their
status as feeholders.64
In resolving land conflicts, moreover, American courts ruled
against Mexican landholders by employing conflicting legal princi-
ples that violated the United States Constitution and the Treaty. This
58. See ACUNTA, supra note 39, at 20; FRIEDMAN, supra note 46, at 203. Battles for
control over mineral rights produced extensive litigation. See, e.g., United States v.
Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17 (1862) (adjudicating a chain-of-title controversy over
ownership of mine discovered in 1845). Litigation encompassing mineral rights
requires further scholarly investigations that cannot be covered here.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Rocha, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 639, 639 (1869) (describing a
plot of land deemed valuable because of its large asphaltum spring).
60. Chicanas/Chicanos were deprived access to these valuable resources, par-
ticularly in areas once comprising communal tracts. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Taylor, 377
F.2d 733, 736-37 (10th Cir. 1967) (invalidating the grazing rights of descendants of
settlers who held these rights before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo); MARIO T.
GARCiA, DESERT IMMIGRANTS: THE MEXICANS OF EL PASO, 1880-1920, 156-57 (1981)
(discussing El Paso government officials' attempts to prevent Mexicans from using
salt beds that had long been used for domestic and export purposes). The unfavor-
able outcomes of other cases provide additional evidence of the deprivation of
natural resources suffered by Chicanas/Chicanos. A chain-of-title search in each case
revealed that Mexican grantees originally owned the land in question. See, e.g.,
Schwarz v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986) (determining ownership of coal and
lignite between surface owners and State); Maufrais v. State, 180 S.W.2d 144, 144
(Tex. 1944) (involving the State's request to enjoin Maufrais from mining, excavating,
and "disturbing sand and gravel from" the riverbed).
61. FRIEDMAN, supra note 46, at 202-03.
62. See BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES
116-35 (1924).
63. Congress responded with legislation favorable to the squatters' demands. See
infra notes 414-16 and accompanying text. On the nature of squatter politics, see
Christian G. Fritz, Politics and the Courts: The Struggle over Land in San Francisco, 1846-
1866, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 127, 135-37 (1986); Donald J. Pisani, Squatter Law in
California, 1850-1856, 25 W. HIST. Q. 277, 285 (1994). Until ownership status was
established, Mexican-owned property should have remained off-limits to squatters.
64. The United States, for example, appealed a number of confirmed decisions
that conferred tracts to their Mexican title holders, as discussed in this Article. See,
e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 26 F. Cas. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 15,269); United
States v. Cazares, 25 F. Cas. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,761); United States v. Bernal,
24 F. Cas. 1123 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,581).
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approach yielded consistent results, despite its ad hoc nature. Several
courts' rulings benefited the dominant population; other highly
questionable holdings permitted Mexican property to accrue to the
public domain. By adding land to the public domain, courts facilitated
distribution to members of the dominant population. By this
method, "[o]nce land was surveyed, it was disposed of.... A whole
continent was sold or given away-to veterans, settlers, squatters,
railroads, states, colleges, speculators, and land companies."'
Beyond such court decisions, the United States created an arse-
nal of legal techniques to allow third parties to challenge Mexican
landholders' rights where the United States either did not or could
not file suit directly.66 These private rights of action also permitted
challengers to prosecute Mexican landholders in the name of the
United States upon the payment of a $1,000 bond, even in situations
where the government held no adverse interest in the land in ques-
tion.17 By requiring grantees to defend their property from suits
brought by third parties as well as those prosecuted by the govern-
ment, the United States breached its treaty obligations to protect
grantees' pre-existing property rights and denied them the security
against governmental action required by the Constitution.68 De-
fending their property rights against this multiplicity of legal
assaults exhausted grantees' economic resources, ultimately reduc-
ing their estates by also forcing them to alienate portions of their
land in exchange for representation and court costs provided to
65. FRIEDMAN, supra note 46, at 203.
66. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 70 (1878); United States v.
San Jacinto Tin Co., 23 F. 279, 290 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885); see also Sena v. United States,
189 U.S. 233, 233 (1903) (reporting that the original petition was amended to allow
American Turquoise Company and "one McNulty" to join with the United States in
challenging a Mexican grantee). These actions caused protracted delays in securing
confirmed status.
State governments also took actions that undermined Chicana/Chicano legal
claims. For example, the Texas constitution provided that "no claim or right to land
which issued prior to November 13, 1835, shall ever hereafter be used in evidence in
any courts of the state unless recorded in the country in which the land is situated."
TEx. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (repealed 1876). Before Texas adopted this provision, failure
to record a claim did not render such claims inadmissible. Courts later held that the
provision violated the U.S. Constitution, but not before it had induced hardship and
delays. See, e.g., Texas Mex. Ry. v. Locke, 12 S.W. 80 (Tex. 1889).
68. See U.S. CONST., amend. V. Under the Constitution, treaties also constitute
the "supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. Therefore, the Treaty
should have provided grantees of Mexican descent with protection from govern-
mental action, even outside the regime of the Fifth Amendment. See Ely's Adm'r v.
United States, 171 U.S. 220, 237 (1898) ("Sustaining the validity of the grant to the
extent of the land paid for is but carrying out the spirit of the treaty, the obligations
of international justice and the duties imposed by the act creating the Court of Pri-
vate Land Claims.").
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defend their title to the whole.69 Attorney-initiated partition actions,
in turn, further expedited the loss of land, where grantees had
pledged their interest as collateral. 70
While Chicanas/Chicanos lost their land in litigation, Congress
created public laws that subsidized rural enterprises and their fee-
holders.7' The new holders, including the United States, thereafter
leveraged their acquired holdings to produce yet more wealth via
"commerce, industry, mining, [and] agriculture."7 The consequences
of these public subsidies extend into the present, as public law con-
tinues greatly to enhance the economic standing of the agricultural
sector.73
B. Historical Framework
Mexico permitted land grants to individuals (including women,
Native Americans, and foreign nationals)74 and to groups that estab-
lished communal forms of property (empresarios). The grants were
subject to the grantee's performance of certain conditions75 or in
69. See infra Part II.B.2.b.ii. Attorneys and Land Grants.
70. See infra notes 442-53 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 413-17 and accompanying text.
72. ACUI3A, supra note 39, at 12, 20.
73. The present size of the rural economy illustrates this point. In 1992, the
agricultural sector contributed $85.6 billion to the U.S. economy. U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-104FS, U.S. AGRIC.: STATUS OF THE FARM SECTOR
6-7 (1995) [hereinafter STATUS OF THE FARM SECTOR]. Furthermore, if the definition of
the agricultural sector includes inputs such as fertilizer, seeds, and machinery as well
as outputs that channel into other economic sectors, the agricultural sector added
$1.1 trillion to the 1992 gross domestic product. See id. This is significant in light of
the fact that the gross domestic product, in that year, totaled $6 trillion. See id.
74. See Translation of the Decree of the Mexican Congress Respecting Coloniza-
tion, Aug. 18, 1824, art. I (repealed 1836), reprinted in Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 589,
634 (1858) [hereinafter Translation Respecting Colonization]. For a discussion of a
Mexican governor's authority to grant land to foreign nationals for agricultural
endeavors, see United States v. Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. 266, 273 (C.C.D. Cal. 1859) (No.
14,713).
75. See Translation of the General Rules and Regulations for the Colonization of
Territories of the Republic of Mexico, Nov. 21, 1828, reprinted in Ferris, 10 Cal. at 635-
36 [hereinafter Translation of the Rules] (requiring cultivation and settlement of
property; time constraints; colonization of families on empresario grants; and proof of
performance to the municipal authority). For case law references to conditions at-
tached to a grantee's award, see United States v. De Haro, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 599, 625
(1856), which stated that the grantee could neither sell nor alienate the property, nor
obstruct roads, and he was required to cultivate cattle and occupy the property
within a year or he would lose his right to the provisional grant. See also Fuentes v.
United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 443 (1859). The Grant in Fuentes involved the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. That he should enclose it without prejudice to the crossways, roads,
and uses; he shall have the exclusive enjoyment of it, and apply it to
such use and culture as may best suit his views.
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consideration of governmental service.76 Grants to foreign nationals
were specially conditioned upon the grantee's adherence to Mexican
law.7 Other grants derived from marriage, donation,78 or direct pur-
chase.79
Once in possession of Mexican land, foreign nationals enjoyed a
considerable measure of financial success.w For example, the holder
of the Rio Ojotska land grant in California gleaned at least $10,000
from his business enterprise and used the funds to erect a mill, build
a blacksmith shop, raise cattle, and employ fifty to sixty workers.81
Marriages with Mexican women brought additional benefits for
foreign nationals. Under Mexican law women could inherit property
and also petition for grants.82 Therefore, marriage to a Mexican
2. That he should apply to the proper judge for judicial possession of
the same, by whom the boundaries shall be marked out, and along
which landmarks should be placed to designate its limits, and that
fruit and forest trees shall be planted on the land.
3. That the land given should contain eleven leagues for large cattle,
as is designated by a map said to be attached to the expediente. The
land is to be surveyed according to the ordinance; and should there
be an overplus, it was to inure to the benefit of the nation.
Id. at 450.
76. See Shadow & Rodriguez-Shadow, supra note 14, at 266. Settlers favored
traditional communal grants because they permitted access to natural resources and
facilitated commodities production and the raising of livestock. See id.
77. See Translation Respecting Colonization, art. I, supra note 74,; ROBINSON,
supra note 26, at 60.
78. See United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 15,970)
(involving the bequest of a tract to Maria Clara Ortega and Maria Isabel Clara Ortega
from their father who had resided on his San Ysidro grant since 1809).
79. See, e.g., Ainsa v. United States, 184 U.S. 639, 640 (1902) (stating that "the
Mexican government, December 28, 1836, sold and conveyed land to Juan, Rafael
and Ignacio Elias Gonzales in consideration of $142.50 and other valuable considera-
tions").
80. American settlers, both inside and outside the territories, benefited economi-
cally from Mexican law. One historian observes that, "[sitarting in the 1820s, hide
and tallow traders from New England regularly tied up their ships in California
harbors to acquire leather for shoe factories and tallow to make candles. For these
they traded textiles, articles of apparel, hardware, and notions." VICTOR WESTPHALL,
MERCEDES REALES: HISPANIC LAND GRANTS OF THE UPPER RIO GRANDE REGION 69
(1983); see also Dalton v. United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 436 (1859); McKinney v.
Saviego, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 235 (1855); United States v. Reading, 27 F. Cas. 716 (N.D.
Cal. 1853) (No. 16,127), aff'd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1 (1855); ROXANNE DUNBAR ORTIZ,
ROOTS OF RESISTANCE, LAND TENURE IN NEW MEXICO, 1680-1980 at 68-75 (1980)
(demonstrating that foreign nationals who settled in the New Mexico territories
sustained economic gains). Indeed, "[mlost of the merchants in Alta California were
foreigners." SANCHEZ, supra note 31, at 175.
81. See United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 626, 626 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,862).
82. Janet Lecompte, The Independent Women of Hispanic New Mexico, 1821-1846,
12 W. HIST. Q. 24 (1981). Mexico's Colonization Law of 1836 also required foreign
nationals seeking grants to naturalize or marry Mexican women. See United States v.
Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. 266, 270 (1857).
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woman owning property facilitated acquiring acreage beyond limi-
tations allowed individual grantees. Such marriages also enhanced
the material success of foreign nationals by facilitating access to a
wide network of established familial relationships.
Although foreign nationals benefited from their land grants,
those grants produced dire consequences for the Mexican Republic.
For example, one Swiss native, John Augustus Sutter, held a consid-
erable position in his area as a result of his grant-"a combination of
feudal lord and alcalde."'8 Yet, he recruited volunteers to help in the
invasion of Mexicom and his settlement 7 served as a site of anti-
Mexican activity leading up to the war."'
83. The Mexican Colonization Law of 1824 limited individual grantees to grants
of 11 leagues. United States v. McLaughlin, 127 U.S. 428, 449 (1888); see also EBRIGHT,
LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 39. The law of community property in the Mexican
province of California became the law of the State of California through Article XI,
§ 14 of the first Constitution of California and Act of April 17, 1850, defining the
rights of husband and wife. See Guadalupe T. Luna, "This Land Belongs to Me!":
Chicanas and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 3 HARV. LATINO L. REv. (forthcoming
1999).
84. For a description of the role of women during this period, see Antonia I.
Castafieda, Presidarias y Pobladoras: The Journey North and Life in Frontier California, in
CHICANA CRITICAL ISSUES 73, 73-93 (Norma Alarc6n et al. eds., 1993); JUAN GOMEZ-
QUI&ONES, ROOTS OF CHICANO POLITICS, 1600-1940, at 61-65 (1994); SANCHEZ, supra
note 31, at 57.
85. ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 60-61. An alcalde is "a chief magistrate in charge
of a district; a regional governmental post combining judicial, administrative, and
tax-collecting duties; subordinate to the gobemador (governor) of the region."
ANTONIO MARIA OSIO, THE HISTORY OF ALTA CALIFORNIA, A MEMOIR OF MEXICAN
CALIFORNIA 343 (1996).
Sutter was a notorious figure in the history of California. See, e.g., RICHARD
DILLON, FOOL'S GOLD: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF CAPTAIN JOHN SUTrER OF
CALIFORNIA 15-16 (1967). At one point the Mexican Republic, in recognizing the
potential threat Sutter presented, sent Andres Castillero to negotiate with him to
purchase his fort and surrounding land. Although purportedly offered $100,000 for
the property, Sutter refused. See Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 640 (1858).
86. For a discussion of Sutter's role in the political disturbances that "agitated
the country" in 1845, see United States v. Reading, 27 F. Cas. 716, 716 (N.D. Cal.
1853) (No. 16,127), aff'd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1 (1855). American courts later used
Sutter's subversive activity against the Mexican government as an excuse for allow-
ing him to expand his land holdings at the expense of Mexican grantees. See infra
notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
87. Sutter's tract was described as a "privately owned fortress overlooking the
Sacramento and American rivers [that] had some of the physical aspects of a
pueblo." ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 60-61.
88. See Pisani, supra note 63, at 278; ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 114. By 1844,
several hundred Americans resided in the lower Sacramento Valley. See WESTPHALL,
MERCEDES REALES, supra note 80, at 69.
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1. Land Grant Procedure
A series of colonization laws required persons seeking a land
grant to specify in a written petition the requested site and its
boundaries. 9 To ensure proper processing, petitioners also consulted
either a district prefect or another local office where the land was situ-
ated.90 These requirements verified the accuracy of the petitioner's
account of places and events and also ensured that the requested grant
would not injure third persons or the public.91 In addition to conduct-
ing surveys, government officials also identified the boundaries of
proposed tracts by referencing natural landmarks and the boundaries
of other established grants. Rivers, "rocks,"9 and mountains therefore
89. See Translation Respecting Colonization supra note 74, art. II, (requiring "a
petition, expressing [the petitioner's] name, country, profession, the number, de-
scription, religion, and other circumstances of the families, or persons, with whom he
wishes to colonize, describing as distinctly as possible, by means of a map, the land
asked for"); see also Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 593 (1858) (citing the Translation of
the Rules, supra note 75). For example, one petition reads:
To his Excellency the Governor:
I, Juan B. Alvarado, colonel of the auxiliary militia of this depart-
ment, to your Excellency, with due respect, do represent, that being
actually the owner... of a very small tract of land, which is not suffi-
cient to support the cattle with which it is stocked.., and being
desirous of increasing it, at the same time to contribute to the
spreading of the agriculture and industry of the country, I solicit
your Excellency, according to the colonization laws, to be pleased to
grant me ten sitios de ganado mayor (ten square leagues) of land.
Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 543 (1854); see also Hayes v. United
States, 170 U.S. 637, 642 (1898) (map showing extent and boundaries filed with
petition); Chaves v. United States, 168 U.S. 177, 190 (1897) (involving a petition
describing claim as "adjoining the boundaries of the land belonging to the Indians of
the Town of Jemez"); Cervantes v. United States, 5 F. Cas. 380 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No.
2560); State v. Balli, 190 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. 1944); Sheldon v. Milmo, 36 S.W. 413 (Tex.
1896).
90. Case law provides additional descriptions of the land grant process. See, e.g.,
United States v. McLaughlin, 127 U.S. 428, 448 (1887) (identifying three types of
Mexican grants: grants defined by specific boundaries; grants within larger grants;
and grants of land known by a certain name); Hornsby v. United States, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 224 (1869) (reiterating Mexican procedures used in granting land).
91. See Translation Respecting Colonization supra note 74. Article III recites in
relevant part: "The Governor shall proceed, immediately [to investigate] whether the
petition embraces the requisite conditions ... both as regards the land and the can-
didate ... or, if preferred, the respective municipal authority may be consulted,
whether there be any objection to making the grant .... Id.; see United States v.
Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525 (1854); United States v. Sufiol, 27 F. Cas. 1367 (N.D.
Cal. 1855) (No. 16,421); Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 593 (1858).
92. The Spanish word "pena" is translated to mean "rock" by some American
courts. The English word "rock" may denote a stone, which is easily moved. By
contrast, the Spanish term "pena" refers to a rock outcropping or boulder, which is
not easily moved. Thus, usage of the word "rock" promoted incorrect references of
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helped define the boundaries of a petitioner's land grant.93 Adjoining
and surrounding ranchos deterred encroachment by proposed peti-
tions, serving as a check against geographical conflicts.94 Receiving a
land grant also involved the ceremony of seisin, not unlike property
transfers under the common law. Once possessed of a tract, grant-
ees could neither encumber nor transfer their property without the
consent of the Mexican government.9
In addition to the formal process, Mexican officials customarily
looked to actual events and intent, rather than to the specific letter of
Mexico's colonization laws, when issuing grants.97 In such situations,
boundaries defined under the Mexican system. Such incorrect references facilitated
easy challenges to the land titles of Mexican grantees. Unless otherwise indicated by
citation, all Spanish-to-English translations are those of the Author.
93. See United States v. Castro, 65 U.S. 346, 347 (1860) (involving grant with
natural boundary demarcations). This use of natural landmarks stemmed, in part,
from the Mexican practice of relying on a region's ecosystem to ensure self-
sufficiency, particularly in areas of scarce natural resources. See Juan Estevan Arrel-
lano, La Querencia: La Raza Bioregionalism, 72 N.M. HIST. REv. 31, 32 (1997) (discussing
the concept and origin of bioregionalism as employed by the Spaniards).
94. See Fuentes v. United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 443, 450 (1859); De Arguello v.
United States, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 539, 541-44 (1855); Dodge v. Perez, 7 F. Cas. 794,
796 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) (No. 3953) (reporting on Rancho San Jose and adjoining creeks
as "well-defined natural boundaries").
95. This ceremony symbolized the "act or delivery of juridical possession."
Castro, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 347 ("He shall request the judge of that district to give
him the juridical possession ... who shall mark out the boundaries with the respec-
tive landmarks...."). Malcolm Ebright provides a description of one such ceremony
during Spanish governanceof California:
I took them by the hand, I conducted them over said lands, they
pulled up grass, threw stones to the four cardinal points, and we all
said together three times, 'long live the king, our lord, whom may
God preserve!' as evidence of true possession, which they received
quietly and peaceably without any opposition ....
EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 24. After Mexico gained its independence
from Spanish rule, the ceremony was amended to replace "long live the king" with
"long live the president and the Mexican nation." Id. at 24 n.52; see also United States
v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 286 (1897) (discussing seisin under Spanish law). For
examples of seisin and its historical value, see DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at
194-95; CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 98-
101 (1988).
96. See General Rules and Regulations for the Colonization of Territories of the
Republic of Mexico, cited in Cessna v. United States, 169 U.S. 165, 168 (1898); Ferris v.
Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 635 (1858).
97. MALCOLM EBRIGHT, TIERRA AMARILLA GRANT, A HISTORY OF CHICANERY 28
n.74 (1980) ("The concern is not so much what the law books say, as what actually
happened. If a grant was recognized by a former government this would be of
greater significance than the fulfillment of all the formal requirements."). Ebright
also notes that under the Mexican legal system, customary law played a more sig-
nificant role in the land grant process than under Anglo-American law. Id.
Consequently, although custom and practice were recognized in some areas of
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the Republic granted title unless injury resulted to third parties or the
proposed grantee failed to perform certain conditions.98 Alternatively,
petitioners could denounce the tract. 9 Reliance on customs and prac-
tices also arose in part because of communication difficulties
between grantees and officials in Mexico City.ln Accordingly, even
before formal processing of the grant, Mexico permitted provisional
occupancy on the proposed tract.
Absent any adverse or contrary information, the documents
were collected into one package, known as an "expediente,"'' and
forwarded to the governor of the region, who then advised the de-
partmental assembly (legislative body) of the award.' Next, the
Anglo-American law, they were largely disregarded in the grant confirmation proc-
ess. See id.
98. See United States v. Carrillo, 25 F. Cas. 312 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,737)
(reporting that grantees were permitted to sow their land and build a house before
completion of petition process). While differences in the significance of possession
exist under civil and common law, courts from the relevant period recognized that
those differences could be insignificant. See, e.g., Sufiol v. Hepburn, 1 Cal. 254 (1850).
99. See Nunez v. United States, 18 F. Cas. 487, 490 (D.C. Cal. 1856) (No. 10,379),
for an example of a denounced tract. The decision in Allen v. West Lumber Company,
244 S.W. 499, 501 (1922), provides an analysis of the medieval Spanish doctrine
recognizing that title to real estate could be lost by abandonment, its application
under Mexican law, and an example of a court's inability to reconcile the concept
with the common law. See also Fuentes v. United States, 63 U.S. 443, 446-47, 460
(1859).
100. See United States v. Rocha, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 639, 643 (1869). The Court re-
ports that, at times, "however, when the lands were situated and the parties lived at
a great distance from the seat of government, the preliminary proceedings were
begun before a prefect, who made the usual reference for report, received the same,
and then transmitted all the papers to the governor for his action." Id. "Monterey, the
seat of government, was over four hundred miles from Los Angeles." Id. at 642. For a
discussion of Mexican custom and practice in the award of grants, see EBRIGHT,
TiERRA AMARILLA, supra note 97, at 28 n.74 ("In practice, few grants were revoked by
the Spanish or Mexican governments except for failure to occupy the land, and then
usually on the petition of an individual or group of settlers wanting to use the
land.").
101. At times the expedientes were stitched together. See United States v. Cambus-
ton, 25 F. Cas. 266, 267 (C.C.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 14,713). Many cases provide examples
of expedientes. See, e.g., United States v. Elder, 177 U.S. 104, 112-13 (1900); Cessna, 169
U.S. at 170-73; Romero v. United States, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 721, 733 (1863); United
States v. Castro, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 346, 349 (1860); Bouldin v. Phelps, 30 F. 547, 550-
51 (N.D. Cal. 1887); United States v. Guerrero, 26 F. Cas. 52, 52-53 (N.D. Cal. 1855)
(No. 15,269); State v. Balli, 190 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. 1944).
102. The practice of forwarding the governor's decision was not regarded as an
absolute requirement. See Hornsby v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 224, 229-30
(1869) (discussing governors' duties and noting that want of approval by the de-
partmental assembly does not affect the validity of a grant). In Cambuston, the court
reported on the nature of the custom and the governor's relationship with the gen-
eral assembly:
The loose and informal mode of conducting business, the small value
of the lands, the infrequency of the meetings of the assembly, and
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assembly forwarded the information to Mexico City and sometimes
provided copies to petitioners.lu The Mexican government preserved
the expedientes among its archives, forming records of the grant pro-
ceedings. Mexico also kept a log of the grants, the Toma de Razon,
enumerating the names of grantees, the lands granted, and the dates
of each award.10'
Mexico's award of land grants for multiple reasons resulted in
varied tract sizes. The earliest grants, during both the Spanish and
Mexican periods, were awarded for the performance of military
obligations or "meritorious service."' 5 For example, the first land
grants in Alta California belonged to veterans of the Spanish army of
other causes, soon led the governors to depart from the strict course
of procedure with respect to concessions of land which [Governor]
Figueroa had observed; and the practice grew up of issuing the final
document[], or title paper, immediately upon the making of the de-
cree of concession.
25 F. Cas. at 274.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Bolton, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 341, 350 (1859) (reviewing
the administrative steps followed when processing a grant). For examples of the
language used in grants, see Cessna v. United States, 169 U.S. 165 (1898) and Chaves v.
United States, 168 U.S. 177 (1897).
104. See, e.g., Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. at 267; United States v. Castro, 25 F. Cas. 329,
329 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 14,753). In California, more than 800 land grants existed
prior to annexation. See Gates, The California Land Act of 1851, supra note 24, at 402.
For a detailed review of the grant process, see United States v. Fossat, 25 F. Cas. 1166
(N.D. Cal. 1862) (No. 15,140).
105. See De Arguello v. United States, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 539, 540 (1855). Don Jose
Dario Arguello, as one of the "founders of [Mexico], and ... commandant6 of the
Presidio at San Francisco," was granted "a tract called 'las Pulgas.'" Id.; see also
Executors and Heirs of Augustin de Yturbide v. United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 290,
291 (1859) (explaining that "in recompense for his high merit in having achieved the
independence of his country," President Yturbide, in 1822, received a grant of 20
leagues of land located in Texas).
The process of awarding land tracts in exchange for conscription and
"meritorious service" was not unknown in the United States. In August of 1776, for
example, Congress offered land to deserters from the British army with a special
bonus to officers who could induce soldiers to desert with them; subsequent legisla-
tion extended additional land grant awards. See HIBBARD, supra note 62, at 32 n.1. In
Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542 (1854), the court noted:
The State of North Carolina, in 1780, passed an act reserving a certain
tract of country to be appropriated to its officers and soldiers; and in
1782 ... proceeded to enact that 25,000 acres of land [in that tract]
should be allotted for and given to Major-General Nathaniel Greene
... as a mark of the high sense the State entertained of the extraordi-
nary services of that brave and gallant officer.
Id. at 559 (citing Rutherford v. Greene's Heirs, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 195, 196 (1817)).
The U.S. government offered land bounties to volunteer soldiers who assisted in the
invasion of the Mexican Republic. For an examination of Anglo-American land
grants for military service, see HIBBARD, supra note 62, at 116.
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occupation. 06 Other petitioners received tracts in consideration for
escorting a government official or friar, or for settling an area while
engaging in agricultural enterprises.
107
2. Grantees, Contractual Performance, and Land Use
Contrary to some court observations, grant awards consisted of
conveyances of title for consideration, such as monetary payments
or services rendered to the government.1 8 Settling and cultivating a
proposed tract also provided adequate consideration for a grant."
Thus, mutuality of agreement served as the basis for the land grant
process.
In general, Mexican grantees fulfilled their contractual promises
according to the dictates of the Republic's colonization laws. His-
torical accounts document their productivity in planting, cultivating,
and harvesting wheat, barley, cotton, tobacco, fruits, corn, wheat,
beans, and other crops. Indeed, the high crop yield led one re-porter to characterize a region of the territories as "[t]he Nile of the
106. See ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 93-94. These particular tracts were awarded
around 1784. See id. at 52.
107. See Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875) (stating that "[it had been the
practice of Mexico to grant large tracts to individuals, sometimes as a reward for
meritorious public services, but generally with a view to invite emigration and
promote the settlement of her vacant territory"). For a discussion of the many rea-
sons American settlers opposed grants of larger-sized tracts, see Gates, The California
Land Act of 1851, supra note 24, providing a discussion of the increased demand for
land following American control of California. See also Bakken, supra note 21, at 249
("In California's early years, many saw these large land holdings as a social evil ...
[and criticized what was deemed] land monopoly."). For a discussion of the con-
centration of land in the hands of large landowners in the contemporary period and
a proposal to remedy that problem while restoring Chicanas/Chicanos to the land,
see infra notes 490-526 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., State v. Gallardo, 135 S.W. 664, 667 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (describing
payment of $210 on behalf of 96 inhabitants).
109. The Mexican and Spanish government awarded grants with an awareness of
the ecosystems around them. "[Elach grant contained all of the ecosystems vital to
the maintenance of traditional Hispanic subsistence patterns as these had evolved in
the Southwest. Thus, each conformed to the stipulations for types of land (e.g.,
agricultural, grazing, etc. [sic]) ...." Marianne L. Stoller, Grants of Desperation, Lands
of Speculation, Mexican Period Land Grants in Colorado, 19 J. W. 22, 25 (1980). Such
grants allowed grantees to engage in agricultural enterprises. See id.
110. See Teschemacher v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 862, 865 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No.
13,843) (corn, watermelons, and beans), aff'd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1 (1855); Chabolla v.
United States, 5 F. Cas. 387, 388 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 2566) (wheat and barley);
Refugio Rochin, Hispanic Americans in the Rural Economy: Conditions, Issues, Probable
Future Adjustments, in NAT'L RURAL STUD. COMM. 62 (1992) (discussing how barley
and other agrarian commodities ensured the viability of communities).
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West."' '  Grantees also raised cattle and horses bearing their
brands and implemented extensive irrigation systems that pres-
ently remain in use."3 Finally, several Mexican grantees engaged in
profitable export and trade. Artisans and missions pursued com-
mercial activity."' Travelers and merchants during their journeys
from Kansas City, Missouri and cities farther east provided accounts
as to the nature of Mexican enterprises.
Notwithstanding the consideration grantees provided through
payment or performance of services, following the U.S.-Mexican War,
American courts characterized many of the grants as gratuitous
111. J.J. Vernon, Field Crops in the Mesilla Valley, in BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION OF
THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, REPORT OF DOIA ANA COUNTY 32 (Albert J. Foun-
tain ed., 1882). Vernon investigated the Mesilla Valley, a portion of the Rio Grande
valley comprising 110,000 acres in New Mexico, with approximately 35,000 acres
under cultivation. See id.
This fertile territory, once conquered, provided a valuable asset to American
growers, an asset that has added immeasurably to the economic status of such farm-
ers. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-95-133, FARM PROGRAMS,
DISTRIBUTION OF USDA INCOME SUPPORT PAYMENTS (1995). Public law in the agri-
cultural sector and international markets continue to enhance the economic status of
farmers in this region. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3301 (1994).
112. See Chabolla, 5 F. Cas. at 388 (observing that cattle and horses bore grantee's
brand).
113. More information regarding irrigation systems can be found in New Mexico
law governing irrigation systems from the Spanish and Mexican period and their use
in the present. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. XVI (irrigation and water rights); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 3-53-3 (Michie 1978) (irrigation and regulation of public acequias);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-12 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1997) (elections of officers of com-
munity ditches).
114. Missions cultivated extensive gardens, orchards, tropical fruit trees, plums,
bananas, oranges, olives, figs, corn, beans, chilies, cotton, and nuts. See J.F. MUNRO
FRASER, HISTORY OF MARIN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 33 (1880). The missions and enter-
prises traded fruits and vegetables with, and exported leather and cotton goods to,
European countries. See id. For example, during the Russian occupation of Fort Ross
in California, missions traded with Russians. See id.
115. See Sterling Evans, Eastward Ho! The Mexican Freighting and Commerce Experi-
ence Along the Santa Fe Trail, 19 KAN. HIST. 242-61 (1996-97). Physician Josiah Gregg,
who recorded his 1831 trip along the Santa Fe Trail, describes an encounter in El
Paso, Texas, with a group of Mexican citizens who were transporting fresh fruit,
dried fruit, and wine to "distant markets." See JOSIAH GREGG, THE COMMERCE OF THE
PRAIRIES 303 (1844); see also Susan Shelby Magoffin, DOWN THE SANTA FE TRAIL AND
INTO MEXICO (Stella M. Drumm ed., 1926) (detailing commerce from Santa Fe, south
to Chihuahua). Martha Menchaca similarly reports on the clearing of roads in Santa
Paula, California. See MARTHA MENCHACA, THE MEXICAN OUTSIDERS, A COMMUNITY
HISTORY OF MARGINALIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN CALIFORNIA xvi (1995).
Menchaca also notes that the community "planted citrus orchards, established a
sheep herding business, and constructed humble adobe homes and chapels." Id. The
region remains an exceedingly profitable center of trade. See generally THE INST. FOR
MFG. AND MATERIALS MANAGEMENT, PASO DEL NORTE REG. ECON. SOCIOECONOMIC
PROFILE (1992); THE INST. FOR MFG. AND MATERIALS MANAGEMENT, SOUTHWEST
BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE (1992).
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awards. 6 To the detriment of grantees, these rulings advanced a
legal culture that facilitated alienation. The decisions also conflicted
with both the promises of the United States under the Treaty and the
constitutional protections of private property.
3. American Conquest
The United States officially declared war against Mexico on
117May 13, 1846, an action that derived from the United States' an-
nexation of Texas and its hunger for Mexican lands stretching to the
Bay of San Francisco." 8 Before the United States invaded the Mexi-
can provinces, Mexico effectuated various measures to curtail
foreign immigration. 9 Nevertheless, Americans continued to enter
the country.2 As early as 1842-well before any formal declaration
of war-both Euro-Americans and the United States government
were encroaching on Mexico's political sovereignty over its terri-
tory.121 To counter Mexico's assertions of authority over its public
domain, American settlers promoted myths that they were under
116. See, e.g., De Arguello v. United States, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 539, 547-48 (1855)
("The statute books of Mexico abound in acts offering every inducement to Mexican
families to settle on the frontiers; proffering gratuitous grants of land and of agri-
cultural implements-expenses of their voyage-maintenance for a year-and leave
to import certain articles free of duty."); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10
Pet.) 662, 735-36 (1836) ("We dispose of our public lands by sale; but Spain has
uniformly bestowed her domain in reward for meritorious services, or to encourage
some enterprise deemed of public utility.").
By contrast, Spanish and Mexican accounts record the transfers to grantees as
consideration for military duty, transporting friars, and land purchases and sales. See
Arrellano, supra note 93, at 32 (quoting from RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE LOS REYNOS
DE LAS INDIAS, VOL. 2, BOOK 4, Trr. 5, LAW 1). As to the nature of Mexican law, see
Manry v. Robison, 56 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1932) (applying Mexican law to settle land
dispute).
117. Haas, CONTESTED EDEN, supra note 5, at 333.
118. See THOMAS R. HIETALA, MANIFEST DESIGN, ANXIOUS AGRANDISEMENT IN
LATE JACKSONIAN AMERICA 154-56 .(1988). For one court's interpretation of the war,
see Palmer v. United States, 18 F. Cas. 1047 (D. Cal. 1857) (No. 10,697).
119. In 1830, for example, "the Mexican government enacted a decree forbidding
entrance to Mexico from the north without a Mexican passport, forbidding the intro-
duction of slaves into Mexico, and from a practical point of view, forbidding all
American colonization in Texas." CARUSO, supra note 5, at 5.
120. Id. at 6.
121. See Haas, CONTESTED EDEN, supra note 5, at 334-41 (describing a variety of
hostile actions taken by U.S. citizens and officials). As Caruso notes, "these people
were illegal aliens and had no rights, [thus] it was in their best interest to push for a
change in government. The only way they could establish their position was to
provoke a revolution." CARUSO, supra note 5, at 6.
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siege by the Mexican government.122 These myths served as the pri-
mary "justification" for the attack on Mexican authorities.'2
3
In California, the hostilities began at dawn on June 6, 1846,
when John Fremont and a group of American riflemen arrested
General Mariano Vallejo, the military commander and director of
colonization in California Alta.'2' Vallejo had long extended hospi-
tality to American and European settlers, and the events that
transpired that night caught him by surprise1 2 His arrest, identified
as the Bear Flag Rebellion, precipitated a formal declaration of war
122. In California "rumors of Mexican and Indian attacks against Americans were
flying through the American settlements." CARUSO, supra note 5, at 124. Lisbeth Haas
reports that
Californio forces had already been fighting against Americans to re-
take the Sonoma area from a group of settlers instigated by U.S.
Army officer John C. Fremont, who had illegally imprisoned Cali-
fornio officials, seized governmental and private property, occupied
Sonoma and its surroundings, and declared California the "Bear Flag
Republic," independent of Mexico.
Haas, CONTESTED EDEN, supra note 5, at 333. Fremont was in California Alta illegally
without permission from the Mexican government to allow him to return after the
government had ordered his departure. See CARUSO, supra note 5, at 124. Fremont,
nonetheless, attacked Indian settlements and engendered the support of the Ameri-
can settlers. See id. at 125.
123. The same myths supported American legal reasoning that either advocated
or allowed the use of force in expediting the Conquest of Mexico. See Morehead v.
United States, 17 F. Cas. 729, 734 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 9792) (accepting the govern-
ment's argument that "American settlers in the Sacramento valley were a small
band, menaced with extermination or expulsion from the country, and driven to rely
upon each other for protection"); see also PADILLA, supra note 4, at 53 ("By nearly all
accounts, the Bear Flag Revolt, which opened the U.S. Conquest of California, was an
unnecessary provocation of comic proportions. At least the American narrative
versions are funny. For Californios... of course the Bear Flag incident was not at all
humorous."). Whatever the reasoning of the American military and courts, it is
important to remember that American settlers were in a foreign country, Mexico, and
therefore subject to that country's rules and regulations. See Translation Respecting
Colonization, supra note 74. Additionally, the United States also coveted the West
and sought to connect the eastern boundaries with the West. See supra text accompa-
nying note 118.
124. See PITr, supra note 39, at 27. As a previous owner of vast territories in San
Francisco, Sonoma, and Napa Valley, General Vallejo assisted in the formation of
California and also served as mayor of Sonoma. See id. at 78. For examples of litiga-
tion that affected Vallejo's property, see United States v. Vallejo, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 541
(1861); United States v. Vallejo, 28 F. Cas. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 16,605); United
States v. Vallejo, 28 F. Cas. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 16,606); Vallejo v. United States, 27
F. Cas. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 16,818); and Vallejo v. United States, 27 F. Cas. 926
(N.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 16,819). The American military and legal actions ultimately
impoverished Vallejo. See PADILLA, supra note 4, at 77 (describing Vallejo's interpre-
tation of events leading to the alienation of his property interests).
125. See PITT, supra note 39, at 27.
126. See id. In Fremont v. United States, the Court reports that:
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by the United States against the Mexican Republic. Despite the U.S.
government's expectation that the war would be brief," the conflict
lasted until June 30, 1848, ending with the signing of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Notwithstanding this historical record, American legal opinions
characterized the Conquest as a defensive action. For example, Chief
Justice Taney stated:
[T]he genius and character of our institutions are peace-
ful, and the power to declare war was not conferred
upon Congress for the purposes of aggression or ag-
grandizement, but to enable the general government to
vindicate by arms, if it should become necessary, its
own rights and the rights of its citizens. A war, there-
fore, declared by congress can never be presumed to be
waged for the purpose of conquest or the acquisition of
territory.9
Chief Justice Taney's reasoning reveals the belief that the
United States was merely vindicating the pre-ordained rights of the
[Clivil war broke out in the province, which ended by the expulsion
of the Mexican troops; and Colonal Fremont entered California at the
head of an American force, in 1846, and the country was entirely
subdued, and under the military government of the United States, in
the beginning of 1847, and continued to be so held until it was finally
ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 562 (1854). Additional judicial interpretations of the California
conflict abound. See, e.g., Hornsby v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 224, 239 (1869)
(declaring that the authority and jurisdiction of Mexican officials in California termi-
nated on July 7, 1846, when the United States "took possession of Monterey, an
important town of California ... and within a few weeks afterwards occupied the
principal portions of the country"); United States v. Pico, 19 F. Cas. 595, 596 (D. Cal.
1857) (No. 11,130) (designating July 7, 1846, the date the United States captured
Monterey, as the moment of actual Conquest of California). For summaries of the
Conquest in Texas, see Kenedy Pasture Co. v. State, 231 S.W. 683 (Tex. 1921), State v.
Sais, 47 Tex. 307 (1877), and State v. Gallardo, 135 S.W. 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). For
an account of the invasion of New Mexico, see Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 176, 177 (1857).
127. Mexico's refusal to sell the territories also generated hostile American reac-
tions. For example, President Polk declared that "[i]f Mexico would not sell ... the
desired territory would be taken by force." CARUSO, supra note 5, at 43. "The term 'To
conquer a peace' was coined to express Polk's policy. He wanted war with Mexico in
order to force the Mexicans to hand over their land as part of the peace treaty." Id.
128. See HIETALA, supra note 118, at 155.
129. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (1 How.) 603, 614 (1850). Notwithstanding Chief
Justice Taney's declaration, other courts characterized the conflict as a "Conquest."
See, e.g., Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 480 (1865) ("our conquest of Califor-
nia"); United States v. Moreno, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 400, 404 (1863); Pico v. United States,
19 F. Cas. 590, 591 (D. Cal. 1855) (No. 11,127) ("the rights of a conquered people").
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Americans involved in the Bear Flag Rebellion,' 30 an approach that
conveniently renders irrelevant the rebels' actual intentions. The
Court's characterization notwithstanding, this forgotten war131 in-
volved the invasion, Conquest, and acquisition of "a colony two and
a half times as large as France" by the United States. 132 Within the
Mexican provinces, the United States also inherited a substantial
Mexican population holding estates and agricultural enterprises of
differing sizes.
133
4. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
Entered into force on July 4, 1848, the Treaty formally ended the
war between the United States and Mexico.13 By its design and in-
tent, the Treaty established a legal relationship with those remaining
130. See discussion supra note 123.
131. Lisbeth Haas reports that with few exceptions "historians have poorly por-
trayed Californios' guerrilla-type tactics of war that involved surprise attack and
quick retreat, or they have argued that Californios were too politically divided to
effectively resist. Yet it took hundreds of troops under Stockton, Fremont, Kearny,
Gillespie, and Mervine to reestablish American control of southern California from
late September 1846 to early January 1847." Haas, CONTESTED EDEN, supra note 5, at
331.
[H]istorians in general have yet to produce a literature that investi-
gates in a sustained manner the strategies Californio leaders and
citizens developed to thwart the American takeover and that exam-
ines their goals and objectives in waging a resistance that lasted for
six months and enabled them to reoccupy for a time Los Angeles,
Santa Barbara, and San Diego. In most war accounts Californios are
invisible, or their involvement and commitment, ideas, and inten-
tions are dismissed.
Id. at 333.
132. ACU&A, supra note 39, at 20. Outside the legal venue, the circumstances
underlying the Conquest of formerly Mexican property are well documented. See
generally GLORIA ANZALDUA, BORDERLANDS, LA FRONTERA, THE NEW MESTIZA (1987);
MARIO BARRERA, RACE AND CLASS IN THE SOUTHWEST: A THEORY OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY (1979) (discussing the Conquest and colonization of Mexico); GRISWOLD
DEL CASTILLO, supra note 14. The cost to the United States also included tremendous
human losses during the Conquest. "The Mexican War was the deadliest war the
United States ever fought. The number of deaths was staggering: 110 out of every
thousand participants died of disease, accident, or wounds." RICHARD BRUCE
WINDERS, MR. POLK'S ARMY, THE AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN THE MEXICAN
WAR 139 (1997). For a historical presentation of the Chicana/Chicano presence
outside the Southwest, see Dennis Nodin Vald6s, Betabeleros: The Formation of an
Agricultural Proletariat in the Midwest, 1897-1930, 30 LAB. HIST. 536 (1989); Dennis
Nodin Vald~s, The New Northern Borderlands: An Overview of Midwestern Chicano
History, 2 PERSP. IN MEX. AM. STUD. 1 (1989).
133. See CAREY MCWILLIAMS, NORTH FROM MEXICO: THE SPANISH-SPEAKING
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 52 (1949).
134. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15, at 922.
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in the annexed territories. In decreeing the Treaty's purpose, its
drafters'-" provided that the two countries were "animated by a
sincere desire to put an end to the calamities of the war ... and to
establish upon a solid basis relations of peace and friendship, which
shall confer reciprocal benefits ... and assure the concord, harmony
and mutual confidence, wherein the two peoples should live, as
good neighbors."' 6 On this basis, the Treaty was deemed mutually
beneficial. It is well established that the Treaty was not negotiated in
good faith, but rather, was imposed on the Mexican Republic. 137 None-
theless, the Treaty and governing legal principles protected grantees'
property rights
Article VIII of the Treaty extended citizenship status to Mexican
grantees electing to remain in the annexed territories. The Article
provides that: "Those who shall prefer to remain in the said territo-
ries, may either retain the title and rights of Mexican citizens, or
acquire those of citizens of the United States., 3 1 In either case, the
135. As to the nature of the negotiations between the two republics, see Jack
Northrup, The Trist Mission, 3 J. MEx. AM. HIST. 13 (1973). Northrup notes the Euro-
American exasperation with Mexican delegates who "disput[ed] about the wording
of a few articles" but contends that Euro-American negotiators failed to "comprehend
the values and standards of their Latin counterparts." Id. at 21.
Mexican negotiators included Jose Joaquin de Herrera, Jose Bernardo Couto,
Brigadier General Ignacio de Mora y Villamil, and Miguel Atristain; the delegate for
the United States was Nicholas Trist. MILLER, supra note 16, at 279-80. See generally
Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441 (1874) (adjudicating dispute over payment owed
Trist for his role in the treaty's negotiations).
136. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15, at 922. Provisions of the Treaty
enumerated in this Article at times include their Spanish version because throughout
the land grant adjudication process, Spanish documents were misread and misinter-
preted, or key provisions were omitted with adverse consequences for Mexican
grantees. In Spanish, the covenant provides:
En el nombre de Dios Todo-Poderoso:
Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados-Unidos de America,
animados de un sincero deseo de poner trmino a las calamidades de
la guerra que desgraciadamente existe entre ambas repfiblicas, y de
establecer sobre bises solidas relaciones de paz y buena amistad que
procuren reciprocas ventajas a los Ciudadanos de uno y otro pays, y
afianzen la concordia, armonia y mutdia seguridad en que deben
vivir, como buenos vecinos ....
Id.
137. See, e.g., GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 14, at 21, 42 (stating that finan-
cial and political pressures partly induced Mexico to agree to the Treaty). Griswold
del Castillo asserts: "With an arrogance born of superior military, economic, and
industrial power, the United States virtually dictated the terms of settlement." Id. at
xii.
138. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo art. VIII, supra note 15, at 929. For a discussion
of the protection of fully vested property rights, see Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 176, 177 (1857).
139. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15, at 929.
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Treaty clearly encompassed legal rights specific to protecting their
property interests. Indeed, Article VIII specifically addressed the
issue of property rights by providing protection to both established
and non-established grantees:
In the said territories, property of every kind, now be-
longing to Mexicans, not established there, shall be
inviolably respected. The present owners, the heirs of
these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said
property by contract, shall enjoy with respect to it,
guarantees equally ample as if the same belonged to
citizens of the United States.40
Thus, through Article VIII, the Treaty expressly entrusted the United
States with the obligation to respect and protect the property inter-
ests of grantees remaining in the annexed territories.
Additional evidence of the obligation negotiated and adopted
by the United States to protect Mexican property interests is illus-
trated in Article IX, which further elaborates the principle of these
covenants:
The Mexicans... shall be incorporated into the Union
of the United States and be admitted, at the proper time
... to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the
United States according to the principles of the Consti-
tution; and in the mean time shall be maintained and
protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and
140. Id. In Spanish, the provision reads:
Las propiedades de todo g~nero existentes en los expresados territo-
rios, y que pertenecen ahora A Mexicanos no establecidos en ellos,
serdn respetadas inviolablemente. Sus actuales duefios, los herederos
de estos, y los Mexicanos que en lo venidero puedan adquirir por
contrato las indicadas propiedades, disfrutarin respecto de ellas tan
amplia garantia, como si perteneciesen j ciudadanos de los Estados
Unidos.
Id.
Furthermore, the Protocol of May 26, 1848, which interpreted the treaty, de-
clared first that the grants of land made by Mexico in the territories "preserve the
legal value which they may possess, and the grantees may cause their legitimate
(titles) to be acknowledged before the American tribunals," and second that "[con-
formably to the law of the United States, legitimate titles to every description of
property, personal and real, existing in the ceded territories are those which were
legitimate titles under the Mexican law in California... up to the 13th of May,
1846 .... S. Doc. No. 357, at 1119-20, reprinted in MILLER, supra note 16, at 381.
Other provisions defined boundaries and exempted tariffs on goods. See
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15, at 936-37.
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property, and secured in the free exercise of their relig-
ion without restriction.
1 4 1
The provisions of both Articles VIII and IX clearly guaranteed
constitutional as well as other protections to the country's citizens of
Mexican descent.142 As the supreme law of the land, the Treaty specifi-
cally required the application of constitutional mandates protective of
property rights.
5. Senate Amendments and the Undermining
of the Treaty Negotiations
The Treaty's negotiators-both Mexican and American-
drafted Articles IX and X of the Treaty. Article IX's language, as
quoted above, reveals the intent of the negotiators to ensure the
protection of the legal rights of Mexicans remaining in the territories.
Article X's language reveals similar motivations; however, the Sen-
ate removed it at the behest of the Executive during the Treaty'sratifcatin ,. 143
ratification proceedings. By removing Article X, the United States
robbed the Treaty of its integrity.
Article X provides:
All grants of land made by the Mexican Government or
by the competent authorities, in territories previously
appertaining to Mexico, and remaining for the future
within the limits of the United States, shall be respected
as valid, to the same extent that the same grants would
141. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15, at 930. The Spanish translation
provides:
Los Mexicanos que, en los territorios antedichos ... segun lo estipu-
lado en el articulo precedente, seran incorporados en la Union de los
Estados Unidos, y se admitiran en tiempo oportuno ... al goce de to-
dos los derechos de ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos conforme a los
principios de la constitucion y entretanto serdn mantenidos y proteji-
dos en el goce de su libertad y propiedad, y asegurados en el libre
ejercicio de su religion sin restriccion alguna.
Id.
142. At the time of the signing of the Treaty, the United States government pos-
sessed the clear authority to ensure the protections of federal constitutional and
statutory law. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. Nonetheless, constitutional provisions rec-
ognizing treaty law as the supreme law of the land should have also protected
grantees of Mexican descent. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51
(1833).
143. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
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be valid, if the said territories had remained within the
limits of Mexico.1"
As negotiated, the covenant would have protected the property
rights of grantees and allowed additional time for the perfection of
grants. The provision allowed Mexican grantees whose performance
of grant conditions was interrupted by the conflict over Texan inde-
pendance or the U.S.-Mexico War to complete the performance of
those conditions.14 That provision led one Court to declare:
144. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, art. X, reprinted in MILLER, supra note 16, at
242-43. The Spanish translation provides:
Todas las concesiones de tierra hechas por el Gobierno mexicano, o
por las autoridades competentes en territorios que pertenecieron an-
tes de Mexico y quedan para lo futuro dentro de los Limites de los
Estado-Unidos seran respetadas como validas, con la misma exten-
sion con que lo serian si los indicados territorios permaneciran
dentro de los limites de Mexico.
Id. at 242.
145. See Cessna v. United States, 169 U.S. 165, 186 (1898) (noting that in addition
to protecting complete grants, "Article 10 ... proposed to give grantees ... further
time to perform the conditions."); Geoffrey P. Mawn, A Land-Grant Guarantee: The
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo or the Protocol of Queretaro?, 14 J.W. 52 (1975); MILLER,
supra note 16, at 262-67; WESTPHALL, MERCEDES REALES supra note 80, at 74-75. For a
more complete historical examination of Article X, see EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra
note 19, at 28. For an examination of Article X in case law, see Blue v. McKay, 136 F.
Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1955). For additional discussion of the striking impact of Article X
on the Mexican population, see infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
146. The provision provided as follows:
grantees ... put in possession thereof, who, by reason of the [war and
the events leading thereto], may have been prevented from fulfilling
all the conditions of their grants, shall be under the obligation to ful-
fill the said conditions within the periods limited in the same
respectively ....
MILLER, supra note 16, at 242-43. The Spanish provision states:
Pero los concesionarios de tierras en Tejas, que hubieren tomado
posesion de ellas, y que por razon de tierras en Tejas, que hubieren
tornado posesion de ellas, y que por razon de las circunstancias del
pays desde que comenzaron las desavenencias entre el Gobierno
mexicano y Tejas, hayan estado impedidos de llenar todas las condi-
ciones de sus concesiones, tendran la obligacion de cumplir las
mismas condiciones, dentro de los plazos senalados en aquellas re-
spectivamente ....
La anterior estipulacion respect de los concesionarios de tierras en
Tejas, se extiende a todos los concessionarios de tierras en los indica-
dos territorios fuera de Tejas, que hubieren tornado posesion de
dichas concesiones; y por falta de cumplimento de las condiciones de
alguna de aquellas dentro del nuevo plazo que empieza a correr el
dia del canage ....
Id. at 242-43.
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That article not only contemplated binding this gov-
ernment to respect all grants which would have been
recognized as valid by the government of Mexico if no
cession had been made, but also proposed to give to
grantees who had failed to perform the conditions of
their grants, and whose failure to perform might be
deemed to have avoided the grants, further time to per-
form the conditions.147
The provision embodied an agreement between the Mexican and
American negotiators that the war would not disturb the property-
holding status of Mexican grantees.
In submitting the Treaty to the Senate, however, President
James Polk lobbied to strike Article X on two grounds:
[First] no instructions given to Trist contemplated or
authorized its insertion. [Second, tihe public lands
within the limits of Texas belonged to that state, and
this government has no power to dispose of them, or to
change the condition of grants already made. All valid
titles to lands within the other territories ceded to the
United States will remain unaffected to the change of
sovereignty .... 4
Polk's objections centered on the covenant's text regarding extensions
of time in Texas for the performance of interrupted conditions.
149
In the end, the Senate adopted President Polk's interpretation,150
despite Mexico's objections,151 taking the position that grantees'
147. Cessna, 169 U.S. at 174.
148. MILLER, supra note 16, at 248.
149. See id at 247. Miller enumerates Polk's several grounds for rejection of Arti-
cle X including, inter alia, that he had recalled Trist from Mexico because "his
continued presense [sic] with the Army could be productive of no good, but might
do much harm by encouraging the delusive hopes and false impressions of the
Mexicans." Id. Although Trist received notification of his recall, he ignored the Presi-
dent's order. Ironically, with regard to the submitted Treaty, the President stated:
conforming, as it does, substantially, on the main questions of
boundary and indemnity, to the terms which our Commissioner;
when he left the United States in April ... was authorized to offer;
and animated, as I am, by the spirit which has governed all my offi-
cial conduct towards Mexico, I have felt it my duty to submit it to the
Senate for their consideration, with a view towards ratification.
Id. at 247-48.
150. See MILLER supra note 16, at 246-59. Miller reports that the Senate vote to
reject Article X was unanimous, while the final vote on ratification was 38 to 14 in
favor, with nine votes not counted. See id. at 251-52. There is one likely additional
impetus behind the removal of Article X: the desire to evade unfavorable precedent
concerning land grant adjudication. In United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51
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status as citizens afforded them adequate protection under constitu-
tional norms."5 2 This change altered the substance of the agreement
(1833), the Court addressed a claim for land in Florida that concerned an article of a
treaty between the United States and Spain. Just as in the Mexican territories, peti-
tioners in Florida submitted their claims to a board of commissioners to determine
their validity. Id. at 55. In Percheman, the parties disputed the proper interpretation of
a treaty provision. On the one hand, the Spanish terms provided that "quedran ratifi-
cadas y reconocidas a las personas que estan en posesi6n de ellas .... " Id. On the other,
Percheman's attorney asserted that quedran had been mistranslated such that the
passage read "[land grants] shall be ratified," instead of "[land grants] remain rati-
fied." See Id. at 68. For a more extensive discussion on the variances between the
Spanish and English terms at issue in Percheman, see EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra
note 19, at 32.
Justice Marshall recognized that both the Spanish and English versions of the
treaty must be considered in determining the validity of a later grant. Marshall wrote
that "[tihere is a difference between the English and the Spanish versions of the
eighth article. Both are equally originals, but surely the justice and liberality of the
United States will extend to the claimants the full benefit of either." Percheman, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) at 68. The Court also recognized the rights of private property in a
Conquest. Finally, the Court stated that negotiations leading to the drafting of a
treaty must also be considered: "In attempting to ascertain the true meaning of the
parties ... we are not confined to the language of the treaty; we may look into the
negotiations which preceded it." Id. Thus, the Court's holding in Percheman, if ap-
plied to grants in the territories, would not have allowed Euro-Americans such broad
inroads into Mexican lands.
As Malcolm Ebright asserts, "the language of Article 8 of the Florida treaty
was quite similar to Article 10 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo." EBRIGHT, LAND
GRANTS, supra note 19, at 32. Thus, Justice Marshall's ruling likely would have re-
quired American courts to recognize the Spanish text of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo in conjunction with its English counterpart. Such recognition would have
protected Mexican property interests. Disregarding the Spanish text facilitated incor-
rect interpretations of the relevant language. Malcolm Ebright argues "it is likely that
the United States did not want to be fettered with the liberal precedent of Perche-
man's construction of Article 8 of the Florida treaty in the Guadalupe Hidalgo
treaty." Id. at 32. Thus, to avoid the effect of this precedent in the territories, Congress
removed Article X from the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
151. To alleviate the concerns of Mexican officials over the removal of Article X,
U.S. emissaries responded with a Statement of Protocol on May 26, 1848:
The American government by suppressing the Xth article of the
Treaty... did not in any way intend to annul the grants of lands
made by Mexico in the ceded territories. These grants... preserve
the legal value which they may possess, and the grantees may cause
their legitimate titles to be acknowledged before the American tribu-
nals.
Protocol of Quertaro, May 26, 1848, reprinted in MILLER, supra note 16, at 380;
ACUIJA, supra note 39, at 19-20; see Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554,
555 (5th Cir. 1946) (noting that "inviolably respected" as used in the Treaty of Gua-
dalupe Hidalgo constitutes a "covenant").
152. See ACUNA, supra note 39, at 19; EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 29;
MILLER, supra note 57, at 246, 289.
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with Mexico, and although the Senate can modify a treaty, changing
the substantive terms breaches the signers' original intent."3
This substantive change to the Treaty precipitated further leg-
islation by alowing for the interpretation that the Treaty was not
self-executing."' As a result, new laws arose that exceeded the dic-
tates of the Treaty by requiring "each and every person claiming
lands" to submit to new and more stringent legal tests. These
changes ultimately allowed courts to impose questionable legal
obligations at both the federal and state level, jeopardizing the rights
of the country's earliest Chicana/Chicano population. This legisla-
tion and its effects on the Chicana/Chicano community are
examined in Part II, below.
C. Mexican Law and Native Americans
Before considering land grant adjudication and its conse-
quences for Mexican grantees, this section examines the relationship
between Native Americans and the Mexican Republic. Although the
Conquest of the Native American population is complex and a full
treatment of the subject lies beyond the scope of this Article, under-
standing three important points provides useful context for
complete comprehension of the material that follows.
In contrast to Anglo-American law, Mexican law recognized
Native Americans as Mexican citizens."5 6 Therefore, the Treaty's
covenants, which protected Mexican citizens, extended to the in-
digenous population residing in pueblos or former mission lands.57
153. See Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 704-05 (1995).
154. Id. at 701-02 (describing the difference between self-executing and non-self
executing treaties as turning on the question of whether the agreement requires
legislative implementation).
155. An Act to Ascertain and Settle the Private Land Claims in the State of Cali-
fornia, Ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631 (1851) [hereinafter California Land Act].
156. See LISBETH HAAS, CONQUESTS AND HISTORICAL IDENTITIES IN CALIFORNIA,
1769-1936 33 (1995) ("In 1826, all Indians were made full and equal citizens under
the law .... "). For an account of a challenge to the citizenship status of Native
Americans outside the land grant context, see Anderson v. Mathews, 163 P. 901, 902
(Cal. 1917), which described a refusal by a county clerk to register a Native American
to vote.
157. For example, Article XI provides:
[T]he sacredness of this obligation shall never be lost sight of by the
said Government, when providing for the removal of the Indians
from any portion of the said territories, or for it's [sic] being settled
by citizens of the United States; but on the contrary special care shall
then be taken not to place its Indian occupants under the necessity of
seeking new homes, by committing those invasions which the United
States have solemnly obliged themselves to restrain.
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In addition, as a condition of every grant, Mexico required that no
injury occur to the resident Native American population.' Finally,
Mexico's secularization laws gave "former neophytes the right to
claim a share of mission land" in communal forms.'59 Thus, Mexican
law clearly endeavored to provide Native Americans with a greater
measure of protection than they had under the Anglo-American
system.IW
By contrast, American legal actors held varying beliefs regarding
Native Americans, and legal principles were constrained by the cul-
tural bias of their interpreters. For example, one litigant argued that
Pocahontas, the Indian princess, whose descendants
have held and now hold places of honor and profit, and
large estates, real and personal; and let us not forget the
virtues of Pocahontas, her courageous acts and noble
darings in the cause of humanity, which have made her
character illustrious, and her portrait worthy of a niche
in the capital of the United States of America. 6'
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 15, at 932; see also United States v. Cande-
laria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926) (analyzing relationship of indigenous population to
Spain and Mexico); Indians of Cal. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 583 (1942); Christine A.
Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201 (1996) (discussing the relationship of the indigenous
population to the treaty).
158. Case law reports on the language of conditions obligating grantees. See, e.g.,
Chaves v. United States, 168 U.S. 177, 178-79 (1897) ("I grant ... the cultivation and
working of the land ... provided that no prejudice results to the Indians and resi-
dents settled in that vicinity."). For additional case law interpreting Mexican rights
vis h vis claims of Native American ownership, see United States v. Suiol, 27 F. Cas.
1367 (N.D. Ca. 1855) (No. 16, 421) and Sufiol v. Hepburn, 1 Cal. 254, 255 (1850).
159. MONROY, supra note 29, at 126. Monroy also asserts that the various decrees
and laws guaranteeing Indian entitlements were paid little attention because of the
intermittent political confusion that prevailed in California and the interior of Mex-
ico. See id. For case law treatment, see United States v. Conway, 175 U.S. 60, 61 (1899),
which discussed a petition to confirm a land grant to a group of Native Americans.
Communal sharing of natural resources, particularly in areas where water remained
in scarce supply, constituted an essential element of a grant. See, e.g., Pueblo of Zita
v. United States, 168 U.S. 198, 198-99 (1897) (discussing Pueblos' petition for 382,849
acres).
160. While the incomplete legal record has frustrated analysis of the specific
nature of Native American property ownership under the Mexican government,
Anglo-American case law provides some evidence of Native American ownership
and defense of pueblo lands in the Mexican territories. See, e.g., Barker v. Harvey, 181
U.S. 481, 482 (1901) (adjudicating Mission Indians' claim of a right of permanent
occupancy in former Mexican Lands ceded to the United States under the treaty);
United States v. Candelaria, 16 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1926) (involving a 1769 grant de-
riving from the Spanish period of control in Valencia, New Mexico).
161. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 530 (1854) (statement of the
case). For a current analysis of the role and myth of Pocahontas as having rejected
her native background, see WOMEN & POWER IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 6 (Laura F.
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Most Native Americans did not benefit from such adulation of
"royalty," as innumerable legal rulings included or relied upon odi-
ous and demeaning stereotypes of the indigenous population.
16
1
These harmful characterizations accordingly cast Native Americans
as neither deserving nor entitled to the protection of the law.
A long established record demonstrates the means by which
the United States extensively challenged indigenous titles, ques-
tioning whether Native Americans were Mexican citizens, whether
they could possess and sell land,1'6 whether pueblo grants were
Klein & Lillian A. Ackerman eds., 1995) (arguing that the "good Native" woman
cannot be perceived as truly Native and that for the princess "to be 'good,' she must
defy her own people, exile herself from them, become white and perhaps suffer
death"); Rayna Green, The Pocahontas Perplex, The Image of Indian Woman in American
Culture, in UNEQUAL SISTERS 15 (Ellen C. Dubois & Vicki L. Ruiz eds., 1990).
162. The judiciary's biased and racist characterization of the nation's indigenous
population is well-established. See, e.g., Luco v. United States, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 515,
521-22 (1859) (emphasizing importance of protecting settlers from "barbarous
tribes"); Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 540 (describing Indians' "degraded condition
... and ignorance generally). Further, judicial treatment disregarded Native Ameri-
cans' historical presence, which is difficult to reconcile with labeling the indigenous
population as "aliens and foreigners," notwithstanding that Euro-Americans entered
the country, more recently, as immigrants. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,
419-20 (1856). Several cases provide general treatment of Native Americans within
the context of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See United States v. Coronado Beach
Co., 274 F. 230, 232-33 (S.D. Cal. 1919) (declaring that "the military posts in the
territory were on the seacoast; and it would be strange policy indeed which would
isolate the posts, intended for the protection of settlers, and compel them to dwell;
among the savages without protection"); Hayt v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 455, 455
(1903) (involving the Utah Indians and analyzing whether territory annexed by the
United States was recognized as "Indian country"); De Baca v. United States, 37 Ct.
Cl. 482, 482 (1901) (involving the Navajo Indians and deciding whether child of
Spanish parents born in New Mexico in 1809 was by birth an American citizen).
163. See Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 540 (rejecting the U.S. Attorney General's
arguments that the Native American grantee was not a Mexican citizen and could
not "take, hold, and convey" land).
Mexican law regarded Native Americans as possessors rather than occupants
of their property interests. See Mexican Congressional Act of Sept. 17, 1822, cited in id.
at 538-39; Klein, supra note 157, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201 (1996). Thus, in the territories
they could buy and sell lands. See Ritchie, 58, U.S. (17 How.) at 540; see also Arenas v.
United States, 322 U.S. 419, 427 (1944) (holding that "[u]nder the Treaty of Gua-
dalupe Hidalgo [Mission Indians'] ancestral lands and their governance passed from
Mexico to the United States"). In Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823),
however, the Court held that under U.S. common law, Native Americans possessed
the right of occupancy but not ownership status. The conflict between Mexican
recognition of Native American citizenship and U.S. failure to do so presented set-
tlers with additional opportunities to challenge Native American property rights.
For an analysis of tribal rights and the legal treatment of Native Americans,
see Jo CARILLO, READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, RECALLING THE RHYTHM OF
SURVIVAL (1998); VINE DELORIA JR. & CLIFFORD M. LITTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Con-
temporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of
Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 237 (1989).
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valid, 64 and whether natural resources could be communally
shared. Ironically, after native land was taken and conveyed to third
parties or municipalities, the new fee-holders then asserted "rights" of
succession deriving from original granting language and ancient
pueblo rights in order to gain access to the area's natural resources.166
Like Mexican grantees, Native Americans of the past wit-
nessed land loss resulting from breaches of treaty obligations and
failure to recognize cultural and religious practices including
communal ownership of land. 67 Present day indigenous communi-
ties continue to face threats to their environment, religious rituals,
and customs and practices.9' Both groups simultaneously remain
subject to poverty and exclusion from the benefits of American agri-
cultural policy imposed by the shared history of land dispossession.
19
The next section examines the mechanisms by which the United
States government and private individuals deprived former Mexican
citizens living in the annexed territories of their land and economic
well-being.
164. See Barker, 181 U.S. at 499 (holding that servidumbres did not encompass
Mission Indians' rights to general occupation and use of granted property).
165. See, e.g., Los Angeles Farming Milling Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 217 U.S.
217, 218 (1910) (adjudicating claim of ownership over riparian rights); Devine v. City
of Los Angeles, 202 U.S. 313, 314 (1906) (adjudicating riparian rights claimed by the
city); Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314, 319 (1903) (involving a successor of an-
cient pueblo rights). This area of study is well-documented but beyond the scope of
this Article. For a discussion of the relevant issues, see, for example, United States v.
Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946), which involved compensation for taking
of land, and MONROY, supra note 29, at 194, which discusses the breakdown of tradi-
tional forms of social organizations.
166. See supra notes 159-60.
167. See United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278 (1897) (noting antecedent gov-
ernment retained title to communal property).
168. See, e.g., Noah Sachs, The Mescalero Apache Indians and Monitored Retrievable
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 641 (1996); Linda Fantin, Woman's
Goal: Keep Nuclear Waste off Indian Reservations, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 17, 1997, at B3;
Dion Hayes, Mojave Desert Indians Fighting To Stop Dump, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 1998,
at 3.
169. According to the court in United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1304
(1986):
The Treaty memorializes a pledge to the Mexican nation that the
United States would honor the rights of Indians living in the ceded
territory at the time the treaty was executed. As such, it is a treaty of
the United States securing the rights of [Nlative Americans, and it is
to be construed according to the special principles controlling inter-
pretation of Indian treaties.
Other current litigation involves Spanish land grants and, in one instance, a
tribe seeking a return of native land. See Doug Johnson, New Mexico Pueblo Fights to
Keep its Ancestral Prize Lawsuit: Tribe Believes its 1748 Spanish Land Grant Gives It Title
to the Highest Ridge on Sandia, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1997, at B1.
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II. THE LAND GRANT EXPERIENCE
Regard of the law for private property is so great ... that it
will not authorize the least violation of it, not even for the
general good of the whole community.' 7°
The desire for natural resources and land fueled the actions of
the dominant population seeking access to the natural resources in
the former Mexican provinces. 7' It is no secret that gold, timber, and
other valuable natural resources were prominent considerations in
the challenges to Mexican claims of ownership. In Peralta v. United
States,'72 the Court noted that the territories were "new, and rich in
mineral wealth, and attracted settlers, whose industry and enterprise
produced an unparalleled state of prosperity.','1 3 The Court further
declared: "The enhanced value given to the whole surface of the
country by the discovery of gold, made it necessary to ascertain and
170. JOHN H. CLOUGH, PROPERTY, ILLUSIONS OF "OWNERSHIP": THE PROCESS OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT 29-30 n.4 (1984) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*139). Blackstone's reasoning apparently was suitable for early Euro-American
settlers but not for the early Chicana/Chicano population.
171. Various authors attest to the geographical topography and environmental
diversity of Mexico's territories-the land coveted by the United States. For example:
California had environmental diversity and richness unparalleled
anywhere in the world. The state's geographic undulations encom-
pass the lowest and the highest points in the conterminous United
States. Spanning more than ten degrees of latitude and extending
over one hundred million acres, California is a bridge between cool-
temperate, foggy, dimly lit rain forests and open, parched, hot, sun-
bathed sub-tropical deserts. This astounding array of California
vegetation exists in close juxtaposition, spilling and swirling in patterns
created by elevation, climate, soil, and bedrock.
M. Kat Anderson et al., A World of Balance and Plenty, in CONTESTED EDEN, supra note
5, at 12; see also WARREN A. BECK & YNEZ D. HAASE, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF CALI-
FORNIA 8-10 (1974) (describing California's diverse topography, soil, rainfall, native
vegetation, and fauna). Finally, the California economy during the Spanish and
Mexican periods shows that "Indians, Franciscans, soldiers, settlers, and traders
engaged in modes of exchange and production that reflected local and national
strategies of economic development." Steven W. Hackel, Land, Labor, and Production,
The Colonial Economy of Spanish and Mexican California, in CONTESTED EDEN, supra
note 5, at 111-12. The economy also sustained "intensive agriculture, cattle ranching,
artisan crafts, and foreign commerce." Id. This is in marked contrast to legal and
historical accounts that emphasize American contributions. See, e.g., Luco v. United
States, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 515, 524 (1859) ("The influx of American settlers had, from
the year 1849, given great value to the lands, had placed them in worth, as they were
in extent, on an equality with a principality ... .
172. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434 (1865).
173. Id. at 439; see also Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669-70 n.1
(1979) (stating that the territories were "a largely untapped resource" around the
time of annexation).
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settle all private land claims, so that the real estate belonging to
individuals could be separated from the public domain."74 The evi-
dence ultimately shows that judicial concerns with settling private
land claims, so as to meet the needs of American industry, did not
similarly benefit Chicanas/Chicanos holding land grants.
Specifically, covetous settlers targeted the larger holdings of
grantees, engaged in anti-Mexican hostilities, and pressured Con-
gress for relief. According to one scholar, California Senator Gwinn
"probably voiced the opinions of the average American who re-
garded California as a fabulous region that should be open to land-
hungry Americans and who looked with suspicion upon the huge
size of the California ranchos."75
A. Land Act Legislation
Congress responded to this land hunger via the California Land
Act of 1851.176 In stark contrast to American obligations under the
Treaty, Congress imposed upon grantees the burden of proving the
validity of their claims of ownership.17 Through the Act Congress
established a Land Claims Commission to determine the validity of
ownership of land grants.78 According to the Court in United States
v. Coronado Beach Co., 9 "[t]he object of the creation of the special
tribunal to settle private grants in California was to segregate them
from the 'public domain' and thus open up a vast area of that do-
main in California to settlement under the homestead and
preemption laws."'' Indeed, the California Land Act required:
[t]hat each and every person claiming lands in Califor-
nia by virtue of any right or title derived from the
174. Peralta, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 438.
175. ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 99; see also MIRANDa, supra note 39, at 39
(contending that in introducing legislation, William Gwinn "openly admitted that his
intent was to encourage squatters and force Mexicans off the land").
176. California Land Act, 9 Stat. 631 (1851).
177. Section Eight of the California Land Act provides:
That each and every person claiming lands in California by virtue of
any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government,
shall present the same to the [land] commissioners ... together with
such documentary evidence and testimony of witnesses as the said
claimant relies upon in support of such claims.
§ 8, 9 Stat. at 632.
178. See United States v. Fossatt, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 445, 447 (1858) (explaining that
validity of claim to ownership means determining a claim's authenticity, legality, or
interpretation).
179. 255 U.S. 472 (1921)
180. Id. at 478 (citing Botiller v. Dominquez, 130 U.S. 238, 249 (1889)).
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Spanish or Mexican government, shall present the same
to the said commissioners when sitting as a board, to-
gether with such documentary evidence and testimony
of witnesses as the said claimant relies upon in support
of such claims. 8
Thereafter, "[tihe United States compelled the Mexican grantee
willing or unwilling to present their titles for adjudication, or as an
alternative, forfeit their lands to the public domain." 82 This require-
ment conflicted with the promises to protect the property of
Mexican grantees in the Treaty.
Legislation and judicial interpretation in land grant adjudica-
tion cut one level deeper into the protections of the Treaty by
adopting a legal presumption that Mexican landowners did not hold
clear title.' 4 In interpreting the land acts, American courts held that
grants were to be construed against the grantee, who had the burden
of producing evidence "of such persuasive and preponderating force
as to convince the court that the title is real, and besides, possesses the
181. California Land Act § 8. California adjudicated the largest number of cases
under the land acts, but other legislation affected Colorado and Arizona when those
territories came into existence. See United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 291 (1897).
The California Land Act was amended several times to accomplish its man-
date. For example, the laws of January 18, 1854, and January 10, 1855, extended the
time within which the Commission was to act. The Commission disbanded March 1,
1856, after five years. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 10, 1855, 10 Stat. 603 (1855). Subsequent
legislation permitted an extension of time to accommodate the claims of non-
Mexican grantees to present their claims to the land commission. See Act of Mar. 3,
1854, 10 Stat. 268 (1854).
182. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 23 F. 279, 296 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885).
183. See Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, art. VIII, supra note 15, at 929-30. In Span-
ish, the provision reads:
Las propiedades de todo g~nero existentes en los expresados territo-
rios, y que pertenecen ahora A Mexicanos no establecidos en ellos,
serAn respetadas inviolablemente. Sus actuales duefios, los herederos
de estos, y los Mexicanos que en lo venidero puedan adquirir por
contrato las indicadas propiedades, disfrutardn respecto de ellas tan
amplia garantia, como si perteneciesen A ciudadanos de los Estados
Unidos.
Id. By forcing grantees to prove the validity of their claims, even when they had
performed all the conditions of the award, the California Land Act created a separate
class of landowners and established legal presumptions that favored the United
States. See infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text. Requiring grantees to defend
their titles in a judicial setting also created opportunities for U. S. officials to erect
further barriers to grantees' quiet enjoyment of their property, including lax custody
of grant records and biased or incompetent interpretation and authentication of
documents. See infra notes 226-45, 355-66 and accompanying text.
184. See Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 250 (1889); Sanford A. Mosk, The
Influence of Tradition on Agriculture in New Mexico, 2 J. ECON. HIST. 34, 46 (Dec. 1942).
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legal attributes which the statute requires.""' This presumption clearly
contradicted the letter and spirit of the Treaty, which provided pro-
tection for grants according to Mexican law.
Failure to present a claim and demonstrate definitive proof of
fee ownership within two years defaulted the land to the public
domain.186 Thus, instead of following established federal and inter-
national law, Mexican law, custom, and governmental records of
land ownership, American officials required grantees to undertake
an entirely new and burdensome process.
The fairness of the process was further strained by the creation of
the Board of Commissioners as the primary forum for reviewing land
claims. This structure raises fairness concerns in part because "[t]he
board of commissioners was not a court, under the [C]onstitution,
invested with judicial powers.,8 7 Additionally, the process increased
the burden on grantees by expanding the number of tribunals to
which appeals could be taken, to five.'88 This lengthened the
185. United States v. Ortiz, 176 U.S. 422, 425-26 (1900) (emphasis added).
186. California Land Act of 1851, § 13, 9 Stat. 631 (1851); see also Swat v. United
States, 23 F. Cas. 521, 521 (D. Cal. 1857) (No. 13,690) (holding that where a claim is
barred, the "land [at issue] must be deemed to be part of the public domain").
187. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 533 (1854). Ritchie raises both
separation of powers and federalism concerns. Id. Conflicts surfaced because federal
district courts did not have complete jurisdiction over land grant adjudication until
the Act of 1860 was passed. See United States v. Rodriguez, 25 F. Cas. 821 (D.C.N.D.
Cal. 1864) (No. 14,950).
The Board of Land Commissioners was subject to the whims of political ac-
tors. Indeed, one historian has characterized the Board as "lame duck politicians,
who were ignorant of both the Spanish language ... and Mexican law...." Gomez,
supra note 40, at 1069 (quoting PAUL GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DE-
VELOPMENT 115 (1979)). Initially under Whig control, the Commissioners interpreted
the California Land Act as mandated by the Treaty and looked to custom in recog-
nizing the claims of many grantees. See Bakken, supra note 21, at 243. One year later,
following a national election, Democrats took over and began demanding further
verification of land claims. See id. at 243-44.
188. California Land Act § 9. While the hearings before the Board in California
ended in 1856, appeals from that state continued for several years thereafter. The
California Land Act itself provided for an appeal from the Board to the U.S. district
court, and from the district court to the U.S. Supreme Court. California Land Act
§§ 9, 10. Moreover,
[aifter the admission of California to statehood, September 9, 1850,
Congress adopted the Mexican Claims Act of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat.
631, which established a Board of Land Commissioners with the
authority, upon petition of those claiming under Mexican or Spanish
grants of land in the annexed territory, to pass upon the validity of
the grants.... By § 12 of the Act of August 31, 1852, 10 Stat. 76, 99,
the Attorney General was given authority over appeals from deci-
sions of the Board ....
United States v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1938).
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litigation process, as confirmed landowners faced appeals by the
United States and others using the name of the United States.'89
Perhaps most significantly, the act failed to provide for final de-
cisions to have the preclusive effect against third parties generally
accorded to judgments regarding title to land. 90 Thus, even when
the Commission confirmed title, its decision did not quiet title for
grantees. Interested third parties could challenge Chicana/Chicano
property holders upon payment of a $1000 bond to the United
States.19'
Furthermore, confirmation of a grant obligated grantees to pre-
sent a clear survey of their tract.9 Failing adverse information or
challenges by the United States or third parties to the accuracy of
surveys, a claimant obtained a vested interest in the tract. 93 Thus,
the survey process provided additional opportunities for those
seeking Mexican property interests to challenge the grant. Once
confirmed and surveyed, the General Land Office issued a land
patent-an official declaration from the United States that the
grantee had demonstrated the validity of a claim.
9 4
In the former Mexican territories outside of California, the
status of land grants remained in limbo until 1854, when Congress
established the Office of Surveyor General to control jurisdiction
189. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 441, 442 (1902) (questioning the
validity of patents issued by the U.S. government prior to confirmation of Spanish
land grants or related activity); United States v. Pena, 175 U.S. 500, 501 (1899)
(challenging the validity of U.S. land grant patents); United States v. Guerrero, 26 F.
Cas. 52, 52-53 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 15,269) (affirming the validity of a land grant in
San Francisco County).
190. Compare California Land Act § 15 (providing right of action for third parties),
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 cmt. b (1982) (noting that the appli-
cation of res judicata to true in rem proceedings historically has meant that such
judgments determined the rights of the claimant against both the opposing party and
"all the world"). This longstanding common law rule was clearly within the scope of
the protection for Mexican grantees under the Treaty and international law. See State
v. Gallardo, 135 S.W. 664, 670-71 (1911).
191. See California Land Act, § 13, 9 Stat. 631 (1851) ("[Tlhe surveyor general of
California ... shall ... cause all private claims which shall be finally confirmed to be
accurately surveyed .... ). The use of bonds allowed challengers to present actions
against grantees in the name of the United States. See Teschemacher v. United States,
23 F. Cas. 862 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 13,843), aff'd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1 (1855).
192. See California Land Act § 13.
193. See California Land Act §§ 13, 15.
194. See California Land Act § 13. In some actions, parties challenging successor
rights asserted that the patent had the effect of a quitclaim deed. See Shelley v. Hur-
witz, 92 P.2d 660 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939). The Treaty protected all existing property
rights but neither created nor defined the rights. See Los Angeles Farming & Milling
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 217 U.S. 217, 236 (1910) (denying that property rights
could be a basis for a writ of error because they are not of federal origin).
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over New Mexico.'95 Subsequent legislation extended that jurisdic-
tion into the territories of Arizona and Utah, and the states of
Nevada, Colorado, and Wyoming. In New Mexico, the Surveyor
General was authorized to "ascertain the origin, nature, character,
and extent of all claims to lands under the laws, usages, and customs
of Spain and Mexico.' ' 196 The Surveyor General then made recom-
mendations to Congress, which was ultimately responsible for
determining whether the Mexican grant "represented an authentic
ownership against the United States.' ' 197 Again, the Surveyor Gen-
eral's commission confirmed only a minority of the Mexican grants
claimed.198
Congress later prescribed "[t]hat it shall and may be lawful for
any person ... claiming lands within the [territories] by virtue of
any such Spanish or Mexican grant ... which have not been con-
firmed by act of congress [sic]... and which are not already
195. Act to Establish the Offices of Surveyor-General of New Mexico, Kansas, and
Nebraska, ch. 103, 10 Stat. 308 (1854). This second major form of land grant adjudi-
cation occurred in New Mexico when Congress, after initially reserving the power of
land grant adjudication to itself, created the Court of Private Land Claims in 1891.
See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 854 (1891). Judicial discussion of this history provides
a useful reference. See Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S. 637 (1898) (concerning an appeal
from the Court of Private Land Claims involving land in New Mexico that derived
from an 1825 grant); United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 290 (1897) (referring to
New Mexico and Arizona and noting that Congress "reserved to itself, prior to the
passage of the act of March 3, 1891, creating the Court of Private Land Claims, the
determination of such claims"). The Court of Private Land Claims existed for over 12
years. See RICHARD W. BRADFUTE, THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS, THE
ADJUDICATION OF SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANT TITLES, 1891-1904, at 215
(1975).
196. § 8, 10 Stat. at 309; Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U.S. 312, 333 (1898); see also supra
note 183.
197. BRADFUTE, supra note 195, at 6. The author states that of the 77,868,640 acres
of land in New Mexico, the U.S. Attorney for the Court of Private Land Claims
estimated that 34,053,340 acres were involved in claims presented before that court.
See id. at 45. This figure does not include the acreage that Congress adjudicated itself
prior to the Court's creation in 1891. See id.
198. Richard Bradfute estimates that in New Mexico:
[tihe court heard claims for 231 grants with a total acreage of
34,653,140, and 80 grants were confirmed for a total of 1,934,986
acres. In Arizona, 17 grants were claimed for 837,869 acres, and the
court confirmed 8 of these for 116,639 acres, rejecting 721,139 acres.
Id. at 214-15. Bradfute, however, contradicts himself in considering whether the
process was fair or biased. For example, his discussion of the number of confirmed
claims before the Court of Private Land Claims in the New Mexico territory asserts
the failure to demonstrate bias: "[T]he fact that the court confirmed only 30 percent
of the claims filed before it, as compared with the 75 percent confirmation rate in
California, did result in bias against grants, but no direct evidence of such bias ex-
ists." Id. at 214.
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complete and perfect, in every such case to present a petition."'1 9
Other sections of the Act required perfected title as of the date of
Conquest 2°° and provided for notice to interested parties.2' Finally,
as under the California Land Act, a grantee's failure to present a
claim within the proscribed period barred future confirmation of
claims. °2
Yet, even when grantees provided definitive proof of owner-
ship before the Board, they remained subject to legal standards that
improperly aided opposing parties. On appeal, the court could retry
a claim on issues of fact or law and permit testimony beyond the im-
mediate issue, including amending the record below. In authorizing
courts to rehear every question "as truth and justice may require,"
the land acts essentially promoted land challenges against grantees
of Mexican descent•.2 By placing Mexican landholders on the defen-
sive at every stage of the process, these novel rules directly
contradicted the pledges made by the United States to protect the
199. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 854 (1891).
200. See § 8, 26 Stat. at 857 ("[Any person or corporation claiming lands in any of
the [territories] under a title ... that was complete and perfect at the date when the
United States acquired sovereignty ... shall have the right... to apply to said court
... for a confirmation of such title.").
201. § 1, 26 Stat. at 854. The statute reads as follows:
The court... shall give notice of the times and places of the holding
of such sessions by publication in both the English and Spanish lan-
guage, in one newspaper published at the capital of such State or
Territory, once a week for two successive weeks, the last of which
publications shall be not less than thirty days next preceding the
times of the holding of such sessions may be adjourned from time to
time without such publication.
Id. The California Land Act also provided for public notice and permitted actions by
those contesting the purported grant. California Land Act, §§ 5, 13, 9 Stat. 631 (1851).
202. Subsection 8 of Section 13 of the 1891 Act recites:
No concession, grant, or other authority to acquire land made upon
any condition or requirement, either antecedent or subsequent, shall
be admitted or confirmed unless it shall appear that every such con-
dition and requirement was performed within the time and in the
manner stated in such concession, grant or other authority to acquire
land.
26 Stat. 854 (1891).
203. The Court in United States v. Chaves, 159 U.S. 452 (1895), reports:
Upon any appeal the Supreme Court shall retry the cause, as well the
issues of fact as of law, and may cause testimony to be taken in addi-
tion to that given in the court below, and may amend the record of
the proceedings below as truth and justice may require; and on such
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property of Mexican grantees, and thereby violated the Treaty's
mandate.0 5
In addition, grantees confronted other broken promises. In the
Protocol of Quertaro, the United States pledged "not [to] diminish
in any way what was agreed upon ... in favor of the inhabitants of
the territories ceded by Mexico."2°6 In the same Protocol, the United
States vowed that
suppressing the Xth article ... did not in any way in-
tend to annul the grants of lands made by Mexico in the
territories. These grants, notwithstanding the suppres-
sion of the article of the Treaty, preserve the legal value
which they may possess; and the grantees may cause
their legitimate titles to be acknowledged before the
American tribunals.0 7
In direct contradiction to the terms of the Protocol, American courts
presumed annulment of the grants and then assigned grantees the
burden of proving and reproving the validity of their claims, at
every level of the legal system. Thus, the United States broke prom-
ises upon promises by enacting laws and providing for challenges
that undermined grants the Mexican government had or would have
concluded were valid.
Initially, grant holders who had performed the conditions of
their grants believed that they were exempt from presenting their
claims for determination of validity. 208 They rested this belief on
governing legislation that provided:
in deciding on the validity of any claim brought before
them under the provisions of this act, [such claims] shall
be governed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the
law of nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the
205. See United States v. Ortiz, 176 U.S. 422 (1899); Chavez v. United States, 175
U.S. 552 (1899); United States v. Pico, 27 F. Cas. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 16,047); see
also MILLER, supra note 16, at 380-406.
206. MILLER, supra note 16, at 381.
207. Id. at 381.
208. Cf. Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 255 (1889) (citing Counsel's argu-
ment that the California Land Act only applied to "imperfect, inchoate, and
inequitable" titles rather than "complete and perfect" titles); United States v. San
Jacinto Tin Co., 23 F. 279, 296 (C.C.D. 1885) ("The United States compelled the Mexi-
can grantees, willing or unwilling to present their titles for adjudication, or, as an
alternative, forfeit their lands."). Initially, questions arose as to whether individuals
holding land in fee status were obligated to comply with the legislation. See, e.g.,
Ainsa v. United States, 184 U.S. 639 (1902) (denying ownership and possession of a
grant dating from 1836) ; Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 572 (1854)
(Catron, J. dissenting) ("Mexican claims had no standing in an ordinary court of
justice....").
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government from which the claim is derived, the prin-
ciples of equity, and the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, so far as they are applicable .
Article VIII of the Treaty, moreover, promised to protect grantees'
property interests. Consequently, if grantees had complied with all
of the conditions attached to their awards under Mexican law, they
should have been exempted from the confirmation process.
In Phelan v. Poyoreno,21° one California court stated at length:
Mexicans who previous to the acquisition of California
... had acquired from the governments of either Spain
or Mexico, a perfect title to lands in California, and who
chose to remain in [California] ... were by the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo protected in the ownership and
enjoyment of their lands the same as though no change
of sovereignty had occurred ... [and they] were not
compelled to submit them for confirmation to the board
of commissioners ... nor did they forfeit their lands by
a failure to represent them to such board for confirma-
tion, and that the titles thus vested may be asserted and
maintained like other perfect titles in the courts of the
country ... which were perfect at the date of the treaty,
could, if they so elected, present them to the commis-
sion for confirmation, but were not bound to do So.1
Thus, given Mexican law, the covenants made by the American gov-
ernment in the Treaty, and the clear position of the California court,
Mexican grant holders had good reason for believing that they need
not re-demonstrate the validity of their holdings to the new Ameri-
can tribunals.
Federal courts, however, took a different stance: namely, pres-
212 213ent the title or forfeit the land.212 In Botiller v. Domringuez, the Courtaddressed this issue and held that under the Land Act of 1851:
no title to land in California, under Spanish or Mexican
grants, could have any validity unless submitted to and
confirmed by the commission, or, if rejected by the
209. California Land Act, Ch. 41, § 11, 9 Stat. 631 (1851).
210. 13 P. 681 (Cal. 1887)
211. Id. at 683 (citing Minturn v. Brower, 24 Cal. 644); see also United States v.
Circuit Judges, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 673 (1865) (analyzing the 1851 Act and jurisdiction).
212. See, e.g., United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 23 F. 279, 296 (C.C.D. 1885)
("The United States compelled the Mexican grantees, willing or unwilling to present
their titles for adjudication, or as an alternative forfeit their lands.").
213. 130 U.S. 238 (1889).
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commission, confirmed by the District or United States
Supreme Court.
14
Consequently all landowners in the territories, even if in possession
since the earliest colonization years, were obligated to meet the dic-
tates of the Land Acts or risk automatic forfeiture of their property.
B. Mexican Grantees in Case Law
In United States v. Fossatt,"5 the Court declared that "[t]he United
States did not appear in the courts as a contentious litigant; but as a
great nation, acknowledging their obligation to recognise [sic] as
valid every authentic title, and soliciting exact information to direct
their executive Government to comply with that obligation. 216 The
case law, however, reveals that the United States failed to perform
its obligation to protect Mexican grantees and, accordingly, margi-
nalized them within the new legal regime.
1. Initial Disputes and Judgments
In the aggregate, grantees faced five types of legal challenges
based on the following: (1) the possession of documents purporting
to establish ownership; (2) the authority of Mexican officials to grant
awards; (3) the ability to grant lands near coastal areas; (4) the exis-
tence of proper registration in Mexican archives; and (5) courts'
general refusal to follow Mexican colonization law, or custom and
practice, in requiring the performance of conditions attached to
land grant awards. Grantees' experience litigating these claims
demonstrates that court rulings produced erratic and arbitrary deter-
minations that disregarded Mexican landowners' le§,al rights, while
providing advantages to the non-Mexican population.
214. Id. at 255.
215. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 445,450-51 (1858).
216. Id.
217. In addition to these legal advantages, settlers also effectuated challenges to
grantees through violence both before and after the Conquest. Although in existence
before the Conquest, the State of Texas officially recognized the Texas Rangers as an
official law enforcement entity of the State. The Texas Rangers pressured Mexican
landowners out of the use of their property and surrounding natural resources. See
JULIAN SAMORA ET AL., GUNPOWDER JUSTICE: A REASSESSMENT OF THE TEXAS
RANGERS 27-30, 41-42 (1979); see also GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 14, at 83
("The Cortina Rebellion, in the Brownsville-Matamoros area in the 1850s and 1860s
and the El Paso Salt War in the 1870s pitted entire communities against the Texas
Rangers in a struggle for the land.").
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a. Mexican Law and Granting Papers
In contrast to both the Treaty and general principles of property
law, the United States required each and every grantee to demon-
strate the validity of their claims of ownership as a legitimate and
valid fee.218 The absence of "proof of grants" in the form of complete
expedientes, documents, or evidence in title registries triggered judi-
cial presumptions against their validity.
One court reasoned:
Where the petition, and the other requirements following
it, have not been registered in the proper office with the
grant itself, a presumption arises against its genuineness,
making it a proper subject of inquiry before that fact can
be admitted. It is not to be taken as a matter of course,
nor should slight testimony be allowed to remove the
presumption. Both the kind and quantum of evidence
must be regarded.219
Courts attempted to justify this presumption by maintaining
that archival and other primary evidence worked to "guard against
fraud."' 0 As one student of the process has noted,
[grantees were thus required to gather] all the papers
they could to prove to the gentlemen of the board that
they owned the land they had been living on for so
many years. They looked into their leather trunks for
original grants from Mexican governors. They called
upon their friends and relatives to testify to long resi-
dence and to the number of their cattle. They went to
Yankee lawyers for help. They sent to the Surveyor
General's Office in San Francisco for copies of the ar-
218. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 23 F. 279, 296 (C.C.D. 1885).
219. Fuentes v. United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 443, 454 (1854). Courts, and in
some instances, the Board of Land Commissioners, required Mexican books of rec-
ords pertaining to registration of grants. See United States v. Cambuston, 25 F. Cas.
266 (C.C.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 14,713). However, at least one court declined to give
conclusive weight to such documents:
We do not regard the catalogue of grants as authoritative proof of
grants enumerated in it, or as a conclusive exclusion of grants not so
registered by Jimeno, which may be alleged to have been made
whilst California was a part of the Mexican Republic, though they
may bear date within the time to which that Index relates. But in this
case, it may be referred to as an auxiliary memorandum made by
Jimeno himself of his action upon the petition of West.
United States v. West, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 315, 317 (1859).
220. Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434, 440 (1865).
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chives files relating to particular ranchos. They made
journeys and drew upon their slender fund of cash."'
By demanding primary documents,2 courts imposed extensive de-
lays, exhausted the economic resources of grantees,m and effectively
disallowed quieting title, thereby extending potential adverse conse-
quences to a grantee's heirs.
Some scholars have attempted to explain the absence of these
documents as resulting from the "loose and careless methods" of
Mexican officials; 221 however, contrary to such scholars' assertions,
historical evidence in case law undermines such claims. Grantees
who attempted to produce records and archival evidence encoun-
tered a number of barriers that precluded access to their
documents.26 Indeed, if any government was loose and careless with
grant documents, it was that of the United States.227
First and foremost, during and after the Conquest, American
governmental and military officials destroyed or ordered the de-
struction of land grant documents.2 For example, in United States v.
221. ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 103.
222. See Bergere v. United States, 168 U.S. 66 (1897) (dismissing claim, in part, for
failure to provide grant materials); Neuguent v. United States Dep't of Interior, 640
F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (requesting land grant documents that remained "missing").
223. See Bergere, 168 U.S. at 66; United States v. Auguisola, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 352,
353-54 (1863) (upholding petitioner's claim and rejecting all 13 exceptions taken by
the United States to the District Court's decision to approve the grant after rejection
by Board); Rodrigues v. United States, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 582 (1863) (involving a con-
tinuing post-confirmation challenge to boundaries of the grant); United States v.
Bernal, 24 F. Cas. 1123 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,581) (noting that Carmen Bernal faced
ongoing challenges based on allegations of fraud despite confirmation of her grant).
224. See Sena v. United States, 189 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1903) (discussing the heirs of
original grantee, Jose de Leyba); Yturbide v. United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 290
(1859) (rejecting claim by Yturbide's heirs); United States v. Sutherland, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 363 (1856) (discussing minor children of Miguel de Pedrorena).
225. Morrow, supra note 19, at 15.
226. Apart from the acts of either American officials or the Mexican government,
disasters also hindered access to land grant documents. For example, several great
fires in San Francisco destroyed a number of titles, records, and other evidence of the
existence of the grants. See Fuentes, 63 U.S. (22 How.) at 451 (noting that "the great
fire of the 3d and 4th May, 1851, occurred," destroying land grant books and other
documents). It is curious that a "natural disaster" resulted on or near the location
where the Board of Commissioners was hearing land grant claims in San Francisco.
227. In the 1950s, the government brought the Spanish Archives into the office of
the Surveyor General in San Francisco. Transcripts were scattered in Washington,
D.C., in the land office in Glendale, California, and in the Attorney General's Ar-
chives in Sacramento, California, among other places. All surviving records are now
kept in the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
228. For example, the heirs of an original grantee in New Mexico asserted:
[Iln the year 1846, while the original documents of title were in exis-
tence in the town of Paso del Norte ... where the heir resided, the
place was occupied by the military forces of the United States, and
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Chaves,229 the petitioners, appealing on behalf of the United States,
sought confirmation of a recognized land grant in Valencia County,
New Mexico. Although one of the original grantees held duplicates
of the granting documents until his death, the petitioners could not
produce the duplicates because they had been stolen, destroyed, or
lost by a third party.23 The petitioners testified that the original
documents "once in the custody of the defendant (the United States)
after the solemnization of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, were
wrongfully and negligently destroyed or lost by the [United
States]."'31
The record reveals the veracity of the petitioner's allegations.
Territorial librarian Ira M. Bond, for example, testified that the gov-
ernor directed him to sell grant documents as "waste paper.,232 Bond
"sold and disposed of the old records, supposing them to be of no
value., 233 Although Bond later recovered "most of them," upon ex-
ternal criticism of the governor's actions, he nonetheless failed to
recover all of the discarded documents, including those of the peti-
tioner. The American registry of Mexican grants in the office of the
territorial Surveyor General was similarly "fragmentary and defec-
tive. " 4
Although the petitioners in Chaves ultimately succeeded in their
claim, the case illustrates the extent to which United States govern-
ment officials bear responsibility for the dispossession of Mexican
grantees. Similar accounts of grant-related document destruction
throughout the territories appear in other cases.23 ' The range of these
the original documents of title and the official registry where they
were recorded were destroyed by the American forces ....
United States v. Pendell, 185 U.S. 189, 190 (1902). Historians attest to the long mem-
ory this type of destruction engendered in the communities in which it occurred. See
Shadow & R6driguez-Shadow, supra note 14, at 292 n.11.
229. 159 U.S. 452, 453 (1895). Mexican Governor Francisco Sarricino "granted the
tract to Juan Chaves and about 60 Others, and to the town of Cubero" in 1833. Id. The
petitioners alleged that the "chief alcalde of that jurisdiction did, during the same
year, put them in possession." Id.
230. Id. at 454.
231. Id. at 462.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 463.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Hayes v. State, 100 S.W. 912, 913 (Tex. 1907) (chronicling the de-
struction of documents in 1864). Because of the war, the Mexican departmental
assembly dissolved and thus could not complete its assigned tasks with respect to
the record keeping of land grants. See MacKay v. Armstrong, 19 S.W. 159, 163 (Tex.
1892) (citing depositions of Pedro Bustamante, Martine de J. Sanchez, and Pable
Levin). These depositions report "that the public archives of the state of Tamaulipas
were kept at the said city of Victoria, and that in the year 1864 said archives were all
destroyed by an armed force of guerrillas under command of Col. Dupin." Id.
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accounts demonstrates that far from being the result of "loose and
careless" methods of Mexican authorities, the loss of grant docu-
ments also resulted from American officials' bald orders to discard
the documents.]
In addition to those who engaged in outright destruction of
documents, other officials systematically destroyed, misplaced, or
"lost" Spanish books that enumerated titles.237 For example, in United
States v. Cambuston,25 John Fremont, one of California's first senators
and an instigator of the Mexican Conquest, testified that he had lost
granting documents in his possession. 9 Such haphazard methods of
"protecting" land grant documents allowed interested parties to
alter or destroy the expedientes and other archival evidence.2 °
Moreover, American officials held land documents under poor
conditions. For example, various California Alta documents were
"found lying on the floor" of the public offices housing the docu-
ments.241 In United States v. Knight's Administrator2 42 the Court reported
that:
All the real records of land titles are known to have
been in the Secretary's office at Los Angeles when the
country was taken by the American army. But Captain
Halleck lets us know that he and Mr. Hartnell and Gen-
eral Kearney mingled with them a large quantity of
othe papers found in the custom-house at Monterey,
and that their bulk was further swelled by private con-
tributions. It is notorious, too, that many false papers
236. Chaves, 159 U.S. at 452.
237. In United States v. Bale, 24 F. Cas. 968 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,504), claimants
alleged that the "records of grant proceedings deposited in [the] alcalde's office
[were] destroyed at [the] time [the] office [was] taken possession by [the] 'Bear Flag
Party.'" Id. at 968. Even without documents, however, the claim was confirmed. Id.
238. 25 F. Cas. 266 (C.C.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 14,713). On August 13, 1846, Fremont
took possession of the archives until September 8, 1846. Thereafter, until 1847, the
records remained near Sacramento at Sutter's Fort, a "flea-infested" outpost. See
NELSON BEECHER KEYES, THE AMERICAN FRONTIER, OUR UNIQUE HERITAGE 270-71
(1954).
239. There, the court was forced to recognize that "it is possible that some espedi-
entes [sic] have been lost. Colonel Fremont appears to have removed several, which
were lost in the mountains." Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. at 267.
240. See, e.g., United States v. Galbraith, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 89, 96 (1859)
(describing the alteration of a deed).
241. See United States v. Knight's Adm'r, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 227, 230 (1861); see also
United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17, 119 (1862) (holding four different
versions of the same title record to be fakes because they were without the valid
original).
242. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 227 (1861).
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were placed among them at different times by dishonest
claimants, for their own fraudulent ends.243
In short, it was well known at the time that American officials
left the grant records "in a condition where spoliations or loss of
documents may have taken place."2 4 These officials also created
chain-of-custody problems in determining the authenticity of
documents and sometimes simply made the documents inaccessi-
ble.245 Such conditions imposed further inequitable burdens on
grantees, making it extremely difficult for them to meet the already
inappropriately high evidentiary requirements to establish their
claims.
Yet, even where a grantee possessed documents, courts estab-
lished newer legal standards that hindered confirmation or
disallowed precedent. For example, courts required recording of
grants in public title books.
Written documentary evidence, no matter how formal
and complete, or how well supported by the testimony
of witnesses, will not suffice [to establish that a Mexican
grant is valid] if it is obtained from private hands and
there is nothing in the public records of the country to
show that such evidence ever existed.246
Courts required, moreover, "that any copy of a grant document had
to be made by one who had the authority by law to make such cop-
ies," 247 even where a grantee had undisturbed and notorious
possession for an extended period of time. Such requirements con-
tradicted the promises of the Treaty because long-standing
243. Id. at 237.
244. Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. at 267. Although non-Mexican claimants also faced
charges of fraud in appropriate instances, such charges were easily directed to the
Mexican grantee in spite of primary evidence showing undisturbed ownership and
official grant of land. See infra notes 249-50, 263-64 and accompanying text.
245. Jeremiah S. Black was the U.S. Attorney General and, according to one
author, kept Mexican grantees from obtaining copies of their granting papers.
EXPLOITS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN CALIFORNIA, BY AN EARLY CALIFORNIAN 6-7
(1860) ("The archives, nailed up in boxes in Benecia, or scattered through the States,
were inaccessible alike to claimants and the law agent of government."). In at least
one instance, Attorney General Black alleged that a claim concerning lost documents
was fraudulent and spurious. See Fuentes v. United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 443, 448
(1859).
246. Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434, 440 (1865).
247. BRADFUTE, supra note 195, at 139 (rejecting grants in Cieneguilla, Conejos, El
Rito, Sanguijuela, El Embudo, and Sitio de Navejo cases).
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occupancy adequately supported a claim for title under Mexican
law."
The above described impediments to obtaining legal recogni-
tion of Mexican grantees' rights, combined with the private right of
action available under the statutes, created a defacto license for oth-
ers to challenge their titles. Thus, it is not surprising that squatters
and other Euro-American challengers brought claims for land own-
ership against grantees of Mexican descent. For example, in Peralta v.
United States,24 Sefiora Peralta had long met her obligations under
Mexican law to secure her land. s° Nevertheless, the Court rejected
the claim because she lacked certain documents, even though the
Peralta family asserted that their disappearance resulted from
fraud. The Court reasoned that Sefiora Peralta was at fault for her
circumstances and denied a title that the Mexican government
recognized as valid."'
Resistance to confirmation went to startling lengths. When
Mexican granting officers attested to the validity of their signature
on grants, or to the status of the property in relation to its grantee,
courts still refused to confirm the grant. In rejecting the testimony of
Mexican government officers, one court reasoned that:
owing to the weakness of memory with regard to the
dates of grants signed by them, the testimony of the late
officers... cannot be received to supply or contradict
248. See supra notes 97-100. Cases also provide support: "The greater part of the
Alameda Grant it is found, has been occupied in strips, from beyond the memory of
men now living." Montoya v. Gonzales, 232 U.S. 375, 376 (1914).
249. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434 (1865).
250. See John S. Hittell, Mexican Land Claims in California, A Documentary History of
the Mexican Americans, HUTCHINGS' CAL. MAG. (1857), reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN AMERIcANs 199,205 (Wayne Moquin & Charles Van Doren
eds., 1971) ("The Peralta grant ... was made in the last century, and has been in
constant possession ever since, under a perfect title according to the Mexican law
251. See Peralta, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 436. Specifically, the Court noted that "if the
parties had used the proper diligence in procuring the issue of the grant and judicial
measurement and formal possession, there might have been no difficulty in the
case." Id. For an alternative view expressed in a case involving a non-Mexican
grantee, see United States v. Sutter, 27 F. Cas. 1368, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1861) (No. 16,424),
which held that the existence of permanent buildings and other improvements was
sufficient proof to protect a claim. The Peralta case is interesting because the Peralta
family was one of the more established families in Alta California-not even their
wealth and class standing saved the family's property. For example, Pitt reports that
lawyers divested the Peralta family of its 19,000 acre property, Rancho San Antonio,
with a then-estimated value of $3 million. PITT, supra note 39, at 97 (citing Peralta, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 434 (1865)).
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the public records, or establish a title of which there is
no trace to be found in the public archives. 2s
At the same time, other courts relied on the hazy memories of non-
Mexican officials to protect the interests of non-Mexican grantees .
This double-standard unfairly disadvantaged Mexican grantees, and
added to the confusion and inconsistency of land grant case law.
Irreconcilable and shifting standards, moreover, governed the
process. For example, when John Fremont presented his claim to
Mariposas, a site of gold mines, he asserted that his granting papers
were missing or lost.2m Nevertheless, being known as an instigator of
the Conquest, and as a former American soldier and spy, Fremont
benefited from his status; the Court extended a privilege not applied
to grantees of Mexican descent and permitted the use of parol evi-
dence to establish the validity of his claim.2 Thus, Fremont's failure
to produce key documents did not disallow his claim to Mariposas.
John Sutter, another key figure in the Conquest, who supported
the rights of squatters trespassing on Mexican land, also benefited
from favorable exercises of judicial discretion. In United States v.
Sutter'56 the petitioner-who already possessed a fort used as a base
for the Conquest of Mexico-sought "a grant of lands to be distrib-
uted amongst colonists whom he proposed to introduce. ' '2' 7 The
California Land Act required grantees to follow Mexico's coloniza-
tion law. Sutter's goal of enlarging his estate violated Mexico's
colonization laws; thus, Sutter's application was limited to his origi-
nal petition encompassing eleven square leagues.258
252. Luco v. United States, 15 F. Cas. 1080 (N.D. Cal. 1858) (No. 8594).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 27 F. Cas. 896, 897 (N.D. Cal. 1856) (No.
16,195) (reporting on Sutter's reexamination and noting that "[hjis recollection when
making his last deposition seems more uncertain and confused than when his testi-
mony was first taken").
254. See Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 551 (1854). The Fremont
case is recognized as a critical case in land grant law. As one of the earliest claims
processed through the Board of Land Commissioners and culminating with an
appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court, it established the "standards" dictating the land
grant adjudication process. United States v. Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. 266, 273 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1859) (No. 14,713) (Note). Mariposas was ultimately held as a grant of 10 sitios
"north of a river, within the Sierra Nevada in the east part of Merced, on the west."
United States v. Cameron, 21 P. 177, 178 (Cal. 1889) (citing Fremont v. United States,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 542 (1854)).
255. 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 565.
256. 27 F. Cas. 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1861) (No. 16,424). Sutter was involved in other
grants challenges as well. See United States v. Pico, 19 F. Cas. 595 (D. Cal. 1857) (No.
11,130). At one time, Sutter also "was military commandant of the northern frontier
of California, and charged with civil jurisdiction" in that region. United States v.
Reading, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1, 3 (1855).
257. Sutter, 27 F. Cas. at 1370.
258. Mexican law limited grants to 11 square leagues:
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The purpose of land grant process in his case supposedly was to
adjudicate the validity of claims and not grant further land under
Mexican laws5 9 Furthermore, Sutter testified that his documents were
"burnt and lost."2'6 Notwithstanding the prescribed process and pro-
cedure, the Board reasoned that because Sutter had distributed lands,
he "had thus conferred on the nation what was deemed an important
service," and accordingly ruled in his favor.2 6' Not only did Sutter lack
grant documents, as required by past decisions, but neither the Treaty
nor Mexican law recognized grants following an "important service"
conferred on a foreign government.62 Thus, by this ruling, the court
created new law to validate an otherwise invalid claim.
These judicial double-standards extended even to those situations
where Mexican grantees presented their grant documents, demon-
strating that anti-Mexican bias riddled the confirmation process. In
Luco v. United States,2 3 Jose and Jose Maria Luco petitioned for con-
firmation of their claim and presented their documents. The United
States challenged their ownership as fraudulent and the issue turned
on the authenticity of the granting documents.M
In making its case, the United States referred to the claimant as
"Don Pepe, the household jester of General Vallejo... living with
the profusion and bounty of semi-barbaric pomp. 2 The Court addi-
tionally referred to the claimant as:
not actually a servant, yet a dependant of General
Vallejo ... gaining a precarious livelihood by making
and mending clothes and tin ware, acting as alcalde,
printer, gardener, surveyor,' music teacher, and attend-
ing to a grocer and billiard table for Vallejo.2
It shall not be permitted to unite, in the same hands, with the right of
property, more than one league square of land, suitable for irrigation,
four square leagues in superficies, of arable land, without the facili-
ties of irrigation, and six square leagues in superficies, of grazing
land.
Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 634 (1858) (quoting Translation Respecting Coloniza-
tion, supra note 74, art. XI). The case reports that Sutter "was desirous [of] enlarging
his enterprise ." Id.
259. See California Land Act § 8, 9 Stat. 631, 632 (1851).
260. Sutter, 27 F. Cas. at 1368.
261. Id. at 1378.
262. See supra notes 74-77, 105-07, 140-42 and accompanying text.
263. 64 U.S. (23 How.) 515 (1859).
264. Id. at 523 (statement of the case).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 533.
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Thus, although the grantee was esteemed enough by his neighbors
to be chosen as alcalde and had established a remarkable range of
talents, the Court decided that these facts provided adequate sup-
port for the government's challenge.267
Not even with the testimony of General Vallejo, former com-
mander of colonization in California, would the court allow the
Lucos' ownership of the claim. The testimony of the granting officer
and other Mexican officials could not convince the Court of the merit
of the grantee's claim.26' Thus, allegations of fraud plagued Mexican
grantees both with and without documents. While the Court earlier
had claimed to require documents to protect against fraud ,269 when
documents were provided, they too were challenged as fraudulent,
providing another pretext for alienating Mexicans from their land.
The Court's treatment of Jose and Jose Maria Luco contrasted
directly with its treatment of Thomas A. Larkin, the United States
Consul to Monterey before the Conquest. In United States v. Larkin,
the petitioner sought a grant but had failed to perform the require-
ments under Mexican colonization laws.271 Larkin's claim was
especially suspicious because he allegedly employed privileged
information concerning the Conquest to establish a claim to Mexican
land.272 No question of fraud was raised in the lower court, how-
ever.273 Consequently, on appeal, the Supreme Court disallowed
examination of the fraud claim, ultimately holding in Larkin's favor.27a
This ruling prompted one dissenting Justice to observe that
267. Id. at 534.
268. 63 U.S. (23 How.) at 541 (characterizing the former governor's testimony as a
"formula of words on which... a conviction of perjury could never be sustained).
269. See Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434, 439 (1865). In discussing the
rigidity of the rules underlying those decisions, the Court noted:
We are asked to relax the severity of those rules in this case, because
it is alleged to be meritorious. Courts administer justice by fixed
rules, which experience and wisdom have demonstrated are neces-
sary in the investigation of truth. There will sometimes, in applying
those rules to the various affairs of life, be cases of individual hard-
ship; but this does not prove that the rules are unwise, or not the best
that can be adopted ....
Id.
270. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 557 (1855).
271. Id. at 563 (holding that "[c]ircumstances may excuse [non-compliance with
grant terms] even in cases where the condition is contained in the grant").
272. Id. at 565.
273. See United States v. Larkin, 26 F. Cas. 870 (1855) (No. 15,563).
274. Larkin, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 562 ("[Elven were we to entertain the question
[that the grant is fictitious], we see nothing in the record to justify the imputa-
tion....").
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[t]his evidence merely shows that Larkin was laying the
foundations for a claim upon the United States, and was
wholly unconnected with the Mexican regulations. The
evidence satisfies me that this claim was fabricated after
the difficulties between the United States and Mexico
had occurred, with a view to enable the American con-
sul at Monterey to profit from it, in the event of the
cession of the country to the United States.2 75
Thus, despite the availability of what would seem at least arguably
probative evidence, neither Larkin's inside information nor his
"fabricated claim" barred him from obtaining ownership status.
The decision in United States v. Hancock276 provides another ex-
ample of preferential judicial treatment of non-Mexicans despite
allegations of fraud. Hancock involved allegations that the survey of
an underlying tract delineated an
erroneous location [and] was fraudulently and inten-
tionally made by one Henry Hancock,.... who at the
time of making such survey was a secret owner of an
undivided half interest in the rancho, and was at the
same time the agent of the other owners thereof, and by
them intrusted with all matters concerning the location
of the grant ....
The court also noted an allegation
that said location was made for the purpose of de-
frauding the United States out of, and corruptly gaining
for himself and his co-owners, some 26,000 acres more
than they were by law entitled to; and that Hancock, by
false and untruthful representations made to the United
States Surveyor General for California, deceived that of-
ficer, and procured the final confirmation of the survey
upon which the patent was founded.278
Nevertheless, the court summarily dismissed the allegations, basing
its decision in large part on the reputation of "Col. Hays, so well
known to the country 50 years ago as the famous Texas ranger and
gallant soldier of the Mexican War."279 The court declared that such a
275. Id. at 565.
276. 30 F. 851 (1887) (hearing in equity).
277. Id. at 852.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 858. This Article does not assert that all Euro-American claimants
whose claims were tainted by fraud succeeded in obtaining patents to their property.
That many did, however, cannot be denied. For a particularly notable example, see
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soldier would not have committed fraud during that war.280 Thus,
the Colonel's reputation as a "gallant soldier" substituted for an
evidentiary standard of proof in the court's analysis.281
In Morehead v. United States,2 the court confirmed the grant de-
spite suspicious circumstances that raised a clear possibility that the
grant to a non-Mexican was based on a fraudulent transaction:
After the best consideration I have been able to give this
case, my opinion is that although there are some suspi-
cious or rather improbable circumstances connected with
the claim, yet on the whole the preponderance of proof
is in favor of its genuineness, and that it ought to be
confirmed.'
Morehead provides additional support for the conclusion that the
Court's treatment of non-Mexicans was decidedly more favorable
than its treatment of Jose and Maria Luco or Sefiora Peralta. The
Court's bias in favor of Euro-Americans is made clearer by the lack
of conclusiveness it accorded to its determinations of Mexican
grants, which were subject only to challenge for fraud extrinsic to
the decree or patent at issue.2
A further example is provided by Howard v. Colquhoun,2 which
involved an appeal concerning jury instructions for charges of fraud
in the registration of a grant.21 The circumstances of the case pro-
voked the Texas Supreme Court to declare:
WESTPHALL, MERCEDES REALES, supra note 80, at 36, which describes 58,627,456 acres
of fraudulently claimed land in Arizona and New Mexico, including the notorious
Peralta Reavis claim of 12,467,456 acres. For other examples of purported fraud, see
BRADFUTE, supra note 195, at 127-28. Bradfute refers to alleged forgeries involving
the grants of Rancho de Galvan, Bosque Grande, Roque Lobato, and Santa Teresa de
Jesus, which were "detected" by Will M. Tipton, a purported expert on the Spanish
language and documents. See id. at 62; see also WESTPHALL, MERCEDES REALES, supra
at 249-50.
280. Hancock, 30 F. at 858.
281. The adverse relationship between Texas Rangers and grantees is well estab-
lished. The Texas Rangers were primary agents in committing acts of violence
against Mexican grantees. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
282. 17 F. Cas. 729 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 9792).
283. Id. at 738 (emphasis added). But cf. Luco v. United States, 15 F. Cas. 1080
(N.D. Cal. 1858) (No. 8594) (refusing to confirm grant absent clear proof of genuine-
ness). The new legal regime required Mexican grantees to demonstrate the validity of
their claims. During the survey requirement, courts exercised discretion in permit-
ting excessive challenges against a confirmed grantee's tract on the basis of
accusations alleging the original and confirmed title was in fact fraudulent. To the
detriment of Mexican grantees, blanket charges would at times lead to dispossession
or rejection of a claim. See cases cited supra note 223.
284. See United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 23 F. 279, 280 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885).
285. 28Tex. 134 (1866).
286. Id. at 141.
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that at this late day, when all who took part in the scene
have gone ... and time has rendered it impossible to
unfold the whole truth connected with ... the grant, it
is the duty of the jury and the court to hold that these
discrepancies and apparent differences in the mechani-
cal work and color of the ink used in the preparation of
the [25 year old] grant were not the work of fraud and
official dereliction.... 7
The Colquhoun court expressed frustration with the number of
late challenges based on fraud:
That fraud, the evidence of which rests in the memory
of witnesses, can be established a quarter of a century
after the grant has been issued by the proper authority
... render[] the grant void and defeat[] the title in the
hands of an innocent purchaser from the grantee....
["M]en's titles may be made to depend on the frail and
treacherous memory of witnesses, or their own personal




The Texas court further quoted a previous case approvingly to the
effect
[t]hat there certainly should be some period of time be-
yond which grants and patents should cease to be open
to attacks in the hands of innocent bona fide holders....
[O]therwise there would be no security to paper titles.
No one can purchase the fairest apparent title without
taking the precaution to inquire into the circumstances
of its emanation.29
287. Id. at 148. The court noted:
It is as rational to infer that the differences in the handwriting and
color of ink used in preparing the grant occurred in the regular line
of the duties of the officers, and were as honestly and properly made,
as it is to infer from them that they were the work of official miscon-
duct and fraud. The mere manual labor of preparing the grant prior
to the signature of the commissioner may have been done by a num-
ber of officials connected with the office, and in the proper discharge
of their duties, and each one may have performed his part with dif-
ferent pens and with different colored ink.
Id.
288. Id. at 145-46 (alteration added) (quoting Johnson v. Smith, 21 Tex. 722, 730
(1858)).
289. Id. at 145 (alteration added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Johnson, 21 Tex. at 730).
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Despite its disapproval of the sort of challenge presented, the Court
left the purported claim intact.290 While there is merit to closing the
door against open-ended attacks at the expense of bona fide inno-
cent holders, the Court failed to apply similar reasoning to claims
against Mexican grantees.29'
The Court's failure to apply doctrines governing challenges
based on fraud equally to Mexican and non-Mexican grantees re-
sulted in a serious jurisprudential problem. The language of the
Court's opinion in Peralta v. United States292 provides a compelling
example of the difficulty posed by the mixture of decisions. In Per-
alta, the Court reasoned that "[tihe right of property, as every other
valuable right, depends in great measure for its security on stability
of judicial decisions."293
By contrast, jurisprudential instability followed from the dis-
criminatory standards applied to Mexican grantees in cases where the
legal requirement of possession of documentary records was an issue.
In a number of instances, courts applying the California Land Act
failed to disallow European and Euro-American claims involving
294suspicious circumstances. Furthermore, challengers of Mexican
grantees' titles continued to allege fraudulent transfers, even after the
Board of Land Commissioners had confirmed the grant at issue.295
Case law demonstrates that courts generally confirmed non-
Mexican grants where evidence suggested the possibility of fraud
but, under similar circumstances, disallowed the claims of grantees
of Mexican descent. One scholar estimates that between forty and
sixty-seven percent of all homestead entries in New Mexico were
fraudulent.2 Commenting on this pattern, one author observed that
"[iun Texas... the words land and fraud were very nearly synony-
290. See id. at 149 (affirming verdicts in the lower courts).
291. Compare this result with the outcome the Peralta family received in Peralta v.
United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434 (1865), where they similarly asserted fraud in the
disappearance of their granting papers.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 439. For the Court's discussion of the rigidity of the rules underlying
those decisions, see supra note 269.
294. See discussion supra notes 254-81 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
296-99 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., United States v. Rico, 27 F. Cas. 806 (1862) (grant confirmed but
fraud alleged on appeal); United States v. Bernal, 24 F. Cas. 1123 (N.D. Cal. 1855)
(No. 14,581) (noting ongoing challenges based on fraud despite confirmation of the
grant). Bernal provides an example of the loose manner in which such charges were
brought against Mexican grantees. Id.
296. See VICTOR WESTPHALL, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN NEW MEXICO, 1854-1891, at
65 (1965); see also HOWARD ROBERTS LAMAR, THE FAR SOUTHWEST, 1846-1912, at 149
(1966) (estimating fraud in approximately 90% of such grant claims by settlers cov-
eting Mexican land); VICTOR WESTPHALL, THOMAS BENTON CATRON AND HIS ERA 34
(1973) (discussing the Catron era and Catron's role in the land grant process).
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mous. 297 As one court observed: "charges of fraud are easily made,
and they were by no means sparingly made by incensed defeated
parties ... these reckless charges by disappointed trespassing and
opposing claimants, in many instances.., involved the officers of
the government, as well as the claimants under the grant. 298 Despite
substantial questions regarding the validity of land claims during
this period, the United States transferred tracts to the public domain,
and thereafter to other parties, rather than returning them to their
Mexican owners.299
b. Challenges to Mexican Authority
Up to the time of the American Conquest, Mexican officials re-
tained authority to grant lands in the Mexican territories O Grantees
nonetheless confronted challenges alleging that Mexican officials
lacked authority to award the grants. In Whitney v. United States,301
the Court rejected a claim encompassing 415,000 acres, reasoning in
part that Governor Manual Armijo lacked authority to award the
grant.3°2 Thus, notwithstanding the clear validity of Mexico's power
297. MILLER, supra note 57, at 32. In New Mexico, a number of grants also derived
from the Spanish period. See, e.g., United States v. Candelaria, 16 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.
1926) (involving a 1769 grant deriving from the Spanish period of control in Valen-
cia, New Mexico).
298. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 23 F. 279, 295-96 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885).
299. For example, the Carson National Forest once belonged to a Mexican grantee
and many national forests are still expediting private gain and accumulation of
wealth. See infra notes 404, 428, 430, 494.
300. The sovereign status of a nation permits it to distribute public lands. See, e.g.,
State v. Gallardo, 135 S.W. 664, 676-77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (discussing Mexican
authority to issue titles to land in its public domain).
301. 181 U.S. 104 (1901) (arising out of an 1845 grant to Antonio Sandoval of La
Estancia in New Mexico).
302. See id. (holding that governors were not authorized to make a grant). The
Whitney court was not alone in being faced with this argument; rather, challenges on
such grounds were a constant feature of the land grant adjudication process. See, e.g.,
Cessna v. United States, 169 U.S. 165, 178 (1898) (considering whether an ayunamente
(general council) had the power to grant tracts); Peralta v. United States, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 434, 446 (1865) (determining whether Mexican officers had power to make
grants of land); Luco v. United States, 15 F. Cas. 1080 (N.D. Cal. 1858) (No. 8594)
(determining authority of granting officers). Other challenges included jurisdictional
disputes among and between various courts. For an additional example, see United
States v. Baca, 184 U.S. 653 (1902). In Baca, Margarito Baca presented his claim for
confirmation of ownership of a tract in Valencia County, New Mexico, called San Jose
del Encinal. Id. at 653. Baca alleged that his land derived from Baltazar Baca in 1768
by order of the Spanish Governor and the Captain General of New Mexico. Id. at 654.
The U.S. argued that the Court of Private Land Claims lacked jurisdiction to allow
the claim. Id. at 659. For a discussion on the authority of a Mexican official to award
a grant, see Owen v. Presidio Mining Co., 61 F. 6 (1893), which discussed the alcalde of
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to determine the distribution of its public domain, courts allowed
challenges alleging that Mexican grants were ultra vires.
In allowing these challenges, courts adopted an attitude remi-




As the Mexican rule approached the period to its final
subversion, when war with the United States was on all
sides recognized as impending, and after the rising of
the American settlers in the country, known as the
"Bear Flag War," had occurred, the governor (Pio Pico)
appears to have distributed grants with a lavishness
that would justify the suspicion that he hoped to secure
to his countrymen, by the pen, the lands he foresaw
they were about to be deprived of by the sword. 4
Despite the error underlying the Cambuston court's approach, its
reasoning illuminates a crucial aspect of a legal culture that facili-
tated extensive challenges to the claims of Mexican grantees.
Other cases provide confirmation of the prevalence of this per-
ception among American courts. For example, in Palmer v. United
States, 05 the court refused to confirm land grants issued prior to the
Conquest because the Mexican granting officials allegedly lacked the
proper authority.36 The Palmer court held "on general principles of
public law, [that] grants made flagrante bello, when conquest has
been set on foot, and actual occupation is imminent and inevitable,
have no validity against the subsequent conqueror.' '
This declaration might have some resonance had the United
States, as "conqueror," not promised, as it did in the Treaty of Gua-
dalupe Hidalgo, that it would accord full validity to such 9rants. By
resting its decision on this reasoning, the Palmer court, among
others, ignored both applicable law and historical fact. First, general
Presidio del Norte's authority and its impact upon the claim of Ernest Dale Owen
and others.
303. 25 F. Cas 266 (D. Cal. 1859) (No. 14,713).
304. Id. at 274 (Note).
305. 18 F. Cas. 1047 (D. Cal. 1857) (No. 10,697).
306. Id. at 1047; accord United States v. Camou, 184 U.S. 572, 573 (1902) (discussing
whether a Mexican official lacked the authority to make grant of public land);
Chavez v. United States, 175 U.S. 552 (1899) (holding that the territorial deputation
had no authority to grant land); United States v. Rocha, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 639 (1869)
(determining in part, Mexico's right to dispose of her public domain in California
before the war).
307. Palmer, 18 F. Cas. at 1047; cf. United States v. Larkin, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 557,
565 (Campbell, J. dissenting) (arguing for denial of the grant because Larkin alleg-
edly benefited from his status as U.S. Consul in Monterey, Mexico, by gaining
favorable information prior to the Conquest).
308. Palmer, 18 F. Cas. at 1047.
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principles of public law should not have governed the decision in
this case. The Treaty was the functional equivalent of positive fed-
eral law under the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause.39
Next, Mexico retained its sovereign status until the time of the Con-
quest, under both international and domestic United States law.310
Finally, as a sovereign state, Mexico could undeniably award grants,
as it had not repealed its land laws prior to annexation. Palmer
illustrates the extent to which courts ignored relevant law and fact
when refusing to give effect to grants where authorities allegedly
lacked capacity. Such convenient avoidance of governing principles
substantially disadvantaged Mexican claimants and augmented the
United States' public domain.312 As subsequent discussion demon-
strates, courts and challengers used Mexican law to dispossess
grantees of their land.
c. Mexican Colonization Law and Conditions Subsequent
Beyond regulating settlement of the region, a key provision of
the colonization laws obligated grantees to cultivate their proposed
tracts.3  The Mexican Republic granted either provisional or fee
ownership status to grant recipients depending upon their successful
performance of this condition unless adverse relevant information was
309. See supra note 142.
310. See infra Section II.B.2.b.iii; see also State v. Gallardo, 135 S.W. 664, 669 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1911) ("[A] mere change in sovereignty, even in the absence of treaty stipu-
lations for the protection of private rights, does not divest the vested property rights
of individuals."). As the court in Grant v. Jaramillo, 28 P. 508 (1892), stated:
Titles which were perfect before the cession of the territory to the
United States continued so afterwards, and were in no wise affected
by the change in sovereignty. The treaty so provided, and such
would have been the effect of the principles of the law of nations if
the treaty had contained no provision upon the subject.
Id. at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dent v. Emmeger, 81 U.S. 308,
312 (1871)).
311. Palmer, 18 F. Cas. at 1051.
312. Id.
313. See Translation Respecting Colonization, supra note 74, art. I. The article
provides:
The Governors (Gefes politicos) of the territories are authorized (in
compliance with the law of the General Congress, of the 18th of
August, 1824, and under the conditions hereafter specified) to grant
vacant lands, in their respective territories, to such contractors
(empressarios) families, or private persons, whether Mexicans or for-
eigners, who may ask for them, for the purpose of cultivating and
inhabiting them.
Id.; see also supra notes 109-15.
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• 314provided . The existence of this requirement provided settlers with
fodder for challenges alleging incomplete performance."' For exam-
ple, in Pico v. United States,316 the Board of Land Commissioners
rejected Pico's claim for failure to strictly perform the conditions
attached to his award.317 Likewise, Chabolla v. United States318 in-
volved an appeal from the California Land Commission's 1855
rejection of the claim of Anastasio Chabolla for property held in
ownership since January 1844.319 The Chabolla family owned 300
head of cattle, forty to fifty horses with corrals, and land under cul-
tivation.320 Although Chabolla had resided on the property for ten
years, the Board of Land Commissioners rejected his claim.321 This
adverse decision forced Chabolla (and, subsequently, his heirs) to
pursue the matter through several appeals, spanning the remainder
of his years and beyond, before a court ultimately confirmed the
grant. By comparison, lax "standards" favored the claims of the
dominant population. Fremont v. United States32 exemplifies the pref-
314. See United States v. Rocha, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 639, 639 (1869) (grantee claiming
a grant awarded "provisionally"); United States v. Moreno, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 400, 401
(1863) (authorization of claimant Moreno to occupy land "provisionally"); United
States v. Carrillo, 25 F. Cas. 312, 312 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 14,737) (affirming
decision of the board that claim was valid, partly based upon use of land by claim-
ant).
315. For example, in Whitney v. United States, 181 U.S. 104, 106 (1901), the Court
noted that, although title was reported as perfect by one surveyor general who
recommended confirmation, Congress did not confirm the grant. When the claim
was re-examined by another surveyor general, he recommended rejection. See also,
e.g., United States v. Bolton, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 341, 353 (1859) (rejecting a grant to a
mission priest); see also Diaz v. United States, 7 F. Cas. 642 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1858) (No.
3878) (alleging absence of the expediente or conditions attached to claim, including
testimony of a non-Mexican official asserting he "never saw the grant").
316. 19 F. Cas. 593 (C.C.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 11,128).
317. Id. at 594.
318. 5 F. Cas. 387 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 2566).
319. Id. at 388 (appealing rejection of claim previously rejected by local authori-
ties). Chabolla's claim was pursued by his heirs after he died in the midst of the
appeals process. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 387.
322. It is unknown how much of the land was saved. On this issue, other case law
and scholarship discuss the lack of res judicata effect, violence, and losses from
mortgage and tax liens that also resulted in land losses. See, e.g., Mora v. Nunez, 10 F.
634 (Tex. 1882) (action to recover Mission Rancho in San Fernando and involving
delinquent taxes legislation). Non-legal scholarship has noted that taxes and forfei-
tures of deeds also resulted in land alienation, where grantees had borrowed against
their property interests in order to defend their titles. See DAVID MONTEJANO,
ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986 60 (1989). Finally,
jurisdictional disputes between Congress and the Court also generated litigation. See,
e.g., Board of Trustees of the Sevilleta de la Joya Grant v. Board of Trustees of the
Belen Land Grant, 242 U.S. 595 (1916).
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erential treatment that courts accorded Euro-American claimants.
Fremont alleged that he was the successor to a tract that derived
from a pre-war grant made to Juan Alvarado.324 The geographic
demarcation positioned the tract "within the limits of the Snow
Mountain, (Sierra Nevada) and the rivers known by the names of the
Chanchilles, of the Merced and San Joaquin, as his property."3" Like
other grantees, Alvarado had to meet certain conditions and receive
approval by Mexican officials for his grant.326 One specific covenant
provided that "grantees were not permitted to sell, alienate nor
mortgage the same, nor subject it to taxes, entail, or any other in-,,327
cumbrance. Alvarado, however, undisputedly had alienated the
land and therefore violated the conditions and colonization regula-
tions. The Court, moreover, in applying the requirements of the
California Land Act of 1851, was obligated both to determine the
validity of land titles and, accordingly, to follow "the law of nations,
[and] the laws, usages, and customs of the government from which
the claim is derived."3 8 Nonetheless, the Court did not inquire as to
whether the transfer was invalid under Mexican law. Alvarado fur-
ther had failed to perform other conditions attached to the grant: he
neither took possession, resided on, nor cultivated the granted land
during the required period.32 9 Thus, Mexican law rendered Al-
varado's claim void for breach of several conditions, leaving him
nothing to convey.
The Court, nonetheless, confirmed Fremont's title despite the
evidence showing Alvarado's "omission to take possession, to have
the land surveyed, and to build a house on it, within the time lim-
ited in this condition."3 In so holding, the Court privileged an
323. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 566 (1854). In contrast to the treatment afforded to
Fremont's claim, Mexican grantees were required to demonstrate by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the validity of their asserted title. See, e.g., United States v.
Ortiz, 176 U.S. 422, 425-26 (1899) (requiring that the validity of a title be proved by
preponderance of the evidence).
324. Fremont, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 543. Alvarado purportedly received the grant in
1844 from the governor of Alta California, Manuel Micheltorena. See id.
325. Id. at 545.
326. See id.
327. Id. at 566.
328. Id. at 553 (citing California Land Act, § 2, 9 Stat. 631 (1851)).
329. See id. at 568 (Catron, J., dissenting); cf. Feliz v. United States, 8 F. Cas. 1130
(N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 4720) (holding that conditions had been performed despite the
Board of Land Commissioner's rejection of claim due to the grant's lack of proof as
to its genuineness).
330. Fremont, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 560. In dissent, one justice noted that "[the
original grantee] never was a colonist ... never did a single act under his contract to
colonize and ... could not have obtained a definite title from ... the departmental
assembly." Id. at 572 (Catron, J. dissenting). Nor had the land been surveyed. See id.
at 573.
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illegal claim by allowing less rigorous standards of proof concerning
the production of extrinsic evidence33 and failed to apply "the law of
nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the government from
which the claim is derived. 332 The Court thus sidestepped Fremont's
failure to demonstrate either government approval or performance
of requisite conditions.3 Hence, Euro-American claimants benefited
from a double standard that did not require them to meet the exact-
ing, strictly interpreted conditions required of Mexicans.
Courts that allowed Euro-American claimants to introduce not
only direct evidence, but also what was essentially parol evidence
into the land grant adjudication process, exceeded their authority by
flouting the statutory standards and procedures.m Ironically, through
such rulings the Court effectively annulled the stated purposes of the
Land Acts and rejected Mexico's colonization laws.331 Unsurprisingly,
331. See also Hornsby v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 224, 238 (1869) (holding
that approval of assembly was not a condition precedent to the vesting of title to
California land granted by the Mexican government); White v. United States, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 660 (1863) (declining to state the reasons for the court's decision); United
States v. Larkin, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 557, 563 (1855) (reasoning that conditions on
Mexican land grants were not mandatory); Pico v. United States, 19 F. Cas. 590 (D.
Cal. 1855) (No. 11,127) (reversing the rejection of a claim due to nonperformance of
conditions).
332. California Land Act, § 2, 9 Stat. 631 (1851).
333. Fremont, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 560.
334. See also Dalton v. United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 436 (1859) (focusing re-
strictively on whether claimant was an American or Mexican citizen); United States
v. Sutter, 27 F. Cas. 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1861) (No. 16,424) (distinguishing form of elec-
tion in a case involving the transfer of portions of lands within the exterior limits of a
grant to a third party); Teschemacher v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 862 (N.D. Cal. 1855)
(No. 13,843) (involving charge of nonfullfillment of conditions subsequent), aff'd, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 1 (1855).
335. See Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434, 440 (1865) (noting the
"struggle ... to induce the courts to fritter away the act of Congress, and substitute
parol proof for record evidence").
336. According to the court in United States v. Cambuston, 25 F. Cas. 266 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1857) (No. 14,713):
The Fremont decision was critical to the land grant process because it
was among the earliest of the cases decided by the United States dis-
trict court on appeal from the board of commissioners. It was the first
in which the Supreme Court announced the principles by which this
class of cases was to be decided. It has, therefore, remained the most
important and the leading case on this branch of the law, and has ex-
ercised a controlling influence on all subsequent decisions of this
court.
Id. at 272. Compare the court's reasoning in Cambuston with the following provision
from Section 11 of the California Land Act:
That the commissioners ... and the District and Supreme Courts, in
deciding on the validity of any claim brought before them under the
provisions of this Act, shall be governed by the treaty of Guadalupe
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the ruling privileged Fremont by giving him title to "ten square
leagues, within the limits of the Sierra Nevada, and the rivers known
by the names of the Chowchillas, of the Merced and the San
Joaquin. '3 7 This ruling made Fremont one of the largest landholders
in California, with holdings "embracing mines of gold or silver."3
The Court's precedent-evading construction provoked another
court to comment:
At the risk of exposing myself to the ridicule or censure
of many, for what may be considered temerity on my
part in questioning the soundness of these decisions, I
cannot refrain from the opinion that in these cases the
Supreme Court have taken a new departure, and en-
tirely disregarded their previous decisions.33
Thus, the observation that the American judiciary's land grant
opinions are inconsistent with its pre-existing principles is not novel.
Indeed, if the liberal Fremont decision was to be regarded as
valid land-grant precedent, it should have protected Sefiora Per-
alta.3 As previously discussed, by the time Sefiora Peralta asserted
her claim under the new rules, she had long met her land-securing
obligations under Mexican law.341 The Court, nonetheless, denied her
claim on the ground that she lacked certain documents, despite
other clear evidence, including parol evidence, of her performance of
conditions attached to her award. The Court declared only that
Sefiora Peralta was at fault for her lack of documentary evidence and
denied title where the Mexican government had discharged her of
any further obligations.1
In permitting parol evidence in cases involving non-Mexicans,
adjudicative bodies exceeded their authority and ignored statutorily
prescribed standards for the land grant adjudication process and
Hidalgo, the law of nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the
government from which the claim is derived, the principles of equity,
and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, so far as
they are applicable.
§ 11, 9 Stat. 631 (1851).
337. Fremont v. United States, 25 F. Cas. 1214, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 1853) (No. 15,164),
rev'd, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542 (1854).
338. Fremont, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 565 (reporting that "[wie are here called on to
award a patent for a floating claim of fifty thousand arpens of land in the gold region
of California").
339. Gunn v. Bates, 6 Cal. 263, 269 (1855), quoted in Pisani, supra note 63, at 298.
340. Peralta, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 434.
341. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
342. See Hittell, supra note 250.
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procedures.3 3 In the process, the courts created a land claims juris-
prudence that lacked either standards or uniformity. The courts'
disregard for legal principles and their questionable logic in these
cases resulted in shifting and elusive standards of proof that provide
critical evidence of a bias in favor of non-Mexican grantees.
3
4
United States v. Reading4 offers further compelling evidence of
the different approaches courts adopted when adjudicating claims
by Euro-American claimants as opposed to claims by Mexican
grantees. Although a Mexican national, Reading assisted Sutter in
the political disturbances that agitated Mexico during the Conquest
Reading had failed to obtain confirmation from the departmental
assembly, according to the dictates of his award.46 The court, none-
theless, disregarded Mexican law and reasoned:
Even if the conditions of the grant be construed to re-
quire the personal residence of the grantee on the land,
the excuses shown by him for his omission to do so, are
such as should in equity be received. In the 1845 he was
unexpectedly called upon to perform public duties
which he had no right to decline, and the reasons for his
neglect in 1846, are certainly such as should receive the
favorable consideration of this government. 347
Importantly, Reading's participation in the political disturbances
between 1845 and 1848 and his actions in the war against his
adopted country constituted treason against Mexico. The California
Land Act of 1851 required courts to look to the law of Mexico in
determining the validity of grants."6 While it is questionable whether
the United States government would have refused to approve a grant
in the face of Reading's assistance in the Conquest, Mexican authori-
ties would not likely have countenanced his actions.
The court, nonetheless, distinguished Reading's non-performance
in holding that "the grant of the governor, although unconfirmed by
343. Cf. Peralta, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 438 (observing that in "fritter[ing] away the act
of Congress, courts thereafter substituted parol proof for record evidence").
344. See Fremont, 25 F. Cas. at 1215.
345. 27 F. Cas. 716 (N.D. Cal. 1853) (No. 16,127), aff'd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1 (1855).
346. Id. at 716.
347. Id. at 716-17.
348. California Land Act, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631 (1851). Thus, the Court should have
looked to Mexican law on treason to determine the validity of Reading's claim.
Although it remains questionable that a United States court would deny the claim of
a foreign national who aided the United States in war against Mexico, the purpose of
this discussion is to demonstrate that both statute and precedent obliged the Court to
do so, and that it was not equally willing to flout the dictates of the governing
authority for non-White Mexican grantees as it was for their Euro-American coun-
terparts.
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the departmental assembly, vested in the grantee a present and im-
mediate interest." 49 Under either the correct legal standard or the
standard applied to Mexican grantees, the court should have denied
Reading's claim. Thus, the process for deciding Euro-American claims
was extremely lax compared to the court's process for the claims of
Mexican grantees.
In addition to failing to apply the standards of Mexican law to
Euro-American claimants, courts also demonstrated their bias
against Mexican grantees by holding them to legal standards that
did not exist under Mexican law, while rejecting Mexican grants for
failure to perform such obligations. In practice, Mexican petitioners
inconsistently forwarded final grant notices to the departmental
assembly either because of communication difficulties within Mex-
ico or because such forwarding was deemed a courtesy.3 0 The failure
to adhere to the literal conditions of the grant neither resulted in
automatic forfeiture nor disallowed ownership status under Mexi-
can law 5' Absent adverse information concerning a specific tract,
the government of Mexico recognized long-standing possession and
residence as constituting ownership. 2
Nonetheless, American courts, such as that in Peralta, held that
a Mexican grantee's failure to obtain departmental assembly certifi-
cation was a breach of Mexico's granting laws, even if the grantee
had been in possession of the land for an extended period of time.353
349. United States v. Reading, 27 F. Cas. 716, 716 (N.D. Cal. 1853) (No. 16,127),
aff'd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1 (1855); see also United States v. Payson, 27 F. Cas. 477 (N.D.
Cal. 1856) (No. 16,017) (confirming a claim by a non-Mexican grantee).
350. See Chabolla v. United States, 5 F. Cas. 387, 387-88 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No.
2566) (grantees not penalized for failure to submit notices to the departmental as-
sembly). The prior discussion of custom and practice in the land grant process may
also be helpful here. See discussion supra notes 97-100. Primary documents available
at the Bancroft library offer an opportunity to enrich our understanding of the land
grant process, particularly involving custom and practice. See, e.g., Deposition of
Governor B. Alvarado on Behalf of Claimant Jose Estudillo, Estudillo v. United
States, No. 256, The Secretary to the Board Acting as Interpreter, C-I, 23 Pt. 11:1,
Alvarado, Juan Bautista 1853-1854, S.F., (November 11, 1853), Case 256, Before U.S.
Land Commissioners, Bancroft Library.
351. See Bakken, supra note 21, at 234-44; discussion supra notes 97-100; see also
Ames v. The Irvine Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 180, 185-86 (1966) (citing United States v.
Bolten, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 341, 350 (1838)).
352. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
353. See, e.g., Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 489 (1865) (noting that all
Mexican grants in colonization were made subject to the approval of the depart-
mental assembly). For discussion of courts' duty to look at custom in adjudicating
land claims, see supra note 314. See also De Arguello v. United States, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 539, 550 (1855) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's failure to ac-
knowledge "the laws and institutions in force" at the time of acquisition, which it
was authorized and bound to extend to the laws of the several states"); United States
v. Cervantes, 25 F. Cas. 367, 368 (N.D. Cal. 1853) (No. 14,768) (analyzing what con-
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What U.S. courts ignored is that the Republic possessed full discre-
tion to determine the validity of grant awards, and even in "[t]he
non-fulfillment of these conditions, Mexico was competent to over-
look or to forgive" the failure and provide title in spite thereof.
35
Under this logic, Sefora Peralta's grant would have been affirmed as
had been determined by the Mexican government.
d. Granting Language and Grant Documents
The Land Act of 1851 provided "[tihat a secretary, skilled in the
Spanish and English languages, shall be appointed by the said
commissioners, whose duty it shall be to act as interpreter."'3 5 Mexi-
can granting documents were written in Spanish and required
translation for use by American courts. The interpreters, however,
were not always used. One United States Senator observed the per-
sistent failure to employ interpreters and stated that adjudicating
commissioners "know nothing of the Spanish language. I admit they
ought to know it.,
356
Even when interpreters were employed, deceptive or incompe-
tent translations damaged the integrity of the adjudicative process
and harmed grantees, particularly in defending the boundaries of
their grants. For example, in Ainsa v. United States, the government
interpreter translated the term "buena fee" into "gossessors in good
faith," rather than the more appropriate "owners." Translation diffi-
stituted a definitively valid or complete title; namely, a concession by governor and
approval by territorial deputation, or concession by the supreme government).
354. Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 576 (1854) (Catron, J., dis-
senting). The Board of Land Commissioners initially implemented such a policy;
however, the tide shifted when the Democrats took over a year later. See Bakken,
supra note 21, at 244.
355. California Land Act of 1851, § 2, 9 Stat. 631 (1851).
356. Gates, The California Land Act of 1851, supra note 24, at 401 (quoting Senator
John B. Weller).
357. 184 U.S. 639 (1902).
358. See id. at 646. The cases demonstrate the significance of a variety of Spanish
terms to the determination of individual land grants. See, e.g., Sena v. United States,
189 U.S. 233, 235-36 (1903) (analyzing a land grant in terms of a "fanega de maiz ... a
measure of corn which will plant 8.82 acres"); Ainsa, 184 U.S. at 642 (discussing sale
of 11 sitios and 12 caballerias); Cessna v. United States, 169 U.S. 165, 171 (1898) ("a
straight line of five thousand varas shall be a league; a square, each of whose sides
shall be one league, shall be called a sitio"); United States v. Perot, 98 U.S. 428, 430
(1878) (defining a standard vara of Mexico as "somewhat less than 33 1/3 inches");
United States v. Auguisola, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 352, 353 (1863) (involving claim of title
based partly on a concession from the governor declaring original grantees to be
"proprietad del terreno blanado" or "owner of the land"); Sufiol v. Hepburn, 1 Cal. 254
(1850) (interpreting Spanish terms concerning possession of property). In addition,
the court in Lux v. Haggin interpreted bienes comunes as "being those which, not being
as to property of any, pertain to all as to their use-as the air, sea, and its beaches,"
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culties were particularly significant and noticeable where confirma-
tion hinged on the differences between United States and Mexican
units of measurement and identification of geographical markers
used to define boundaries under Mexican law. For example, most
surveyors "did their work in English and the field notes had to be
translated into Spanish, resulting in confusion as to bearing trees
since errors were made in translating the names of the trees from
English to Spanish."39 Thus, interpreters' incompetence, when pres-
ent, as well as their absence, frustrated the Land Acts' intent,
damaged the record for appeals purposes, and imposed additional
barriers to confirmation of Mexican grantees' titles.
Two of the most significant barriers for Mexican grantees devel-
oped around this language problem. First, the United States Attorney
General's office advanced erroneous interpretations of land grant
documents. The United States employed a non-Mexican official as a
witness in the interpretation of land grant documents.&° The Attor-
ney General's special agent in the New Mexico Surveyor General's
office was directed to examine petitions and title papers and deter-
mine, among other things, whether the documents and signatures
were genuine 6 1 While a non-Mexican officer may have become well-
versed in Mexican law, the agent relied on a text compiled by the
United States Attorney.
In determining the validity of a claim, the courts used the text
compiled by United States Attorney for the Court of Private Land
Claims, Matthew Givens Reynolds. The Reynolds text constituted a
second language-based barrier to grantees because it contained vari-
ous errors and misrepresented Mexican law on at least two specific
points. First, it failed to include reference to laws "making custom
applicable to a particular situation or laws defining custom."362 The
compilation further did not discuss "the important subject of the
rules of evidence and presumptions under Spanish and Mexican
law."36 These omissions support the notion that the text employed
"substantial bias, both in the selection of the laws included and in
and bienes publicos as "those which as to property pertain to a people or nation, and,
as to all the individuals of the ... rivers, shores, ports, and public roads." 10 P. 674,
707-08 (Cal. 1886).
359. Hill, supra note 12, at 50.
360. See BRADFUTE, supra note 195, at 61-62 (describing William Tipton's role as
"the primary source of evidence in attempts to prove that a grant document or sig-
nature had been forged"); United States v. Ortiz, 176 U.S. 422, 428 (1899) (explaining
Tipton's role in defending claims on behalf of the United States as an employee of
the Department of Justice). Prior to the Department of Justice, Tipton was employed
in the office of surveyor general in New Mexico. Id.
361. BRADFUTE, supra note 195, at 61-62.
362. EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 135.
363. Id.
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the summary of those laws in the prefatory 'historical sketch.' "M In
spite, or perhaps because of this fact, according to one scholar, the
"book became the primary authority for both the Court of Private
Land claims and the Supreme Court of the United States on Spanish
and Mexican law."35
By adopting Reynold's text as the "definitive statement of
Spanish and Mexican law," the courts adopted its biases thereby
privileging the government and challengers with yet another substan-
tial edge over land grant claimants. 366 The absence of interpreters, the
mistranslation of Spanish terms and Mexican law, and a judicial bias
in favor of the United States created insurmountable hurdles for
many Mexican grantees. Control over the meaning of language pro-
vided the government with the opportunity to buttress
interpretations that might otherwise appear logically tenuous. Inter-
pretations that ultimately worked to the severe detriment of
Mexican grantees.
No longer under Mexican rule, grantees encountered shifting
legal interpretations that undermined their rights, negotiated for
and recognized as "inviolably respected" under the Treaty.367 Al-
though Article VIII provided that grantees, their heirs, and "all
Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said property by contract, shall
enjoy" their property not unlike other citizens of the United States,3
grantees witnessed the reverse in application. Rather, in addition to
repeated direct challenges to their property titles, grantees also faced
collateral attacks by private parties seeking to dispossess them of
their land.
2. Collateral Attack
Confirmation of a grant neither terminated the land grant adju-
dication process nor quieted title. By contrast, confirmation
necessitated a survey attesting to the accuracy of a claimed site. 
36
364. For an example of how this bias disallowed a valid grant see EBRIGHT, LAND
GRANTS, supra note 19, at 127. In his analysis of both the Embudo Grant and the
Court of Private Land Claims, Ebright asserts that the Grant's rejection "was one of
the most unjust decisions rendered by that tribunal in its thirteen-year history." Id.
365. Id. For an example of the Supreme Court's use of the Reynolds text, see
United States v. Chaves, 159 U.S. 452, 458 (1895).
366. EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 136.
367. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, art. VII, supra note 15, at 929.
368. Id.
369. Section 13 of the California Land Act required that:
a patent shall issue to the claimant upon his presenting to the general
land office an authentic certificate of such confirmation, and a plat or
survey of the said land, duly certified and approved by the surveyor-
general of California, whose duty it shall be to cause all private
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Although facially innocuous, the survey requirement did not pro-
scribe rehearing of the grant's validity,37 thereby providing a
mechanism for interested parties to challenge confirmed and pend-
ing grants by charging imprecise boundary demarcations. 71 These
charges artificially prolonged litigation and produced a second clus-
ter of challenges to the land titles of Mexican grantees.
a. Ecosystems and Boundaries
In the United States, a grid system delineates property
boundaries' 72 and emphasizes property as an economic commod-
ity.373 The Anglo-American grid system makes land into precisely
measurable parcels, easily located on a map.374 The Mexican Repub-
lic, in addition to surveying tracts, also determined property lines by
referencing natural landmarks, watersheds, and ecosystems unique to
claims which shall be finally confirmed to be accurately surveyed,
and to furnish plats of the same.
California Land Act of 1851, ch. 41, § 13, 9 Stat. 631, 633 (1851).
370. § 13. The Act provided:
[tihat if the title... to such lands shall be contested by any other per-
son, it shall and may be lawful for such person to present a petition
to the district judge ... plainly and distinctly setting forth his title
thereto, and praying the said judge to hear and determine the same.
Id.; see also Act To Establish a Court of Private Land Claims and To Provide for the
Settlement of Private Land Claims in Certain States and Territories, ch. 539, § 10, 26
Stat. 854, 858 (1891) (requiring survey of confirmed tract and notice to third parties).
371. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 176 U.S. 422, 425-26 (1899) (requiring pre-
ponderance of evidence in demonstrating validity of an asserted title); BRADFUTE,
supra note 195, at 192-93 (observing procedural rules granting an associate justice the
power to permit an appeal and the U.S. attorney a definite period of time to appeal)
(citing United States v. Pena, 175 U.S. 500 (1899)). Bradfute notes that "[i]f any justice
of the Court of Private Land Claims believed that the [attorney's] reasons for the
failure to report the case as provided by law were sufficient, he could allow an
appeal." Id. at 192. This appeal process facilitated availability, a venue for land
challengers and kept Mexican landowners on the defensive against possible appeals
at the various levels.
372. See Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Disposing of Lands in the West-
ern Territory (May 20, 1785), reprinted in 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789 375, 375-76 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., Library of Congress 1933)
(ordering, for example, surveyors to "divide the said territory into townships of six
miles square, by lines running due north and south, and others crossing these at right
angles ... and [allowing] each surveyor [to be] paid at the rate of two dollars for
every mile" that he runs).
373. See DUNBAR ORTIZ, supra note 80, at 97 (grid system permits "the parcel of
land, or its produce and resources, to be brought efficiently to market for exchange").
374. See id.
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the geographical landscapes .37 The Mexican system viewed property
less as an economic commodity and more as a communal resource.376
375. See, e.g., United States v. Baca, 184 U.S. 653, 655 (1902) (involving grant
"bounded on the east by a tableland; [I extend[ing] westward five thousand Castilian
varas to a sharp-pointed black hill; on the north ... bounded by the Cebolleta
mountain; on the south ... bounded by some white bluffs, at whose base runs the
Zufii road"); Rodrigues, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 582 (1863) (involving a grant bounded by the
Arroyo de Butono and the Pacific Ocean); Fuentes v. United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.)
443, 450 (1859) (stating that land grant was "within the ex-mission of San Jose,
bounded on the north by the locality called the Warm Springs, on the south by Palos,
on the west by the peak of the hill of the ranchos Tulgencio Higuera and Chrysostom
Galenda, and on the east by the adjoining mountains"); De Arguello v. United States,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 539, 541 (1855) (involving grant "from the creek of San Matteo to
the Creek of San Francisquito and from the esthero (estuary or bay) to the sierra, or
mountains"); see also Lerma v. Stevenson, 40 F. 356, 357 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1889) ("That
the 'Sierra Blanca,' 'Eagle Peak,' and 'Hot Springs' are natural calls, also stone
monuments; these three natural calls being comers, and known notoriously as such
comers."); State v. Balli, 190 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. 1944) (involving a dispute over Padre
Island, Texas); Denny v. Cotton, 22 S.W. 122, 125 (Tex. 1893) (analyzing boundary of
Rio Grande as a boundary and applying law of accretion and alluvion).
The method of using the natural resources and markers as reference points to
describe land is called bioregionalism. See Arrellano, supra note 93, at 31-37 (giving
examples of bioregionalism and its ancient Spanish origins). This philosophy is used
in both the common law and civil law. For example, the Rio Grande defines the
country's southern border in the Texas Region. Exemplifying bioregionalism, one
grant enumerates that "[tihe tract [known as] Mariposas, to the extent of ten square
leagues, within the limits of the Sierra Nevada, and the rivers known by the names of
the Chowchillas, of the Merced, and the San Joaquin." Fremont v. United States, 25 F.
Cas. 1214, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 1853) (No. 15,164) (quoting Land Grant from Juan B.
Alvarado to John C. Fremont (Feb. 29, 1844)).
To contrast an example of a piece of land marked by non-Mexican boundaries,
see Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U.S. 312, 324 (1898), which illustrates a survey of a grant in
the San Luis Valley of Colorado.
376. DUNBAR ORTIZ, supra note 80, at 97. Ortiz notes that Indian land use practice,
Roman civil law, Spanish customary and civil law, and Mexican and colonial policy
emphasize the "use value production for subsistence and not exchange value for the
market." Id. The communal purpose behind Mexican and Spanish grant policies are
also recognized in case law. For example, in Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1994)
the court noted that
the Rito Seco lands shall remain uncultivated for the use of the resi-
dents of San Luis, San Pablo and the Vallejos, and ... the Rito Seco
waters are hereby distributed among the said inhabitants of the town
of San Luis, and those on the other side of the Vega .... The regula-
tions as to roads shall be also observed so as to allow every one to
have access to his farm lands. Also, in using the water, care shall be
taken not to cause damage to any one. All the inhabitants shall have
the use of pasture, wood, water, and timber and the mills that have
been erected shall remain where they are, not interfering with the
rights of others.
Id. at 1213. Likewise, the court in Corporation of San Felipe de Austin v. State, 229 S.W.
845, 846 (Tex. 1921) noted that
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The United States and American entrepreneurs used grid-based
logic to challenge natural boundary references.37 Reliance on eco-
logical markers was neither awkward 78 nor unreliable7 in recording
[tihe appropriation of large areas for grazing and timber purposes...
was common in the creation of the early Texas towns chartered by
the Spanish and Mexican governments. Those lands were as fully
impressed with a public use and devoted to a public purpose as are
the parks and public grounds of the cities of this time. It was ... as
valuable to the people of those towns as are the public grounds of
present-day municipalities to their inhabitants.
Id. As an example of a communal property law, Mexican colonization law provided
that "[r]ivers, harbors, and public highways belong to all persons in common."
Heard v. Town of Refugio, 103 S.W.2d 728, 733 (Tex. 1937). The primary purpose of
the law was to prevent monopolization of the water front and the water, so that the
waters could serve as many people as possible. Id. at 733; see also State v. Valmont
Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (noting that Mexican law "did
not recognize a system of riparian irrigation rights to river waters").
Communal rights and responsibilities such as these served an important pur-
pose by enabling a greater number of settlers to access surrounding natural resources
in areas where primary farming or ranching activities took place or in areas of scarce
water supplies. See Shadow & Rodriguez-Shadow, supra note 14, at 16 (farming or
ranching).
Moreover, an irrigating ditch or canal that became the property of the com-
munity helped to form distinct acequia societies (water ditches) that continue today.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-9-9 et seq. (governing the maintenance of acequfas); see also
Garcia & Howland, supra note 11, at 40 (discussion of acequias' value to the commu-
nity). Communal property remains a dominant feature of western lands. For a
historical discussion of water rights in Texas, see generally Baade, Water Law, supra
note 22. For further analysis and illustrations of the land use system under Mexican
colonial policy in New Mexico, see Gomez, supra note 40, at 1047-59.
377. See, e.g., Ely's Adm'r v. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 238 (1898) (involving
challenge to the "[nlude methods of measurement" relied upon in measuring tracts);
United States v. Graham, 26 F. Cas. 7, 10 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 15,246) (involving
dispute over the use of natural resources as survey points of reference); United States
v. Peralta, 27 F. Cas. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 16,032) (involving the modification of
imprecise boundaries).
378. Although the land that referred to adjoining ranches was oddly shaped,
natural resources and other geographical boundaries were recognized as sufficient or
well-established boundaries. For example, one court noted that a certain grant's
"boundaries appear to be indicated with tolerable certainty, and it is presumed that
by means of it no practical difficulty will be found by the surveyor in laying off to
the claimant his land." United States v. Wilson, 28 F. Cas. 724, 724 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1855) (No. 16,735); accord Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land & Irrigation Co., 188 U.S.
545 (1903); United States v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 441 (1902); United States v. Moreno,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 400 (1863); Rodrigues, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) at 582; United States v. San
Jacinto Tin Co., 23 F. 279 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885); Espinosa v. United States, 8 F. Cas. 782
(C.C.D. Cal. 1873) (No. 4529); cf. Pheland v. Poyoreno, 13 P. 681, 684 (Cal. 1887)
(holding description of "property as 'the lands known by the name of 'Paso de
Bartolo Viejo,'" was sufficient, if the land was known and could be identified by its
name).
379. Importantly, Mexico employed land surveyors to demarcate boundaries
where necessary. See, e.g., State v. Gallardo, 135 S.W. 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911)
(discussing Mexican surveyors Santiago Longoria and Josefa Bernardo Gomez).
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landholdings, and indeed, Anglo-American law also referred to natu-
ral boundary markers.3° Nonetheless, courts upheld these challenges,
and Mexican grantees did not receive protection from references in
their grant documents to well-known geographical points or ad-
joining ranches.3' Consequently, the recognition of the value of
public use was largely disregarded in land grant adjudication law.
This result is especially troubling in light of the decision by a
Federal district court in Armijo v. United States .382 There, one party
argued that a "survey d[id] not locate the land in a compact form."3
For various reasons, the court declared that "compactness of form
must depend, in many instances, upon a variety of circumstances...
such as the character of the country, its division into different par-
cels by mountains, rivers, and lakes, and sometimes by the relation
of the tract to neighboring grants.",3  Hence, it was known to the
federal courts in California that references to natural boundaries and
other tracts played an important role in determining property lines.
Finally, holders of tracts within larger tracts, known as "floats," also
generated extensive litigation.3 Because floats encompassed specific
amounts of land situated within larger tracts, they directly conflicted
with strict grid-based delineation and gave rise to challenges alleg-
ing imprecision in survey demarcation.
Had other courts considered the variety of circumstances dis-
cussed by the Armijo court, they generally would have been required
to uphold the rights of Mexican grantees. Instead, grantees faced
court orders requiring additional surveys that, at times, resulted in
irretrievable loss of their property interests. Although the courts'
insistence on precise demarcations purportedly served to protect the
380. "From the seventeenth century on, Americans had used metes and bounds
descriptions to set out the boundaries of their property. They described boundaries
by reference to natural monuments such as rivers, trees, or rocks .... "Bakken, supra
note 21, at 238-39. Hence, Mexican references to "hills, mountains, stones, trees,
rivers, Indian Villages, and the boundaries of other grants ... were not alien to
America." Id. at 238.
381. See Ainsa v. United States, 184 U.S. 639 (1902) (rejecting grant referring to
natural objects and denying confirmation of land surplus); accord United States v.
Vallejo, 28 F. Cas. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 16,606); see also, e.g., United States v.
Sanchez, 27 F. Cas. 948 (N.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 16,017) (considering appeal by United
States in boundary dispute on a confirmed claim); Mesa v. United States, 17 F. Cas.
160 (D. Cal. 1855) (No. 9491) (involving an appeal of a boundary-based rejection of
claim involving approximately half a league of land in Santa Clara).
382. 1 F. Cas. 1129 (C.C.D.C. 1857) (No. 536).
383. Id. at 1130.
384. Id.
385. On the nature of floats, see United States v. McLaughlin, 127 U.S. 428, 448
(1888), where the Court defined floats as "grants of a certain quantity of land to be
located within the limits of a larger area." Accord Southern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brown, 68
F. 333, 335-36 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1895).
386. See McLaughlin, 127 U.S. at 448-49.
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United States from false or fraudulent claims, the possibility of
boundary challenges tainted the integrity of the survey process. 
,
Still other non-Mexican land claimants derived further ammu-
nition against Mexican landholders from "mas o menos" ("more or
less") delineations in the grantee's diseho (map).3 Although both
American 9 and Mexican law had long recognized the validity of such
boundaries, American courts responded to these challenges by re-
quiring Mexican grants to contain strictly phrased boundaries. For
example, in United States v. Fossatt, the Court "reject[ed] the words 'a
little more or less,' as having no meaning ... the claim of the grantee
is valid [only] for the quantity clearly expressed., 390 The court in
United States v. Castro stated that mas o menos boundaries "fail[] to
afford any intelligible indication whatever as to the limits of the tract
intended to be granted. ' 391 Based on such rationales, courts rejected
mas o menos demarcations and either reordered surveys or confirmed
smaller tracts that contradicted the original grant language.9
387. See EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 40-42. For example, in United
States ex rel. Castro v. Hendricks, 26 F. Cas. 262 (C.C.D.I. 1858) (No. 15,347a), the land
commissioner allegedly failed to release the petitioner's confirmed tract and thereby
violated "the plain ministerial duty imposed on him." Id. at 262.
388. See United States v. Camou. 184 U.S. 572, 572 (1902) (involving a challenge
based on inability to locate tract with precision); United States v. D'Aguirre, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 311, 313 (1863) (discussing whether petition requesting "five leagues, more
or less, would confine the grant to a [certain, requested] surplus containing but five
leagues, or whether grant would carry the entire 'surplus' ... though that surplus
contained eleven"); United States v. Peralta, 27 F. Cas. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1856) (No.
16,031) (alleging an imprecise boundary demarcations that conflict with the grant);
Mesa v. United States, 17 F. Cas. 160 (D.C. 1855) (No. 9491).
Diseilos varied in size. For example, Robinson provides diseFios of Rancho San
Jose de Buenos Ayers, ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 47, and of Canada de los Nogales,
id. at 104, which are both in Los Angeles County. For an example of a diseiio in case
law, see Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U.S. 312, 324 (1898).
389. As noted above, American titles also referenced natural boundaries. Such
references often resorted to "more or less" in boundary demarcation. See Bakken,
supra note 21, at 238-40. The term "more or less" is also used in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Hardy's Case, 9 Ct. Cl. 244, 245-46 (1873) (using the term in
reference to contract law).
390. United States v. Fossat, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 413, 427 (1857).
391. United States v. Castro, 25 F. Cas. 329, 330 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 14,753)
(involving dispute over size of tract granted to original grantee). But see supra text
accompanying note 389.
Although the genuineness of the grant in Castro was not in dispute, the claim-
ant took less than what was asserted because of the court's difficulty in determining
the boundaries indicated by the evidentiary materials. See Castro, 25 F. Cas. at 331
(No. 14,753).
392. See United States v. Rodriguez, 27 F. Cas. 883 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 16,184)
(affirming repeated survey of grantee's land that diminished its size), accord Dodge
v. Perez, 7 F. Cas. 794 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) (No. 3953) (confirming the grant in general
but excluding certain portions of land).
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The courts' focus on semantic precision is difficult to reconcile
with prevailing American law. In Hardy's case,393 the court recognized
that where terms are imprecise, courts should give them their "plain,
ordinary, and popular meaning," and adopt a "rational and just
construction" that recognizes the words' customary usage. 94 In the
land grant cases, however, courts clearly did not accord Mexican
delineations their plain and ordinary meanings but rather allowed
petty objections to boundary demarcations to cause protracted de-
lays on both the federal and state levels.9
By comparison, non-Mexicans benefited from favorable rulings
notwithstanding the imprecise boundary demarcations of their own
grants. United States v. Stevenson,396 involved a California land claim
based on decidedly "rude and inexact" boundaries. The Stevenson
court, nonetheless, confirmed the claimant's petition on the basis of
a title that purportedly described "the boundaries [with] some preci-
,,398139sion. Similarly, in Weber v. United States,3  the court allowed a
non-Mexican claimant to retain the property at issue, despite an
inexact survey.4OO
393. 9 Ct. Cl. 244 (1873)
394. Id. at 251.
395. See ROBERT J. ROSENBAUM, THE MEXICAN LAND GRANTS: A SETTING FOR
LONG-TERM SKIRMISHING IN THE MExICANO RESISTANCE IN THE SOUTHWEST 68-82
(1981); see also, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 441 (1902) (involving an
appeal filed by the U.S. more than six years after judgment entered against it for
value of land claim); United States v. Ortiz, 176 U.S. 422, 448 (1899) (reversing the
Court of Private Land Claims' decision to validate title); United States v. Rodriguez,
27 F. Cas. 883 (1856) (No. 16,184) (adjudicating appeal by United States without
benefit of argument); United States v. De Haro, 25 F. Cas. 809, 809 (1862)
(challenging post-confirmation survey); Castro, 25 F. Cas. 329 (disallowing confirmed
status induced delay in seeking ownership of tract confirmed by the board of com-
missioners); United States v. Bernal, 24 F. Cas. 1148 (N.D. Cal. 1862) (No. 14,580)
(challenging confirmed grant upon allegations of fraud).
396. 27 F. Cas. 1333 (N.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 16,397).
397. Id. at 1333.
398. Id.
399. Weber v. United States, 29 F. Cas. 527 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1861) (No. 17,328).
400. Id. at 528 (upholding survey returned to court by the surveyor general and
approved by him on January 23, 1860). The case law provides many other survey
related examples. See, e.g., Chavez v. De Bergere, 231 U.S. 482 (1913) (action in eject-
ment and involving heirs deriving from Manuel A. Otero and Jesus M. Sena); United
States v. Berreyesa, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 499 (1859) (declining to instruct district court to
locate and survey tract despite confirmation of grant); United States v. Galbraith, 63
U.S. (22 How.) 89, 96 (1859) (involving a purportedly altered grant); United States v.
Fossatt, 61 U.S. (21 How.) 413, 427 (1858) (disallowing recognition of term "mas o
menos"); United States v. Wilson, 28 F. Cas. 724, 724 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1855) (No.
16,735) (indicating that boundaries of tract "appear to be indicated with tolerable
certainty... [if] no practical difficulty will be found by the surveyor in laying off to
the claimant his land"); United States v. Vallejo, 28 F. Cas. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No.
16,605) (encompassing location and survey of a grant and jurisdiction of district
court); United States v. Castro, 25 F. Cas. 331 (C.C.D. Cal. 1868) (No. 14,754) (holding
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This disparity in the rules applied to Mexicans and non-Mexicans,
under the same relevant facts and circumstances, demonstrates a clear
lack of fairness. The refusal of American courts to follow Mexican law
and afford equal treatment to grantees of Mexican descent frustrated
the promises of the Treaty. Moreover, the rejections lacked fairness
in that they involved Mexican grantees who either possessed con-
firmed tracts, had surveyed their tracts, or who occupied their
property in notorious and undisturbed possession for many years.
By allowing challenges to boundary demarcations, surveys, and ex-
plicit granting language, as well as the filing of exceptions, the courts
prevented res judicata from governing the grant process and deprived
Mexican grantees of the quiet title the process purported to provide.4 '
b. Supplemental Legislative Actions
In the United States, a Jeffersonian ideal attaches to the owner-
ship of rural property.4 2 After the U.S.-Mexico War, settlers, squatters,
that the long-established and relied upon borders of land grants should not be re-
evaluated); Armijo v. United States, 1 F. Cas. 1129 (C.C.D. Cal. 1857) (No. 536)
(examining the claim of heirs of Jose F. Armijo for three leagues of land in Solano
County and rejected by Land Commissioners with appeal focusing on boundary
challenge); Baltzley v. Lujan, 212 P.2d 417 (N.M. 1949) (involving in part ejectment
action against Ramon Vigil).
Although not directly involving a Mexican petitioner, Walker v. Kenedy, 127
S.W.2d 163 (1939), involves chain of title and deed issues resulting from an original
grant to Antonio Rivas and deeds purportedly transferred by Mexican grantees. See
also Teschemacher v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 862 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 13,843)
(involving land claim by original grantees Salvador Vallejo and Juan A. Vallejo),
aff'd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1 (1855).
401. See, e.g., Dominguez de Guyer v. Banning, 167 U.S. 723, 724 (1897)
(concerning an action in ejectment to recover possession of island); Vallejo v. United
States, 28 F. Cas. 926, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 16,819) (describing burdensome
procedural history in challenge to tract allegedly not segregated from public do-
main); United States v. Rodriguez, 25 F. Cas. 821 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 14,950)
(challenging confirmed grant after confirmed survey); United States v. Garcia, 25 F.
Cas. 1242, 1243 (1870) (considering motion to set aside order confirming grant). But
see Weber, 29 F. Cas. 527 (noting that an inexact survey that failed to match diseio still
allowed confirmation).
402. For an elaboration of Thomas Jefferson's vision, see Jim Chen & Edward S.
Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 361
(1997). The authors assert that "agrarian commentators" invoke Jefferson's
romantic vision of yeoman farmers as the foundation of what we
now call Jeffersonian democracy .... According to Jefferson's vision,
if each farm could be a self-sustaining enterprise, and if a substantial
portion of the populace could find gainful employment as independ-
ent farmers, the newborn country's political scene would never fall
victim to the power-seeking schemes of massive economic concerns.
Id. at 387-88. The Jeffersonian "ideal" is a fundamental concept analyzed in agricul-
ture and Jefferson's vision is commonly linked to farming promotion. See, e.g., Neil
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and trespassers seeking property lobbied the Congress for land and
legislation to ease their entry into rural enterprises. Their successes
in the form of congressional legislation and agricultural policy came
at the expense of Mexican ownership.
i. "Agrarian Cupidity" 40
3
Demanding land, squatters, settlers, and veterans targeted the
former Mexican provinces. Along the way, they "took with them a
view long held on the frontier that it was one of the fundamental
rights of Americans to enter upon the public lands, make
improvements, create a farm, and eventually acquire ownership. 4t 4
Their zeal caused one court to note that "individuals sought to ap-
propriate by4Yossession whatever land they deemed necessary for
themselves." Squatters sometimes went so far as to enclose Mexi-
can property with barbed wire to bar owners from accessing their
own land . 6
D. Hamilton, Greening Our Garden: Public Policies to Support the New Agriculture, 2
DRAKE J. AGRIC. LAW 357, 357, 367 (1997) (noting that "Thomas Jefferson and George
Washington were proponents of agriculture and innovative farmers in their day,"
and describing Monticello as the source of Jefferson's inspiration). As one author
recently stated, "the greatest service which can be rendered any country is to add a
useful plant to its culture." Sara M. Dunn, Comment, From Flav'r Sav'r to Environ-
mental Saver? Biotechnology and the Future of Agriculture, International Trade, and the
Environment, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENvT'L L. & POL'Y, 145, 145 (1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting THE GARDEN AND FARM BOOKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 509
(Robert C. Baron, ed. 1987)).
403. GOETZMANN, supra note 5, at 23.
404. GATES, LAND AND LAW IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 187, at 5; see also United
States v. Folsom, 25 F. Cas. 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 15,127) (concerning settlers
seeking to intervene under the United States adversely to a Mexican land grant). The
ability to graze livestock was also eliminated through squatter actions, fence laws,
and the privatization of communal lands. See generally WELSEY CARR CALEF, PRIVATE
GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS (1979) (providing an account of land use on public
lands).
Access to the public domain extends into the present, although payment for
that access does not reflect its true market value. Currently, adjoining ranchers pay a
fee to the U.S. government for grazing on national forests and in the public domain.
See Public Rangelands Improvement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1905 (1996). The grazing fees do
not reflect the market value of the land use but constitute a form of subsidy for
ranchers who now envision their use as "property." See Karl Hess, Jr. & Jerry L.
Holechek, Where Babbitt Got Lost on the Range, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 3, 1995, at A7
(analyzing Babbitt's failed attempt to increase grazing fees so as to reflect the market
value of the land usage).
405. Wheeler v. Bolton, 28 P. 558, 560 (Cal. 1891); see also United States v. San
Jacinto Tin Co., 23 F. 279, 288 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885) (involving 16 years of litigation
regarding the location of a grant).
406. See, e.g., WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB, THE TEXAS RANGERS: A CENTURY OF
FRONTIER DEFENSE (1935) (discussing barbed wire enclosures). For an account of
fencing law under the common law, see Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
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When Mexican grantees sought to defend their property against
trespassers,4 delays in the confirmation process enabled squatters to
select parcels and commit a wide array of trespasses on the property
of the grantees. °8 Squatters and settlers filed adverse possession
actions and eviction proceedings against Chicana/Chicano land-
owners4 and caused further harm when they employed violence• 1 410
against Chicanas/Chicanos who attempted to defend their lands.
This history demonstrates the nature of the tensions over land con-
trol, making evident settlers' disregard for constitutional norms and
other legal principles that protect fee holders' rights. Hence, indi-
viduals from the dominant population trespassed upon lands
belonging to Chicana/Chicano landowners and called upon courts
to vindicate their actions, even though the courts were the judicial
arm of the government charged under the Treaty with protecting the
rights of Chicanas/Chicanos.
While staking their claims to Mexican properties, trespassers
and entrepreneurs411 lobbied Congress, "call[ing] upon such time-
407. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1986).
408. See Wheeler, 28 P. at 560; see also Brownsville v. Cavazos, 4 F. Cas. 460, 461
(E.D. Tex. 1876) (No. 2043) (involving an action for trespass); Armijo v. United
States, 1 F. Cas. 1129, 1130 (C.C.D. Cal. 1857) (No. 536) (discussing the boundary
dispute claim of Armijo's heirs); United States v. Cameron, 21 P. 177 (Cal. 1889)
(analyzing the various types of land grants by Mexican governors in a case involving
a Mexican defendant charged with unlawfully fencing public domain); State v.
Gallardo, 166 S.W. 369 (Tex. 1914) (involving a trespass to try title against Jose L.
Gallardo and others in possession for "40 or 50 years" in Hidalgo County, Texas).
Preemption claims furthered the aims of trespassers. See, e.g., United States v. Mar-
tinez, 184 U.S. 441 (1902).
409. See, e.g., Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554, 557 (5th Cir. 1946).
410. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 7-8, Donahue v. Gallavan, 43 Cal. 573
(1870) (averring that jumpers and squatters were rampant and that "there was no
resistance ... because resistance to jumpers in those days meant blood"). Pleadings
and other legal documentation from land grant challenges provides a rich resource
for further academic inquiry into the impact on Chicana/Chicano life of American
expansion into the former Mexican territories. The Bancroft Library at the University
of California, Berkeley contains many such sources, including inter alia the following:
Plaintiff's Brief, Castro v. Tennant, Supreme Court of Cal. (1869); Complaint, Ramon
v. Mulford, (Cal. Dist. Court 3d Judicial District), (Jan. 30, 1857) BANC MSS C-I
23:11:10. For additional discussion of the violence that plagued Mexican grantees, see
discussion supra note 217.
For a discussion of the impact of racism on nineteenth century Americans, see
generally BARRERA, supra note 132 (1979); ARNOLDO DE LEON, THEY CALLED THEM
GREASERS, ANGLO ATrITUDES TOWARD MEXICANS IN TEXAS, 1821-1900 (1983); Alvin
R. Sunseri, Anglo Attitudes Toward Hispanos, 1846-1861, 2 J. MEX. AM. HIST. 76 (1973)
(discussing the mistreatment, abuse, and antagonism exhibited toward the Chi-
cana/Chicano community). For an example of this form of racist treatment in the
present, see Affidavit of Dennis Nodin Vald~s, Hernandez v. Stuyvesant, (No. Civ.
93-887) (D.N.M. 1993) (on file with author).
411. Professor Montejano elaborates on the role of British and Eastern investment
capital in commercializing Southern Texas ranch land. That investment expedited
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worn legal principles as popular sovereignty, preemption and equal
access to wealth to justify their actions." This campaign brought
aggressive pressure upon the legislature and courts to disregard
confirmed Mexican rural enterprises and place them in the public
domain for distribution to others.
Responding to the pressures and lobbying by settlers and squat-
ters, Congress sought to ease entry into farming and industry in the
country and enacted a wide range of public laws including the Home-
stead Act of 1862, 41 the Reclamation Act of 1888,414 the Morrill Act41
5
and various preemption laws.1 6 Those agricultural laws and policies,
however, conflicted with the property rights of Mexican grantees.
Rather than protect the substantive property rights of Chi-
cana/Chicano landowners in the contested areas, federal land
policies favored the trespassers and treated Chicana/Chicano prop-
erty as empty land.4 17 "[O]utright confiscation and fraud" were
methods often employed when Chicana/Chicano lands were "sold"
418to settlers during expansion hysteria. In some instances,
expansion and connections with domestic and global markets, which in turn acceler-
ated land alienation. MONTEJANO, supra note 322, at 62-63.
412. Pisani, supra note 63, at 278.
413. See, e.g., The Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-308 (1988)) (providing 160 acre grants to settlers).
414. Reclamation Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 527 (1888). "There is no question that the
Reclamation Act was designed to benefit people, not land." Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v.
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 292 (1958). The Act's purpose was to disallow land mo-
nopolies. See Peterson v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir.).
415. Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 301-305, 307, 308 (1988)). The Morrill Act has expanded the wealth of the agri-
cultural sector through sophisticated university research. An attempt to expand
research efforts at land grant universities to include the rural poor has failed. In
California Agrarian Action Project v. Regents of the University of California, 258 Cal. Rptr.
769 (1989), a panel of the California Court of Appeals rejected a claim brought by a
project to "provide relief to the poor, distressed and disadvantaged people of rural
California." Id. at 770 n.1. The project sought to enjoin research regarding agricul-
tural mechanization projects that "favored the interests of large agricultural
businesses to the detriment of the small family farmer." Id. at 770.
416. See, e.g., Act to Extend Preemption Rights to Certain Lands Therein Men-
tioned, ch. 143, 10 Stat. 244 (1853); Act to Provide for the Survey of the Public Lands
in California, the Granting of Preemption Rights Therein, and for Other Purposes, ch.
145, 10 Stat. 244 (1853).
417. For a discussion as to the nature of favorable legislation allowing squatter
sovereignty see Pisani, supra note 63, at 288, 292-304. The gold rush also induced
accelerated, aggressive trespasser and squatter settlements. See id.; see also Newhall v.
Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875) (describing the California Land Act of 1851 as a re-
sponse to the difficulties presented by the "eager search for gold that prevailed soon
after the acquisition of California").
418. MONTEJANO, supra note 322, at 50-53; cf. Wheeler v. Bolton, 28 P. 558, 560
(Cal. 1891) (discussing how Mexican land grants had been made for lands in Califor-
nia without defining boundaries or establishing their validity).
[VOL. 4:39
On the Edge of a "Naked Knife"
"neglected" rural holdings were given to squatters.41 9 These actions
required defensive suits against settlers, trespassers, and squatters,
in which grantees faced the burden of demonstrating the validity of
their claim. 420
In addition to Congressional biases, the settlers also benefited
from the judiciary's attitudes in their quest for land. In Luco v. United
States,42' the Court reveals its bias toward non-Mexican settlers as
follows:
There is an interest which in this and many other Cali-
fornia cases cannot be overlooked-the interest of bona
fide settlers. The Government of the United States con-
tests these cases for the benefit ultimately of that class. It
acquires territory, not that it may become and remain a
vast land owner, but that the acquired territory may be
thrown open to its citizens, for their occupation in mod-
erate quantity, in aid of a public policy .... 42
In furtherance of this policy of throwing open the acquired territory
to America's non-Mexican citizens, the opinion declares:
The rights of such men must be not only respected, but
protected by a just Government. They are the people
who have carried our laws, institutions, and all that
make up an empire, into the wilderness, and subdued
it to the purposes of civilization; who, to reach this
spot where they were bidden by law, have tempted
the dangers of two oceans, or traversed vast spaces of
desert, cut off from their old homes by savage moun-
tains and barbarous tribes. They are entitled to regard
and protection.423
419. See Chabolla v. United States, 5 F. Cas. 387, 387-88 (N.D. Cal. 1855) (No.
2566). In another case, the court noted that:
[tihe Californians are a simple, ignorant people. The Supreme Court
of the State told them their titles would not support an action, either
for the possession or the property; the squatters, who knew Spanish,
kindly interpreted the judgment of the court; it merely took the land
from the Californians, and gave it to them, the squatters.
United States v. Galbraith, 63 U.S. 89, 92 (1859).
420. MONTEJANO, supra note 322, at 51-53.
421. 64 U.S. (23 How.) 515 (1859).
422. Id. at 521.
423. Id.
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Similarly, in adjudicating an action against settlers who some-
times had trespassed on Mexican land, the court in Johnston v.
Smith,4 4 expressed its preference for the settlers, declaring:
[wiere we to decide that this practice was a fraud and
unauthorized by the law, and the titles so issued void,
we might disturb hundreds of the grants obtained by
the early settlers, and deprive them of their lands, for
which they had encountered all the peril, toil and priva-
tion, to which the early settlers were exposed.9
Thus, the Johnston court signaled that it would not be a source of
protection for the rights of Mexican property owners in the face of
challenges by members of the more favored dominant population.
Courts gave effect to this bias by disregarding Mexican owners'
established, self-sufficient communities and pueblos and calling such
land a wilderness. This form of misrepresentation permitted a legal
culture that adhered to the interests of non-Mexicans and disallowed
proper protection to those previously residing in the "wilderness" as
required by the Treaty.
Finally, the courts undermined Chicana/Chicano rights and
permitted land to accrue to the dominant population by ensuring
that grantees lost communal rights in land or natural resources.
First, various aspects of the land acts conflicted with each other or
426pre-war Mexican law. Despite the clear command under the Treaty
that Mexican law should have governed, courts resolved these con-
flicts so that grantees lost communal grazing rights and access to
427water or other natural resources. In contrast to American licensing
424. 21 Tex. 722 (1858).
425. Id. at 727 (citing Russell v. Randolph, 11 Tex. 460, 467-68 (1854)).
426. For example, Section 18 of the New Mexico Land Act conflicts with the
communal water rights of Mexican grantees. See Act To Establish a Court of Private
Land Claims and To Provide for the Settlement of Private Land Claims in Certain
States and Territories, ch. 539, § 18, 26 Stat. 854 (1891); see also Gutierres v. Albu-
querque Land & Irrigation Co., 188 U.S. 545, 545 (1903).
427. See Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F.2d 733, 737 (10th Cir. 1967) ("[Any conflicting
rights prior to the confirmatory Act of 1860 which might have arisen or existed by
reason of the original grant from Mexico, considered in the light of Mexican law and
the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, were thereby extinguished."). David J. Weber
provides an example of a grantee's reaction to alienation:
It is the conquered who are humbled before the conqueror asking for
his protection, while enjoying what little their misfortune has left
them ... They are foreigners in their own land... They have been hu-
miliated and insulted. They have been refused the privilege of taking
water from their own wells.
DAVID J. WEBER, FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND vi (1973) (David Weber ed.,
1973) (quoting Pablo de la Guerra, Speech to the California Senate (1856)).
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agreements with ranchers who were permitted restricted use of the
public domain, Mexican law expressly gave grantees the use of
communal land and did not require a licensor-licensee relation-
ship.429 Where courts denied access to common pastures and
resources, they forced the demise of smaller agricultural and ranch-
ing enterprises that could no longer gather wood or pasture their
flocks. ° In other instances, extralegal forces pressured Mexican
landholders to relinquish their communal and private property
rights. In the El Paso Salt War, Anglo entrepreneurs used Texas
Rangers to prohibit Mexicans from accessing salt beds that long had
been acknowledged as a common resource.
In summary, contrary to U.S. promises in the Treaty, federal
land legislation and policies placed extensive burdens on Mexicans
attempting to defend their property interests. Inconsistent judicial
rulings compounded the problem by creating a lengthy process for
quieting title while encouraging squatter and settler actions against
Mexican landholders.3 2
ii. Attorneys and Land Grants
The new legal requirements and the technicalities of the confir-
mation process forced Mexican grantees to rely on attorneys to
assert and defend their claims, against either the United States or
individual settlers. This situation had at least three substantially
negative effects for the grantees. First, and most obvious, attorneys'
fees for copying, filing motions, traveling to courts in distant areas,
and appealing adverse judgments proved financially exhausting.433
428. See, e.g., CALEF, supra note 404; GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 535-38 (1993) (explaining
that federal acquiescence in unrestricted use of the public domain for livestock
grazing gradually assumed the status of a right). The value of access to the public
domain continues to generate conlict in the present, along with control of the privi-
lege, continues to generate conflict in the present.
429. See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
430. See DUNBAR ORTIZ, supra note 80, at 103 ("When the purchaser fenced the
commons, as he had a right to do under Anglo-American land laws, the former users
could no longer gather wood or pasture their flocks as they had done traditionally.").
But see United States v. Cameron, 21 P. 177, 179 (Cal. 1889) (fencing in area of land of
four sitios used for cattle grazing "was an unlawful inclosure [sic] of the public
lands").
431. See GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, supra note 14, at 83.
432. The evidence includes court-ordered sheriff's sales, which settled tax arrear-
ages and/or outstanding private debts. MONTEJANO, supra note 322, at 52-53. Such
sales were of dubious quality because bids seemed intentionally low. Id.; see also
Chavez v. Bergere, 231 U.S. 482 (1913) (former mission San Fernando Property sold
to Don Eulogio de Cilis for $14,000).
433. See MONTEJANO, supra note 322, at 53. For an example of legal fees associated
with representing defendants, see Cunningham v. Springer, 204 U.S. 647 (1907), in
which the defendant was Maxwell Land Grant company.
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Communication difficulties and grantees' own long trips to San
Francisco to present their claims before the Land Commissioners
caused further distress.4m
Second, in some instances attorneys hindered the interests of
their clients by direct acts, omissions or conflicts. For example, in
United States v. Pacheco, the attorney who represented the claimants
was "interested in, or represent[ed], the adjoining rancho of the San-
Ramon." m Similarly, there were reports that "at least two federal
attorneys were secretly interested in claims they were required to
defend [and] a leading lawyer fraudulently altered a document. 437
These situations presented clear conflicts of interests. Such tactics led
one author to state that
[v]olumes could be filled with accounts of the knavery,
the double dealing, the cross purposes, the perjury, the
lies, the bribery, the alterations and erasing, the sup-
pressing and the destroying of papers, the various
schemes and plots that for the sake of the almighty
dollar have left their stain on the records of the [Texas]
General Land Office. A class of land speculators, com-
monly called land sharks, unscrupulous and greedy,
have left their trail in every department of this office, in
the shape of titles destroyed, patents cancelled, homes
demolished and torn away, forged transfers and lying
affidavitsi9
Still other attorneys harmed grantees by filing motions without
briefs and otherwise providing inadequate representation for their
clients.439 In at least one intervenor action, for example, an attorney's
434. Cf. GATES, LAND AND LAW IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 24, at 17 (asserting that
costs were not the only basis for property loss).
435. 27 F. Cas. 393 (N.D. Cal. 1862) (No. 15,980).
436. Id. at 394.
437. GATES, LAND AND LAW IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 24, at 210 (citing Fremont
v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542 (1854)).
438. AARON M. SAKOLSKI, LAND TENURE AND LAND TAXATION IN AMERICA 148
(1957) (quoting ALFRED N. CHANDLER, LAND TITLE ORIGINS 453 (1945)). Such specu-
lators sometimes operated in organized fashion. One such group was the Sante Fe
Ring. See discussion, infra notes 446-49 and accompanying text. Historians contend
that organizations like the Santa Fe Ring became so successful that lawyers eventu-
ally may have received as much as 80 percent of land grant property in lieu of fees.
See BRADFUrE, supra note 195, at 3 (citing Howard R. Lamar, Political Patterns in New
Mexico and Utah Territories, 1850-1900, 27 UTAH HIsT. Q. 371, 371-72 (1960)
(discussing land speculation rings)).
439. See, e.g., Pico v. United States, 19 F. Cas. 593, 593 (C.C.D. Cal. 1856) (No.
11,128) ("It is to be regretted that the point involved in this case was not debated by
counsel, and that the court is obliged to arrive at a conclusion unassisted by argu-
ments at the bar."). The Pico family was active in Mexican politics long before formal
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motions even failed to follow even leniently interpreted legal stan-
dards.440
Third, attorneys targeted grantees for their personal gain. At-
torneys representing grantees who lacked financial resources often
agreed to exchange services for land-typically one-third, but at
times up to one-half of the amount claimed. These attorneys would
file partition actions permitting them co-ownership status."2 Then,
rather than maintain a joint-owner relationship, the attorneys would
force the sale of the property.443 Other attorneys used their relation-
ships with grantees to profit from land speculation groups.444 For
example, California attorneys William Carey Jones, Elisha Oscar
Crosby, Henry Hittell, and Joseph Lancaster Brent acquired large
holdings from their representation of land grant claimants.445
As one author has noted, "[olne of the most infamous collec-
tions of speculators, land grabbers, dishonest lawyers, and
swindlers, was the Santa Fe Ring. During the 1880s this group
annexation. For a review of Governor Pico's participation in California politics, see
GoMEZ-QUI&ONES, supra note 84, at 109.
440. See United States v. Peralta, 99 F. 618, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1900). The motions were
so poor that the court repeatedly remarked:
The pleadings upon this motion are peculiar in this:
That the petition of the intervenor does not state all the proceedings
in the suit... instead of answering the petition and setting up all the
facts... the petition does not state all of the steps that were taken by
the court after the decree of 1859. It entirely ignores any reference to
the proceedings of this court ... and of the steps... which resulted in
the issuance of a patent to the claimants in the original suit.
Id. at 623; see also Whitney v. United States, 181 U.S. 104 (1901) (discussing excessive
delays in the confirmation and appellate process concerning a deed of gift conveyed
by original grantee to his nephew); Yturbide, v. United States, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 290,
292 (1859) (appeal dismissed for failure of counsel to file notice within required six-
month period).
441. See, e.g., AcLr&A, supra note 39, at 61 (noting that "[l]awyers and speculators
'had a field day using fees, intimidation, bribery, and fraud to realize great profit
and enormous power' ") (quoting ROSENBAUM, supra note 395, at 23); Prrr, supra note
39, at 91 (describing the role of attorneys); ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 102
("[Grantees] sometimes mortgaged their lands and their futures or conveyed
'undivided' interests to their attorneys.").
442. Several cases provide examples of partition litigation. See, e.g., Montoya v.
Gonzales, 232 U.S. 375 (1914); Leroy v. Doe, 32 F. 516 (N.D. Cal. 1887); Adams v.
Hopkins, 77 P. 712 (Cal. 1904); Emeric v. Alvarado, 27 P. 356 (Cal. 1891); De Mares v.
Gilpin, 24 P. 568 (Colo. 1890); State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961); PITr, supra note 39, at 97.
443. See EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 151.
444. For discussions of the involvement of attorneys in the land grant period, see
MIRANDt, supra note 39, at 47 and Prnr, supra note 39, at 91-94.
445. See Charles A. Barker, Elisha Oscar Crosby: A California Lawyer in the Eighteen-
Fifties, 27 CAL. HIST. SOC'Y Q. 133, 134-35 (1948), cited in PITr, supra note 39, at 91
n.17.
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gained so much wealth and power that it was said to completely
control the New Mexico economy and political system."446 The ring
included governors of New Mexico, Surveyors General," lawyers,
"judges, politicians, businessmen and a sympathetic press" all of
whom gathered a vast amount of land grant property. 449
One primary leader of the group was a former United States
Attorney General for New Mexico, Thomas B. Catron.4'0 Catron pur-
portedly acquired his Tierra Amarilla grant with forty-two deeds, but
neglected to purchase the interests of most of the settlers whose
446. MIRANDa, supra note 39, at 46; see also EBRIGHT, TIERRA AMARILLA, supra note
97, at ix ("For with American occupancy came a horde of greedy land speculators,
cattle and railroad companies, and unscrupulous lawyers eager to bend the land
laws for their own gain.").
447. See EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 43 ("[N]early every governor of
New Mexico from the late 1860s to 1885 was a member of the Santa Fe Ring.").
448. Out of the nine men to hold the position of Surveyor General, three were
land grant speculators. See EBRIGHT, TIERRA AMARILLA, supra note 97, at 3 n.8.
[A] notorious example of corruption in the Surveyor General's office
involved a survey of the Maxwell grant. This occurred under Atkin-
son by John T. Elkins and R.T. Marmon. John Elkins was the brother
of Stephen who was not only a bondsman for the surveyors, but also
was promoter for the grant.
Id. On the nature of the Maxwell Land Grant, see Russell v. Maxwell Land Grant Co.,
158 U.S. 253 (1895), which affirmed the grant of Maxwell Holding Company over a
homesteaders' claim. See also DUNBAR ORTIZ, supra note 80, at 97; ROSENBAUM, supra
note 395; Stoller, supra note 109, at 31. Dunbar Ortiz has noted that
The Maxwell Grant ... [was] confirmed, in violation of the 1824
Mexican colonization law limiting grants to eleven square leagues
and the 1842 law requiring approval of the Mexican national gov-
ernment. Later the Supreme Court was to validate the nearly two
million acre Maxwell grant, using the argument that the Court could
not overrule an act of Congress.
DUNBAR ORTIZ, supra; see also Colorado Fuel Co. v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 43 P.
556 (Cal. 1896); JIM BERRY PEARSON, THE MAXWELL LAND GRANT 144-209 (1961)
(describing the infamous role in Chicano history of the Maxwell Grant in depriving
access to natural resources).
449. EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 43. The Ring included several
lawyers, such as Stephen B. Elkins and Henry L. Waldo; federal judges, including
Joseph G. Palen, Samuel B. Axtell, and L. Bradford Prince, also were members. See
PITT, supra note 39, at 91. Probate Judge Robert H. Longwill also enjoyed member-
ship status. See id.; see also WESTPHALL, MERCEDES REALES, supra note 80, at 233-35;
MORRIS T. TAYLOR, O.P. MCMAIN AND THE MAXWELL LAND GRANT CONFLICT 48
(1979) (the newspaper was viewed "as the creature of the Santa Fe Ring").
450. See MIRANDt, supra note 39, at 46; GOMEZ-QUI&ONES, supra note 84, at 241
("Catron became the central figure in the so-called Santa Fe Ring, a network devoted
to using politics to make money .... ).
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deeds he had recorded as his own.45' In spite of this "oversight,"
Catron secured a court decree establishing his ownership of the
entire grant.4" At various times, Catron also held interests in as
many as thirty-four land grants comprising approximately two mil-
lion acres in land holdings.453
Instead of proving that Anglo-American law was "clear and
concise," as characterized by some scholars, the actions of American
attorneys created a muddled legal mess. Moreover, the less-than-
diligent or patently parasitic representation of Mexican grantees
explains why litigation and other costs exhausted the financial re-
sources of grantees.4 6 In short, as with legislation and the grant
confirmation process in general, lawyers helped create and then par-
ticipated in a legal culture that rewarded counter-Mexican acts. In the
process, these actors facilitated breaches of the Treaty in favor of
third parties seeking Mexican land.
iii. Treaty Rights
It is elementary that a change of sovereignty does not affect
the property rights of the inhabitants of the territory in-
volved.5
With the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States for-
mally established a legal relationship with the population of
Mexican descent. Although annexing the former Mexican provinces,
the United States "acquired no right of the soil included in this
grant; nothing but the political powers, jurisdiction, and sover-
eignty, under a special stipulation that the owners of property
should be protected in the enjoyment thereof., 456 Treaties, like federal
451. See EBRIGHT, TIERRA AMARILLA, supra note 97, at x, 25-26 (Catron obtained
the court order without mention of the recorded hijuelas ("deeds")). The Tierra
Amarilla Grant (prior to Catron's purchase) is an example of a communal grant.
452. Id. at x.
453. See WESTPHALL, MERCEDES REALES, supra note 80, at 233-34 . Westphall
further contends this is an approximation. "It is impossible to determine how much
real property he owned at any one time, but it was probably at least two million
acres." Id. at 234. For examples of litigation involving Catron's property interests, see
United States v. Ortiz, 176 U.S. 422 (1899), where Catron appeared for claimants in an
appeal of a grant of validity to their title. See also Catron v. Board of Comm'rs, 33 P.
513 (Cal. 1893).
454. Petition of Antonio Maria Pico, et al., to the Senate and House of Represen-
tatives of the United States (Feb. 21, 1859), reprinted as Compelled to Sell, Little by Little
by Little, in DAVID J. WEBER, FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND, HISTORICAL ROOTS
OF THE MEXICAN AMERICANS 195, 197 (1973).
455. Miller v. Letzerich, 49 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. 1932).
456. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 529 (1854).
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law, are "the supreme Law of the Land" under the Constitution. 7
Treaties are deemed legal contracts between their signatories and The
Constitution directs judges to give them effect.58 In Ely's Administrator
v. United States459 the Court verified that, notwithstanding the Con-
quest, Mexican grantees should have been protected "[i]n harmony
with the rules of international law, as well as with the terms of the
treaties of cession, the change of sovereignty should work no change
in respect to rights and titles; that which was good before should be
good after. ... " Nonetheless, "that which was good before" did not
protect grantees from shifting and elusive norms within the new
legal regime.6'
As provided under the Land Acts, five different laws obligated
the United States to protect grantees and their property rights. In
addition to the Treaty and the Constitution, Mexico's colonization
laws and its customary practices were to govern the land grant ad-
judication process, while international law and the laws of the
United States would also protect grantees as citizens and forever
foreign subjects.4 62 Thus, the United States pledged to protect the
rights of Mexican grantees in the grantees' newly adopted nation.
457. Article VI, Clause 2 of of the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554, 556
(5th Cir. 1946) ("A treaty lawfully entered into stands on the same footing of su-
premacy as does the Constitution ... of the United States,"); Atocha's Adm'r v.
United States, 8 Ct. Cl. 427 (1872) (using compensation fund created by the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo to reimburse expelled American expatriate for property taken
during Revolution of 1844).
458. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. ("Judges in every State shall be bound thereby .....
459. 171 U.S. 220 (1898).
460. Id. at 223.
461. Id.
462. See, e.g., California Land Act of 1851, § 11, 9 Stat. 631, 633 (1851) (enumerating
the Treaty, law of nations, Mexican law, custom and usage, principles of equity, and
the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court); see also Knight v. United States Land
Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 184 (1891) (applying principles of international law as additional
support for obligations under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo); Beard v. Federy, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 478 (1865) (describing land grant process and raising issues of
notice in filing an appeal after "our Conquest of California"); Yorba v. United States,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 412, 414-19 (1863) (statement of the case) (argument of the United
States); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). In observing interna-
tional law, the Percheman court reasoned that "[a] cession of territory is never
understood to be a cession of the property belonging to its inhabitants. The king
cedes that only which belonged to him; land he had previously granted, were not his
to cede." Id. at 86.
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Instead, grantees faced prohibitive burdens of proof, shifting
rules and standards that deviated from long-established American
legal norms, and selective application of the law. Legal actors disre-
garded the fact that Mexican land was not part of the public domain,
thereby promoting biased actions that ran counter to the express
obligations of the Treaty.46 By these means, the United States openly
made available land that supposedly "had been so completely sev-
ered from the public domain of Mexico, so perfectly vested in the
grantee by a legal title in fee, that no right of property in the land
passed to the United States."46 Courts enhanced the wealth of the
dominant population by awarding it title to land that rightfully
belonged to grantees or, more rarely, awarding invalid grants to
non-Mexican petitioners that should have reverted to the public
domain. Hence, the treatment of Mexican grantees violated not only
the Treaty and the Constitution but also the pledges made by both
President Polk and the Senate 65
The same dubious actions of the several branches of the Ameri-
can government also violated established principles of international
law. Prior to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Supreme Court
in United States v. Percheman,) recognized the pre-existing legal
status of lands colonized by acts of war:
It may not be unworthy of remark, that it is very un-
usual, even in cases of Conquest, for the conqueror to
do more than to displace the sovereign and assume
dominion over the country. The modem usage of na-
tions which has become law would be violated; that
sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by
the whole civilized world would be outraged if private prop-
erty should be generally confiscated and private rights
annulled. The people change their allegiance; but their
relations to each other and their rights of property re-
main undisturbed.67
Similarly, the Court later declared:
463. See supra Part II.
464. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 529 (1854).
465. See discussion supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
466. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
467. Id. at 86-87 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Perot, 98 U.S. 428, 430
(1878) ("The laws of Mexico ... were the laws not of a foreign, but of an antecedent
government.... [A]s to that portion of our territory, they are deemed domestic laws
.... .) United States v. Moreno, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 400, 404 (1863) (reasoning that
private property rights were consecrated by the laws of nations).
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By th[e] substitution of a new supremacy, although the
former political relations of the inhabitants were dis-
solved, their private relations, their rights vested under
the government of their former allegiance, or those
arising from contract or usage, remain[] in full force and
unchanged, except so far as they were in their nature
and character found to be in conflict with the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, or with any
regulations which the conquering and occupying
authority should ordain.
Notwithstanding the law of nations, legal actors annulled private
property rights in applying the Treaty through the land grant proc-
ess. Contrary to Percheman, the conqueror did more than displace the
sovereign and assume dominion over the country. Either on behalf
of its Euro-American citizens or itself, the United States displaced
Mexican grantees and their heirs from their rightful property,
thereby working injuries whose effects extend into the present.49
The actions under the new legal regime might have been
somewhat more understandable had the land grant adjudication
process presented Congress with a new endeavor. 470 However, the
United States was already familiar with the issues involved in pro-
tecting the property of the residents of areas transferred to its control
by treaty, having previously negotiated treaties with France and
Spain.471 A similar process in the territories of Louisiana and Florida
also governed the award of land grants. In Soulard v. United States,4n
for example, the Court reports as follows:
In the treaty by which Louisiana was acquired, the
United States stipulated that the inhabitants of the
ceded territory should be protected in the free enjoy-
ment of their property. The United States, as a just
468. Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177 (1857); cf. United States v.
Auguisola, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 352, 358 (1863) (stating that "the United States have
never sought by their legislation to evade the obligation devolved upon them by the
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to protect the rights of property of the inhabitants of
the ceded territory, or to discharge it in a narrow and illiberal manner").
469. See infra notes 479-89 and accompanying text.
470. For an example of the land grant adjudication process that protected persons
remaining in newly acquired Spanish territories, see United States v. Percheman, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). The decision in Percheman involved an 1815 petition by
Sargeant Juan Percheman. There, the Court protected the property interests of land
grantees. Id.
471. See EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 31. See also Treaty of Paris, April
30, 1803, reprinted in MILLER, 2 TREATIES, supra note 16, at 298-505; Treaty of Feb. 22,
1819, reprinted in MILLER, 3 TREATIES, supra note 16, at 3-64.
472. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 511 (1830).
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nation, regard this stipulation as the avowal of a princi-
ple which would have been held equally sacred, though
it had not been inserted in the contract.
The long-established history of the land grant process in the Spanish
provinces should have expedited confirmation for grantees in the
Mexican provinces with little disruption of their rights.474 Specifi-
cally, the language of the California Land Act of 1851, employed so
detrimentally to grantees' interests, derived from earlier French and
Spanish treaties.475 Hence, the potential excuse and assertions of
inexperience in the protection of property rights in a newly acquired
territory fails to explain the dispossession of Chicanas/Chicanos in
the Mexican provinces.
In failing to establish a land claims process that adequately pro-
tected the rights of grantees, the United States generally refused to
acknowledge "that a Mexican grant while under judicial investiga-
tion was not public land open for disposal and sale, but was
reserved territory within the meaning of the law. 476 Rather, shifting
legal norms harmed grantees and established them as outsiders to
Anglo-American law. This outsider status and its root causes remain
the source of continued discontent among Chicanas/Chicanos today.
III. CONTEMPORARY LAND USE AND CHICANA/CHICANO POVERTY
IN THE AGRARIAN DOMAIN
Justice Holmes once declared: "This abstraction called the law
... is a magic mirror [wherein] we see reflected, not only our own
473. Id. at 511-12 ("[T]he relations of the inhabitants of Louisiana to their gov-
ernment is not changed. The new government takes the place of that which has
passed away.")
474. See id. at 86.
475. See MILLER, supra note 16, at 241 ("For Article 9, the Senate amendment was a
new text, adapted from Article 3 of the Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana ... which,
indeed, was the basis of the first paragraph of the article as originally written . .
Section 13 of the California Land Act reads as follows:
[S]aid surveyor-general shall have the same power and authority as
are conferred on the register of the land office and receiver of the
public moneys of Louisiana, by the sixth section of the act "to create
the office of surveyor of the public lands for the State of Louisiana
approved third March, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-one."
§ 13,9 Stat. 631 (1851) (mirroring a provision in the Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana).
For an account of the confirmation of land titles in Louisiana, see Harry L. Coles, Jr., The
Confirmation of Foreign Land Titles in Louisiana, LA. HIST. Q., Oct. 1955, at 1.
476. United States v. McLaughlin, 127 U.S. 428, 454 (1888) (holding that, where a
float had been granted, the United States could dispose of any specific tracts within
the exterior limits of the grant, leaving a sufficient quantity to satisfy the float).
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lives, but the lives of all men that have been!,, 477 "Holmes believed
that this 'magic mirror' offered historians an opportunity to explore
the social choices and moral imperatives of previous generations. 478
While this Article argues that including Chicanas'/Chicanos' rural
experience in legal education enriches our understanding of property
law, this legal experience also provides a basis for understanding their
current economic standing in the rural and agricultural sector. 9 The
magic mirror now shows both that their dispossession was improper
and that agricultural law is replicating the historical alienation of
Chicanas/Chicanos from rural land and policies.
Insofar as legal practices and land use policies privileged the
dominant population, the mirror shows that they also discriminato-
rily determined the distribution of power and benefits.480 Not long
ago, Reis Tijerina and the Alianza in New Mexico revived the land
grant issue and exposed the consequences resulting from land grant
dispossession. 4 1 Currently, discriminatory distribution of agricul-
tural resources excludes Chicanas/Chicanos and invokes Reis
Tijerina's claims for a return of long lost land grants.4 2
Under the federal regulatory framework, farmers in their re-
gions vote on the determination of subsidy awards for their given
477. Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror Law in American History 3 (1989) (quoting
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Speeches of Oliver Wendell Holmes 17 (1891)).
478. Id.
479. In rural areas Chicanas/Chicanos remain primarily as laborers without land
tenure. See generally HISPANIC POPULATION OF U.S. SOUTHWEST, supra note 43. See
generally id. Population figures, however, remain inexact because of the mobility of
agricultural workers during census surveys. See Leslie A. Whitener, A Statistical
Portrait of Hired Farmworkers, 2 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 49 (1994) (explaining that the
nature of seasonal work ensures undercounting of field workers when workers are
not employed on farms during the census-taking period).
480. See supra notes 217-99 for a discussion of this misappropriation.
481. See generally RICHARD GARDNER, REIS TIJERINA AND THE NEW MEXICO LAND
GRANT WAR OF 1967 (1970).
482. See generally HISPANIC POPULATION OF U.S. SOUTHWEST, supra note 43,
(enumerating Chicana/Chicano population in the Southwest); DEVELOPMENT
PROFILE OF RURAL AREAS, supra note 43 (analyzing impoverished rural areas). Chica-
nas/Chicanos have long struggled to be heard in various areas. See ROOTS AND
RESISTANCE: THE EMERGENT WRITINGS OF TWENTY YEARS OF CHICANA FEMINIST
STRUGGLE, HANDBOOK OF HISPANIC CULTURES IN THE UNITED STATES: SOCIOLOGY 175
(Nicolas Kanellos & Claudio Esteva-Fabregat eds., 1994). This required further
litigation to ensure access to public accommodation, see Terrell Wells Swimming
Pool v. Rodriguez, 182 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), and the franchise through
elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests, see White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1983);
GOMEZ-QUII&ONES, supra note 84; JOHN STAPLES SHOCKLEY, CHICANO REVOLT IN A
TEXAS TOWN (1974). Other cases discuss Chicana/Chicano rights to education. See
Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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areas.i At present, Chicanas/Chicanos comprise only 1.7% of rural
landholders" and those without land can neither participate nor
vote on agricultural committees. Land alienation impoverished
them, requiring transformation from land owners to field workers.'
Their labor as fieldworkers consequently renders them ineligible to
participate in the distribution of the federal benefits that accrue to
the agricultural sector!" Long trajectories deriving from the inability
to own land diminish their political standing4'87 and perpetuate dis-
crimination in the administration of farm programs and agricultural
policy 88 Without capital or land Chicana/Chicano farmers cannot
improve their circumstances in a sector where they are largely rele-
gated to subservience for established landowners' personal gain,
and where they do not even benefit from the protections required in
other industries.489
483. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-7.38 (1995).
484. Because the Census identifies rural landowners as Latinas/Latinos, it is
difficult to discern the exact number of Chicana/Chicano landowners holding land.
See generally U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, U.S. DATA
CHARACTERISTICS OF OPERATOR AND TYPE OPERATED BY BLACK AND OTHER RACES,
1992, 1987, AND 1982 (1995). The national total of 12.4 million rural landowners is
dominated by majority-status individuals. Id. During the 1982-87 period, the number
of new farm entrants-those who began operations on their current farm within a
given year of the studied period-averaged about 25,000 fewer people on an annual
basis. See id. at 2-3. Note, however, that these estimates remain imprecise because of
limitations in census data, which do not account for farmers entering and exiting
between the census periods. See sources cited supra note 479. Recently, government
officials have responded to the complaints of those long excluded from accessing
public agricultural programs. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-41,
FARM PROGRAMS: EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF MINORITY FARMERS
(1997) (focusing on minority farmers and reviewing the Farm Service Agency's
efforts to conduct farm programs in an equitable manner).
485. See J.J. Bowden, Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in the Southwest, 8 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 467, 507-12 (1973).
486. Under the federal regulatory framework, farmers in their regions vote on the
determination of subsidy awards for their given areas. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-7.38 (1995).
487. From early in the formation of the United States, the legal rights of fee hold-
ers have permitted access to a wide array of governmental benefits. In the
contemporary period, for example, special tax valuations are available to holders of
rural enterprises. See, e.g., Williamson v. Commissioner, 974 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that special use valuation protects agricultural enterprises and therefore
permits the abeyance of estate taxes). The basis for the special use exemption is to
keep land within the family claiming the exemption. See id. at 1527 (referring to the
legislative history of legislation as promulgated "in the hope of protecting the family
farm"). An ancient property doctrine recognizes these rights as a form of wealth. See
SINGER, supra note 9, at 5 ("Property rights are the legal form of wealth.").
488. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/RCED-97-41, FARM PROGRAMS: EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF MINORITY FARMERS 3-6 (1997) (describing the
FHA's failure to promote farm programs in an equitable manner and noting the
special treatment that non-minority farmers receive).
489. The plight of agricultural workers and their working conditions is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a well-documented discussion, see DENNIS NOoN
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The historical link between land and power is no secret. Paul
Taylor writes that "[a] land policy means social control over one of
the greatest instruments of production." 490 Agriculture "occupies
nearly two-thirds of the private land in the United States, 878 million
acres."491 Yet, since the country's earliest periods, property has re-
mained "concentrated in very few hands. 4 9 ' Examinations of the
sector by Taylor and others demonstrate that public laws, including
homestead laws,493 grazing rights legislation, and a vast array of
labor legislation,495 have long promoted access to the public domain
and provided protection for private economic gain.496 These and simi-
VALDtS, AL NORTE: AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 1917-1970
(1991). Agricultural workers' status contrasts with public law benefiting the eco-
nomic status of some farm actors. See, e.g., Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, 7
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2305 (1967) (authorizing individual farm owners to join together to
market their products); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1985) (recognizing the labor of
farm owners). For an overview of the problems of employing field workers in light
of conflicting laws, see generally PHILIP L. MARTIN, HARVEST OF CONFUSION,
MEXICAN WORKERS IN U.S. AGRICULTURE (1988) (examining issues related to migrant
farmworkers); David M. Saxowsky et al., Employing Migrant Agricultural Workers:
Overcoming the Challenge of Complying with Employment Laws, 69 N. DAK. L. REV. 307
(1993).
490. Paul S. Taylor, Public Policy and the Shaping of a Rural Society, 20 S.D. L. REV.
475, 481 (1975).
491. Gene Wunderlich, Agricultural Landownership and the Real Property Tax, in
LAND OWNERSHIP AND TAXATION IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 3, 3 (Wunderlich ed.
1993) ("ownership of agricultural land is unevenly distributed among 3 million
owners" employing an ad hoc policy as to "who will use the land and how and when
it will be used"). The author provides a detailed study on ownership, tenure, and
taxation to analyze how "land is used, valued, transferred, and held in agriculture
and the rural economy." Id.
492. Thomas Jefferson wrote that "property of this country is absolutely concen-
trated in very few hands." Letter to James Madison, October 28, 1785, in BASIC
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1944). Charles Geisler is one
of many scholars linking the absence of land tenure with poverty. See Geisler, infra
note 472; see also Wunderich, supra note 491, at 4-5 (describing major American
landholders and their holdings). Reis Tijerina and others have called for a return of
misappropriated land to Chicanas/Chicanos. See GARDNER, supra note 481, at 30-47.
493. See supra notes 413-16.
494. See Frank J. Falen & Karen Budd-Falen, The Right to Graze Livestock on the
Federal Lands: The Historical Development of Western Grazing Rights, 30 IDAHO L. REV.
505 (1993-1994).
495. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1973) (denying
farmworkers the right to organize and bargain collectively on the federal level);
Mark Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in
the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987); see also ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF
LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY 106 (1964) (referencing Carey McWilliams's
"Great Exception" model meaning that agribusiness is excepted from "common
principles of social legislation" and "the basic tenets of free enterprise").
496. The true economic value of land use is seen through its exploitation by
private parties who access America's natural resources without paying true market
value for this privilege. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING. OFFICE, GAO/RCED-
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lar policies ensure the growth of large-scale rural enterprises, which
threaten smaller owner-operators.497 The growth of production con-
tracts498  and large-scale enterprises are vertically integrating
agricultural enterprises while imposing costs to the diversity of the
49rural sector. Within the agricultural industry, historical and pres-
ent structural conditions result from the cultural biases of those
responsible for determining property rights and agricultural policy,
and preclude Chicanas/Chicanos from farm ownership.1
97-16, U.S. FOREST SERVICE: FEES FOR RECREATION SPECIAL-USE PERMITS Do NOT
REFLECT FAIR MARKET VALUE, (DEC. 20, 1996).
497. See Dennis Pollock, Heritage of Family Farm Lost in Courts, FRESNO BEE, July
28, 1996, at Cl; James Walsh, Agricultural Model or Menace? Corporate Farms Taking
Hold in the Hog Industry, STAR TR1B., Nov. 6, 1995, at Al. The agricultural census
designates a farm as any place that sold or normally would have sold $1000 or more
of agricultural products during the census year. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 22 (1995). The agricultural census
counted a total of 1.93 million farms in the U.S. in 1992, down from 2.09 million in
1987. Id.
498. Keith Haroldson explains contract farming:
Under the traditional livestock production process, the livestock
owner fed and cared for the livestock throughout the growing period.
Contract feeding arrangements split this process. Under contract
feeding, a livestock owner enters into a care and feeding agreement
with a production facility or feedlot owner. Typically, the feedlot
owner will furnish facilities and labor in exchange for payment by
the livestock owner for the livestock's care and feeding. Such pay-
ment is usually made after care and feeding is rendered. The parties
often include specific terms indicting who will bear production costs
such as feed, medication, and utilities.
Keith D. Haroldson, Two Issues in Corporate Agriculture: Anticorporate Farming Statutes
and Production Contracts, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 393, 412 (1992); see also Chris Anderson,
Expert Sees Farms Without Farmers, THE PANTAGRAPH, Jan. 11, 1995, at Dl (growth of
agriculture as an industry promoting enterprises without farmers).
499. Vertical integration occurs "[wihen a company involved in one phase of a
business absorbs or joins a company involved in another phase in order to guarantee
a supplier or a customer." Haroldson, supra note 498, at 410 (citing DAVID J.
RACHMAN & MICHAEL H. MESCON, BUSINESS TODAY 37 (2d ed. 1979)). Professor Fred
Morrison's description of vertical integration is one "in which individual farms
would disappear or become mere operating units of large, integrated agribusinesses,
which owned the means of production and controlled agriculture from the planting
of the seed to the marketing of the processed product." Fred L. Morrison, State Corpo-
rate Farm Legislation, 7.U. TOL. L. REV. 961, 992-97 (1976).
500. Every five years, since the New Deal, Congress promulgates a new farm bill
that defines the agricultural agenda for the next five-year period. See infra note 523.
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A. A Potential Alternative
"Land is basic to the individual, community, the nation, and the
world," 0 1 and requires new forms of land ownership that equally
distribute the social and political benefits attached to land owner-
ship. 5 2 With holdings of 690 million acres or 30 percent of the
existing area, the "principal landowner ... in terms of area is the
United States."m Several vast areas, previously comprising the for-
mer Mexican provinces, include national forests under the
management of federal officials, who are leasing public lands to
private interests for personal economic gain. °4 Redistribution of
public land to rural Chicanas/Chicanos would arrest their continued
alienation from the agrarian domain or rural landownership. 0 5
A program of land redistribution presents additional beneficial
effects. First, it raises the potential of easing Chicanas/Chicanos into
the realm of rural politics and allows them access to the economic
benefits stemming from federal legislation. Second, it provides ac-
cess to agricultural laws and the policy-making process as a whole,
thereby easing the ongoing impoverishment of rural Chicana/
Chicanos. Third, redistribution would promote the independent
status of individual agricultural operations, a long recognized goal
in the agricultural sector.'06 Finally, a deliberately structured land
use policy would operate as a check against the despoliation of the
public domain.
The extra-legal coercion and legal slight-of-hand of the dispos-
session of Mexican grantees 7 allowed agricultural entrepreneurs to
engage in widespread activities that caused "[elcological destruc-
tion.""5 8 One author contends that heavy grazing, extensive cutting of
timber, and draining of underground water increased with annexa-
501. Public Interest in the Use of Public Lands: An Overview, in PUBLIC INTEREST IN
THE USE OF PRIVATE LANDS 1, 1 (Benjamin C. Dysart III & Marion Clawson eds.,
1989).
502. See TAYLOR, supra note 449, at 485. For a twentieth century urban focus, see
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (allowing the
use of eminent domain power to transfer wealth from an ethnic neighborhood to
General Motors).
503. Wunderlich, supra note 491, at 4.
504. See EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS, supra note 19, at 171 (discussing the former Mexi-
can land owners of the present-day Santa Fe National Forest); see also infra note 532.
505. Presently, Mexican landowners are attempting to receive compensation for
their dispossession from their property interests. See, e.g., Alliance of Descendants of
Tex. Land Grants v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 837 (1993) (holding that the applicable
statue of limitations precluded a remedy).
506. See, e.g., Farmland Protection Policy Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4209 (1988).
507. See supra Part II.
508. DUNBAR ORTIZ, supra note 80, at 106.
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tion and induced soil erosion.' Flooding caused similar results by
causing silt deposits and creating swamp-like conditions.
In addition, snow and rain runoff, which at one time provided
the valley with essential moisture for planting, later cut erosion
trenches some three hundred feet wide and thirty feet deep.
"Shallow drainage depressions which had helped to spread runoff
evenly were replaced by arroyos, which rather than spreading the




The total amount of irrigated land declined in the valley after 1880,
from 125,000 acres to 50,000 acres in 1896.51 Prior to 1880, the land-
scape of the Middle Rio Grande Valley was covered by grass from
four to eight feet tall, but by the late nineteenth century, only
patches of grass remained.5 2 Intensified commercialization exacted
greater demands on land and the process was repeated in other
areas of the country with ramifications that continue. 13
As Eric Freyfogle asserts,
Good land use is best understood as an art, tailored to
the uniqueness of each place and sensitive to the possi-
bilities and limits set by nature. One does not learn this
kind of land use from a book or in a school. It arises of-
ten from experience, from the lessons learned over
time. 514
Chicanas/Chicanos come from a long history of eijidos (small farm-
ing communities) 5 and retain a history of employing alternative
509. For example, according to that author, draining of the watershed caused the
"abandonment of a great deal of irrigable land in the Middle Rio Grande Valley." Id.
510. Id.
511. Id. (discussing the amount of land that actually was irrigated).
512. Id.
513. See, e.g., Gerald Torres, Race, Class, and Environmental Regulation, Introduction:
Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839, 841 (1992) (discussing
ecological destruction and environmental racism in areas where Chicanas/Chicanos
reside). For analyses of the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) on the environment in the Southwest, see Theresa L. Byrd et al., Variation
in Environmental Risk Perceptions and Information Sources Among Three Communities in
El Paso, 8 RISK, HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT 355 (1997) (discussing environ-
mental problems and linkages with NAFTA); David W. Eaton, NAFTA and the
Environment: A Proposal For Free Trade In Hazardous Waste Between the United States
and Mexico, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 715, 717 (1996) (analyzing NAFTA and its influence on
hazardous waste disposal); Elizabeth A. Ellis, Bordering on Disaster: A New Attempt to
Control the Transboundary Effects of Maquiladora Pollution, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 621, 626
(1996) (analyzing NAFTA's effects on environmental cooperation).
514. Eric, T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631,
654 (1996).
515. For litigation involving an eijido, see State v. Gallardo, 135 S.W. 664, 667 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1911), where the land in controversy was designated as "Los Ejidos de
Reynosa."
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agricultural techniques. Earlier rural enterprises demanded alterna-
tive forms of land use that included organic and sustainable forms of
agriculture and were sensitive to the bioregions of a community. 516 If
adherence to such practices were to be attached to grants as condi-
tions subsequent, releasing federal land would promote sustainable
agricultural practices. 17
Effective distribution, nonetheless, depends on establishing
land trusts to offset the enormous costs of initiating an agricultural
enterprise. Access to the agrarian political process is consistent with
the balance of power John Adams advocated:
The balance of power in a society accompanies the bal-
ance of property and land .... If the multitude is
possessed of real estate, the multitude will have the bal-
ance of power and, in that case, the multitude will take
care of the liberty, virtue, and interest of the multitude# . 511
in all acts of government.
Targeting newer forms of land use would enable economic
growth to counter the decay of rural areas, protect rural areas tar-
geted for development, provide a tax base, and permit access to
agricultural committees in their given areas. 19 While these commit-
tees conceivably were not designed specifically to exclude
Chicanas/Chicanos from participation, Chicanas/Chicanos' absence
as landowners bars them from participating in defining the agricul-
tural agenda.520
Preventing public law from concentrating land into the hands
of a few requires redirecting agricultural law and policy to reflect
the wide variety comprised within the nation's diverse history. The
costs of current agricultural legislation, in protecting and increasing
the existing wealth of corporate ownership, are not limited to the
present, but also extend into the future. Available data demonstrates
the consolidation of the country's natural resources in the hands of
516. See Arrellano, supra note 93, at 32 (discussing bioregionalism and Mexican
grantees).
517. A wealth of information concerning alternative forms of sustainable agri-
culture exists. See generally, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-42,
CONSERVE RESERVE PROGRAM, ALTERNATIVE AVAILABLE FOR MANAGING ENVI-
RONMENTALLY SENSITIVE CROPLAND (1995); DEVON PENA, AGROECOLOGY OF A
CHICANO FAMILY FARM (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
518. Charles C. Geisler, Land and Poverty in the United States, Insights and Over-
sights, 71 LAND ECON. 16, 17 (1995) (quoting John Adams, 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 376-77 (C.F. Adams, ed. 1969).
519. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-7.38 (1995). These implementing regulations provide
details as to the eligibility and compliance of federal recipients.
520. If people do not own land in their areas they cannot sit on those committees
and thus cannot vote. Id.
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corporations and indicates likely implications of that phenomenon
for domestic policy and international trade."' Oligopolistic control
over the production of food suggests that independent agricultural
operations are losing their autonomy to corporate agriculture, and
raises critical questions as to who governs the country's natural
522
resources.
Every five years Congress enacts a new farm bill and, combined
with the federal regulatory structure, purports to encourage diver-
sity of small land ownership status. 2 The proposed process would
not only redirect inquiries over whether land monopolies are re-
placing the individual owner-operator in the United States, but
would also diversify the rural economy.
Presently, Holmes's magic mirror does not reveal detailed in-
vestigations promoting Chicanas/Chicanos as a focus of study,
encourage legal academic inquiry, or yield more conscious policies
to deter skewed land tenure. Agricultural economist, Lawrence
Libby, argues that present agricultural law must critically consider
the evolving data regarding the implications and future ramifica-
tions of the policies underlying larger growth of the sector.524 Gene
Wunderlich, moreover, asserts that "public and private interests
should be examined as supporting dimensions of an integrated
property system ... [and] an effective, just, and efficient property
system requires better, and possibly more accessible land informa-
521. John H. Davis, who is credited with coining the term "agribusiness," defines
it as the sum total of all operations involved in the manufacture and distribution of
farm supplies; production operations on the farm; and the storage, processing, and
distribution of farm commodities and items made from them. JOHN H. DAVIS & RAY
GOLDBERG, A CONCEPT OF AGRIBUSINESS 2 (1957), cited in Jim Chen, A Sober Second
Look at Appellations of Origin: How the United States Will Crash France's Wine and Cheese
Party, 5 MINN. J. OF GLOBAL TRADE 29 n.31. (1996).
522. See Neil Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Owner-
ship of Plant Genetic Resources, 28 TULSA L.J. 587 (1993); see also Harold F. Breimyer,
The New Deal and Its Legacy: Agricultural Philosophies and Policy in the New Deal, 68
MINN. L. REV. 333 (1994) (describing how the New Deal's agricultural policies were
designed within and have promoted a commercial conception of agricultural enter-
prise). In 1992 the farm sector accounted for $85.6 billion of the Gross Domestic
Product. STATUS OF THE FARM SECTOR, supra note 73, at 6-7; see also Donald B. Peder-
sen, Introduction to the Agricultural Law Symposium, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 401, 404
n.24 (1990) ("Agriculture has been and remains the nation's most significant industry
with special needs and with its own set of interest groups.")
523. See, e.g., Federal Agricultural Improvement Act of 1996, H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
2854 (1996). During that time Congress hears testimony from farming advocates and
others. The 1996 Farm Bill provides for a new three-year "Fund for Rural America."
See 7 U.S.C. § 2240 (1996).
524. Lawrence Libby, Farmland Protection, Northern Illinois University, Envi-
ronmental Law Conference, Mar. 27, 1997, DeKalb, Illinois (averring that the present
lack of data relating the consequences of agricultural policies to their potential im-
pact on the future encompasses risks that are too great to ignore).
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tion.' 252 Accordingly, this section advocates access to land for Chica-
nas/Chicanos who, without the land tenure from which they have
long been excluded, are kept from obtaining public benefits ex-
tended to the agricultural sector. 26
CONCLUSION
The law knows no finer hour than when it cuts through for-
mal concepts and transitory emotions to protect unpopular
527citizens against discrimination and persecution.
From the time the Founders signed the United States Constitution
to the present, considerations of race have governed the agricultural
agenda and the resulting control of the nation's natural resources.525
The counter-story presented here reveals that throughout most of
American legal history, biased interpretations of the law created a
system that dispossessed and disenfranchised individuals of Mexi-
can background.529 Moreover, Constitutional directives protecting
525. Wunderlich, supra note 491, at 3.
526. This Article does not recommend the wholesale distribution of land. Nor
does it support access to public land without incentives to ensure sustainable devel-
opment and/or alternative sustainable agricultural enterprises. For examples of the
types of sustainable practices advocated, see generally DEVON PE1A, CULTURAL
LANDSCAPES AND BIODIVERSITY: THE ETHNOECOLOGY OF A WATERSHED COMMONS
(1995).
527. Falbo v. United States, 329 U.S. 549, 561 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
528. Conquest ideology helps to explain how law was used as a tool to racialize
grantees, marginalizing them in ways that continue to affect race relations today. As
Immanuel Wallerstein has demonstrated, the ideology of the conqueror systemati-
cally facilitates and sustains inequality between conquering and subject peoples.
Immanuel Wallerstein, Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-
System, in GLOBAL CULTURE, NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY, 31-55
(Mike Featherstone ed., 1990). In Johnson v. M 'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823), for
example, the Court held the doctrine of conquest permitted control over the coun-
try's natural resources. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. In reaching its decision,
the Court relied on a heavily racialized notion of "industry" that privileged the land
use practices of Europeans over Native peoples. See id.; see also Joseph Singer, Prop-
erty and Sovereignty, 86 N.W. U. L. REV. 1, 42 nn.167-68, 52 n.178 (1991) (discussing
the use of the notion of conquest and racial hierarchy in the Court's decision mak-
ing).
529. This Article introduced several key issues dominating land grant law. Yet
other counter-stories involve whether or not the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ap-
plied to island and seacoast property. Commentators suggest that Mexico did not
intend to transfer the property to the United States after the Conquest. See United
States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1986). In Ringrose, the court
discussed the status of coastal islands under the treaty in the following terms: "The
California coastal islands are not explicitly mentioned. The absence of any specific
reference in the treaty to the islands is explained by the fact that the treaty drafters
were primarily concerned with the latitudinal boundary between the two countries."
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property rights were held hostage to the whims of the interpreters of
law. Alienated from their property, Chicanas/Chicanos were treated
as foreigners and disallowed full citizenship status.' 3i In the aggregate,
their stories present complex analytical issues. The governmental
practices involved in their dispossession played a significant role in
determining their current economic status in ways that are difficult
to reconcile with present understandings in property law.
This Article began with the observation that Chicanas/Chicanos
have long held an invisible status within the study of law. While
scholars outside of legal academia continue to ascribe the alienation
of grantees from their property interests to various causes, land
dispossession and its origins remain excluded from legal scholar-
ship. By exploring the application of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo to the claims of Mexican land grantees, this Article urges
continued study of Chicana/Chicano legal history to offset
Id. at 643. The court relied on a historian's interpretation of the issue: "In the treaty,
as a matter of fact, the territory ceded is not mentioned." J. N. Bowman, The Question
of Sovereignty over California's Off-Shore Islands, 31 PAC. HIST. REV. 291, 295 (1962)
quoted in Ringrose, 788 F.2d at 643. Bowman adds, however, that "[tihe territorial
consequences were well understood at the time.... Neither the United States nor
Mexico has ever contested [the inclusion of the islands as part of California]....
[Tihere seems never to have been uncertainty of intent or understanding as to the
side of the line on which they lay." Bowman, supra.
Yet, Mexico took a stance against cessation, arguing that the islands remained
the territories of the Mexican Republic, while the United States argued the contrary.
Id. at 291. The United States relied on a narrow interpretation of a Mexican law that
required government approval for any colonization within 20 leagues of a national
boundary or within 10 leagues of the seacoast: "There can not be colonized any lands
comprehended within twenty leagues of the limits of any foreign nation, nor within
ten leagues of the coasts, without the previous approbation of the General Supreme
Executive power." Translation Respecting Colonization, art. IV, supra note 74. The
United States did not consider island property conveyable to private parties because
it was used for national defense purposes by Mexican authorities. See United States
v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472 (1921) (reporting that off-shore lands were used
for defense purposes). The United States therefore claimed ownership of the dis-
puted territory. This form of reasoning permitted challenges to the grantee seeking
confirmation of land located near seacoasts. See Dominguez de Guyer v. Banning,
167 U.S. 723, 724 (1897) (action in ejectment to recover possession of Mormon Island
"in the inner bay at San Pedro, Cal."); United States v. Polack, 27 F. Cas. 580 (N.D.
Cal. 1857) (No. 16,061) (involving claim on Yerba Buena island in San Francisco Bay);
United States v. Limantour, 26 F. Cas. 947 (N.D. Cal. 1858) (No. 15,601) (involving
islands of Los Farallones, Alcatraz, and Yerba Buena). For examples of an expediente
referencing island property of an original grantee, see Bouldin v. Phelps, 30 F. 547
(1887), which discusses the expediente of Victor Costra for land on an island. See also
United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472 (1921) (reporting that off-shore lands
were used for defense purposes); United States v. Polack, 27 F. Cas. 580 (N.D. Cal.
1857) (No. 16,061) (claim by Joel S. Polack and others, tracing title to original grantor
1838 award to Juan Jose Castro of "islands on the coast in private ownership").
530. See WEBER, supra note 454, at 177-99; DE LEON, supra note 410, at 105; Nancy
Cervantes et al., Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles in the Aftermath of Proposition 187, 17
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1995).
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simplistic readings of the country's historical past, 1 promote greater
intellectual exercise for students, and help diminish Chicanas'/
Chicanos' subordinate legal status.
The Treaty remains a living document that prescribes a legal
relationship with individuals of Mexican descent. As part of the
federal law, it provides a means to remedy the long history of dis-
crimination against Chicanas/Chicanos in the agricultural sector.
532
The task of the contemporary legislative and judicial actor is to use
the Treaty to reverse past biases and unjust dispossession, and en-
sure equal application of the laws for the country's diverse citizens,
so that the tragedies of this story remain part of the past.
531. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 46, at 9.
532. As negotiated and written, the Treaty does not contain an ending date and,
therefore, remains a living document. This fact is important to current litigation and
those seeking to obtain some remedy for the unlawful taking of Chicana/Chicano
property interests. See, e.g., Alliance of Descendants of Tex. Land Grants v. United
States, 27 Fed. Cl. 837 (1993) (heirs and successors to recipients of 433 land grants
sought compensation from the United States for taking approximately 12 million
acres of land without compensation); Sam Howe Verhovek, South Texas Families'
Land Fight A Battle for the Ages, FT. WORTH-STAR-TELEGRAPH, July 20, 1997, at 57.
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